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ABSTRACT
In this Article, the authors provide a case study of heavy-duty diesel
engine regulation under the Clean Air Act, which reveals how the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) chooses various means of
regulation at different times. The Article relates the EPA's choices to the
incentives the agency faces. The Article also shows how the different
forms of regulatory activity influence agency regulations. Finally, the
Article concludes with a critique of regulation-by-litigation as a means of
imposing substantive rules.
INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies in the United States traditionally have carried
out their regulatory duties by issuing regulations that inform regulated
entities how they must conduct various aspects of their business.' For
1. We use the term "regulation-by-rulemaking" to mean the kind of regulation that is
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example, the Environmental Protection Agency issues rules that describe
what sort of pollution control equipment must be attached to particular
types of industrial equipment (e.g., "scrubbers" on coal-fired power plant
smokestacks) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) issues rules that specify safety measures employers must take in
their facilities. The agencies issue these regulations through a process in
which the regulated entities and other interest groups have the opportunity
to comment on proposals, 2 to seek judicial review of the agencies'
procedures and compliance with the statutory framework created by the
legislature, and to seek action by the political branches to alter the
agencies' actions.3
Recently a new form of regulatory activity has appeared: imposing
regulatory measures through litigation. In 1998 the attorneys general of 46
states signed a $246 billion settlement with the tobacco industry that
specified, among other things, how the firms would market their products.4
Also in 1998, the major producers of heavy-duty diesel engines signed a $1
billion settlement with the EPA, which specifies when and how the
industry will regulate nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. The EPA-the
most aggressive federal regulator through litigation-has also used
litigation to impose substantive regulatory provisions on major refinery
operators, 5 electric utilities,6 and wood product firms.7 In each case, the
associated with official notices of rulemaking, public comments, and final notices of rules.
At the federal level, this procedure is constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act and
other statutes and regulations. At the state government level, administrative rulemaking
procedures vary from state-to-state but include elements of notice and public comment that
allow for the rules of due process to be met. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:
State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551 (2001)
(describing institutional reasons for differences in federal and state rule making) (citing
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 297
(1986) (describing relationship between federal and model state administrative procedure
acts)).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
3. The OSHA's ergonomic regulations, for example, were overturned by
congressional action under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2000). See
Kelli L. Dutrow, Comment, Working At Home At Your Own Risk: Employer Liability For
Teleworkers Under The Occupational Safety And Health Act Of 1970, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
955, 958 (2002) (noting that first use of act was to overturn ergonomics rule).
4. See Master Settlement Agreement, available at http://www.naag.org/upload/103246
8605cigmsa.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2003), at 18-36 (describing restrictions on defendants'
behavior agreed to as part of the settlement).
5. See J. Hill, Consider New Refinery Compliance Standards Now Being Set Through
Litigation Actions, 82(8) HYDROCARBON PROCESSING 76 (2002) [2002 WL 18661916]
("Recently, enforcement actions against several petroleum refiners have made them subject
to additional standards and regulatory supervision without the typical rule-making
process.").
6. See US, Power Plant Settle Up, 50(222) THE OIL DAILY (2000) [2000 WL
23421073] (noting suits against seventeen utilities).
7. See Brent Hunsberger, Boise Cascade Will Settle Suit with Government Over Clean
Air Act, THE OREGONIAN (Mar. 14, 2002) [2002 WL 17180641] (noting settlements with
five wood products companies).
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firms involved have paid or expect to pay huge fines and accepted new
regulations as part of a settlement of litigation.8 They have been regulated
by litigation. 9
Regulation-by-litigation replaces notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures with litigation in creating a substantive rule of behavior for
regulated entities. It substitutes a complaint in a legal action for a notice of
proposed rulemaking, courtroom proceedings and closed settlement
negotiations for an agency public proceeding, the rules of evidence for the
open rulemaking record, and a limited list of parties largely chosen by the
agency for open access public participation. It changes the function of
appellate review of agency action, shifting the appeals court to review of
the terms of a settlement rather than the agency's compliance with the
substantive law the agency is charged with enforcing, and eliminates
challenges to the agency's compliance with the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)10 as a basis for review. As a result, public participation is
limited, oversight of agency action by Congress is reduced, and agencies
can operate outside the statutory restrictions imposed upon them by
8. See Hunsberger, supra note 7 (noting fines from $1.3 million to $11 million and
required environmental spending up to $17.9 million for wood products firms); Hill, supra
note 5 (noting $600 million per individual refinery in additional costs); US, Power Plant
Settle Up, supra note 6 (noting $1.2 billion spending required under settlement with a single
utility). Of course, these estimates may overestimate the impact, as settlements routinely
include spending on mitigation efforts that are not the result of new regulatory requirements,
since it is the EPA's interest to announce as large a fine as possible. Id.
9. As we use the term, we intend for "regulation-by-litigation" to be used to describe
those situations where suits are brought by government organizations against private parties
for the purpose of regulating the private parties' behavior in ways that could be
accomplished by regulation-by-rulemaking but have not been. Our definition is different
than some commentators have used in the past. For example, the Center for Regulatory
Effectiveness described a process that fits the tobacco industry suits and settlement, but not
some other regulation-by-litigation episodes. See THE CTR. FOR REGULATORY
EFFECTIVENESS, REGULATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION-THE SMITHFIELD HAMS
LAWSUIT AS AN ESCALATION OF AN EXISTING TREND, at http://www.thecre.com/rebbylit/
private20011220.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002). The CRE description focused on
instances where government officials used private litigators to circumvent the unwillingness
of legislatures to allow the officials to regulate as they wished. The CRE thus included in its
defining characteristics that if a government office "determines that it can circumvent the
lack of legislative authorization, it will work with private trial attorneys to prosecute
lawsuits that would coerce the industry into complying with the agency's goals" and that
"plaintiffs and their government sponsors openly acknowledge that a key goal in filing the
law suit is to achieve a stated policy or regulatory goal (e.g., forcing gun manufacturers to
install "trigger locks" in all guns)." Id. Similarly, Professor Viscusi edited a volume of case
studies of regulation-by-litigation that defined the process more broadly than we do,
including instances in which private litigation over alleged harms sparked regulatory action
such as the breast implant litigation in the 1980s and 1990s and ongoing asbestos litigation.
See W. KIP VISCUSI, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 3 (W. Kip Viscusi ed.,
2002) ("If, however, regulations do not exist for a product, litigation can often help address
gaps in the regulatory structure and stimulate regulatory activity."). We do not include these
within our definition because the agency must still choose a means of imposing regulations
once the private litigation has inspired it to fill a gap and may proceed to impose substantive
rules in any of the variety of ways we describe in this Article.
10. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2000).
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Congress. Regulation-by-litigation is thus a means of imposing substantive
regulatory provisions on regulated entities without the public participation
and the checks and balances of the rulemaking process."1
In this Article, we describe and analyze the rise of regulation-by-
litigation through a case study of the regulation of heavy duty diesel
engines. Over time, the EPA has regulated the manufacture of heavy-duty
diesel engines through traditional rulemaking, through negotiated
rulemaking, and through litigation, offering a chance to compare how the
regulatory process handles similar issues under each method. 2 We
conclude that regulation-by-litigation is a major new form of government
action, offering significant advantages to politicians and regulators but that
are outweighed by its disadvantages to the public and regulated entities.
Because of its advantages for bureaucrats and politicians, however,
regulation-by-litigation is likely to play an increasingly important role in
the regulatory landscape in the future unless elected officials (and their
appointees) and courts take action to limit agencies' use of it.
The first part of this Article sets the stage for our case study by
examining how the Clean Air Act and administrative law constrained the
EPA's regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines and describing the
incentives the Clean Air Act provides for the agency to act in particular
ways. The second part examines how diesel technology affects regulatory
choices. The third part uses the first two to explain the regulatory history
of heavy duty diesel engines. Our conclusion then assesses the use of
litigation to regulate.
I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CONTEXT
To understand the story of heavy-duty diesel emissions regulation, we
must place the regulations in the context of the Clean Air Act, the Statute
that frames the regulatory environment within which the EPA's regulatory
choices were made. The Clean Air Act both requires the EPA to act and
constrains how the EPA may act. Six features of the Clean Air Act are
critical to understanding the EPA's choices in the heavy-duty diesel engine
regulations: the state-federal division of authority; the growth in NOx
emissions; the mobile-stationary source distinction; the EPA's reliance on
modeling; technology-forcing; and reliance on fleet turnover.
11. See Viscusi, supra note 9, at 1 ("The policies that result from litigation almost
invariably involve less public input and accountability than government regulation.").
12. Our analysis thus attempts to respond to the call by Professor Gary Schwartz for
taking regulation-by-negotiation into account in explaining regulation-by-litigation. See
Gary T. Schwartz, Comment, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 348, at 350 (W. Kip
Viscusi ed., 2002).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
A. The State-Federal Division ofAuthority
Starting in 1970 the Clean Air Act required the EPA to establish
"national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards" (NAAQS)
for pollutants that endanger public health or welfare.' 3  The EPA has
established NAAQS for CO, SO 2, particulates, NO., ozone, and lead.14
Once the EPA established the NAAQS, the states were required to develop
a "state implementation plan" (SIP) describing how each would ensure air
quality met the NAAQS within its borders. 15 This plan must then be
regularly updated to take into account new sources, changed conditions,
and newer data. 16  For our purposes, what is important is that the total
emissions from all sources within a state must not cause air quality to fall
below the relevant EPA-set NAAQS-if air quality deteriorates below
NAAQS for any pollutant, a region becomes a nonattainment area for that
pollutant.' 7 The full range of Clean Air Act penalties against states with
nonattainment regions 8 include increased federal regulation, preclusion of
new sources, 19 and loss of federal highway funds.20  These threaten to
dampen economic growth in the state, so states strive to avoid the penalties.
Although the EPA has been reluctant to impose the more drastic penalties,
there are negative consequences to nonattainment status short of an
economic death sentence that the EPA is willing to impose. 2' In short,
states must keep the total emissions from all sources, including natural
sources and population growth, to a level that ensures the NAAQS are
met.22 If air quality falls below the NAAQS, states must have a plan to
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2000).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (2003).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2000). For an overview of the SIP process, see Andrew P.
Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM, GOING
BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000) [hereinafter Morriss,
Politics].
16. See id. at 271 ("SIPs are in a constant state of flux.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
18. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 210 (2d ed. 1994) (describing
failure of the EPA to invoke full penalties). The EPA's similarly drastic authority to shut
down the automobile industry has also not been used, and some evidence exists that it was
never intended to be used. See David P. Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean
Air Act, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 818 (1979) [hereinafter Mobile-Source].
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2000) (describing penalties, including requirement of increased
offsets, for nonattainment areas). There are other negative consequences as well. See
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the
Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1479 (1996) ("The amount of emissions necessary to
qualify as a major source drops for ozone nonattainment areas classified as serious ....
This has the effect of expanding the number of stationary sources subject to the more
stringent emission limitations imposed on major sources.") [hereinafter Reitze, I&M].
20. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 210 (stating that an original consequence of
nonattainment was to be "a shutdown of industrial growth in many parts of the nation").
21. See Reitze, I&M, supra note 19, at 1477-81 (describing actions required in
nonattainment areas); see also RODGERS, supra note 18, at 215-21 (same).
22. There are also "significant deterioration" requirements to prevent cleaner areas
where air quality exceeds the NAAQS from polluting more to reduce air quality to the levels
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reduce emissions so that air quality is improved until it meets the NAAQS.
Imposing penalties is also politically costly for the EPA, since the sanctions
are unpopular in the target states. The EPA will therefore prefer to avoid
invoking sanctions, particularly against a large number of states who might
jointly be able to persuade Congress to override the EPA.
B. Growth in NO Emissions
NO, is the one EPA-criteria-related pollutant whose emissions continue
to grow in spite of extraordinary efforts made to control it. 23 In part this is
because those efforts were slow to begin-ozone-control efforts initially
focused on hydrocarbons rather than NOx.24 NOx emissions have grown
over time, 25 in part because diesel's share of fuel consumed has grown and
because fuel usage has increased.26 As a result, ozone control strategies
built around NOx reduction "must pay greater attention to reducing NOx
from heavy-duty sources. 27 (As discussed below, sometimes reductions
lead to NOx increased ozone levels.)28 The turning point in NOx nationally
occurred in the late 1980s, with total emissions trending upward.2 9 These
trends are expected to continue.
30
NOx emissions are a precursor to ozone, 31 and ozone levels were so large
required by the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7470 et seq. (2000). For a discussion of the
current issues surrounding the NAAQS, see William F. Pedersen, Science and Public
Policy: New Ambient Air Quality Standards Under the Clean Air Act, 16 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 15 (1999). Their qualitative impact is similar to the NAAQS/nonattainment dynamic,
however, so we need not consider further the additional levels of complexity they introduce.
Id.
23. LARRY B. PARKER & JOHN E. BLODGEITr, AIR QUALITY AND ELECTRICITY:
INITIATIVES TO INCREASE POLLUTION CONTROLS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2002); New Source
Review: Refining "Routine Maintenance" Definition Considered in Program Reform,
Official Says, ENV'T REp., Jan. 5, 2001, at 34.
24. Russell Clemings, Dirty Diesels Face Regulations, THE FRESNO BEE, Dec. 15, 2002,
at 20.
25. American Lung Association, State of the Air: 2003 17 (2003) (noting NO,
emissions up 17% since 1970).
26. R.F. Sawyer et al., Mobile Sources Critical Review: 1998 NARSTO Assessment, 34
ATMOSPHERIC ENv'T 2161, 2162-63 (2000); Alan C. Lloyd & Thomas A. Cackette, Diesel
Engines: Environmental Impact and Control, 51 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASs'N 809, 811
(2001) (indicating that NO, emissions for heavy-duty non-road vehicles decreased in late
1980s but "during the 1990s, the increasing numbers of diesel vehicles and mileage traveled
countered reductions from individual vehicles").
27. Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2179.
28. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
29. Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 812, Fig. 4a.
30. Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2162-63; K.G. Duleep, Keep on Truckin
Sustainably?, in TRANSPORTATION, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT: How FAR CAN TECHNOLOGY
TAKE Us? 193 (John DeCicco & Mark Delucchi eds., 1997) (noting estimates that "fuel
consumption will grow by 29 to 42 percent by 2015").
31. Ozone is a form of oxygen, 03, which has been linked to a number of health and
environmental issues. For more information, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Ground Level Ozone (03), 1997 Summary Report, at
http://www.epa.gov/air/aqtrnd97/brochure/ o3.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004); AM. LUNG
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in the 1980s that a major region of the northeastern United States was
declared "nonattainment" with respect to the ozone standard.32 Because of
this declaration, a group of northeastern states first sought a NO, SIP call
for revisions 33 and then petitioned the EPA to limit the NO, emissions from
upwind states through "[s]ection 126" petitions.34 The northeastern,
downwind states argued that, based on prevailing wind patterns, upwind
states' NOx emissions made their way to the northeast and so affected the
downwind states' abilities to meet the NOx NAAQS. In effect, the
downwind states argued that the upwind states were exporting the impact
of their NOx emissions to the downwind states, reducing the NOx
emissions possible in the downwind states if they were to meet the NAAQS
requirements for their area. The EPA ordered the downwind states to
revise their air quality control plans in order to reduce the level of
uncontrolled and controlled NO, emissions and also searched for ways to
procure significant NOx emission reductions in upwind areas, including
seeking to reduce mobile source NO, emissions.35 Obtaining sufficient
reductions to solve the problem from car and stationary source emissions
was not feasible politically or practically. 36 This meant the EPA was under
Ass., What is Ozone Air Pollution?, available at http://www.lungusa.org/air/envozone.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
32. Consider the following description of the steps necessary in nonattainment regions
and the scope of the nonattainment problem:
53.8 million people live in counties violating the 03 one-hour NAAQS. Ozone
nonattainment areas are subject to SIP revisions to meet CAA requirements.
Moreover, the northeastern states, from northern Virginia to Maine, are subject to
ozone transport region requirements. Facilities located upwind of a nonattainment
area for ozone that are in a "ozone transport region" may be subject to controls if
the facility emits more than fifty tons per year of NO.. Since 1990, 03
nonattainment areas require the use of stringent controls on Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOC) and NO, sources. Moderate or worse 03 nonattainment areas
require the use of reasonably available control technology (RACT) on existing
sources. For areas that are serious or worse, a 9% reduction of VOC or NOx
emissions for each three-year period from 1996 through the attainment date is
required. For extreme areas, additional NO, controls are required. CAA section
182(f) imposes on the states a duty to control emissions of NO, unless reductions
would not contribute to the attainment of the ozone standard.
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., State and Federal Command-And-Control Regulation Of Emissions
From Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32 ENvTL. L. 369, 377 (2002)
[hereinafter Reitze, State and Federal].
33. See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing dispute and
SIP call); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing
"section 126" actions).
34. Reitze, State and Federal, supra note 32, at 411 (describing petitions and results).
35. John C. Parker, EPA Knew Its Engine Tests Were Flawed, Volvo Says, TRANSPORT
ToPics 1, 25 (1998) ("'There was a problem with the northeastern states in 1997 not being
able to meet their clean air requirements' Mr. Nyman [of Volvo] said. 'They claimed they
had done everything possible to control NO, from fixed sites and they were going to lose
federal funds if they were not in compliance."') [hereinafter Parker, Engine Tests]. The
EPA and northeastern state officials denied the charge. Id.
36. Chris Bowman, EPA Off On Diesel Rigs' Emissions? Clean-air Goals May Be
Tougher to Meet, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al, A22, reprinted in U.S. HOUSE OF
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pressure from both the upwind and downwind states to find a means of
reducing NOx levels in the Northeast and other nonattainment areas that
did not place the burden of doing so on either the upwind or the downwind
states. This played a role in the EPA's regulation of diesel NOx
emissions.37 Other regions were also experiencing NOx problems from
intra-region sources leading them to focus on heavy duty diesels as well.
38
In addition to the pressure from the upwind and downwind states, ozone
is also a high profile air pollution issue for environmental pressure groups
because ozone is "smog," the paradigmatic air pollution issue. The
American Lung Association (ALA), for example, chose ozone as "the
focus" of its State of the Air reports, reporting on county level ozone
levels,39 and the ALA also used litigation to pressure the EPA to make the
ozone NAAQS more restrictive.40 That more restrictive NAAQS increased
the need for reductions in NOx; environmental pressure groups continued
to use litigation to pressure the EPA to enforce the stricter NAAQS by
designating nonattainment regions.41 Environmental pressure groups also
42specifically targeted heavy-duty diesel engines. As a result, by the late
1990s, the EPA had a severe NOx emissions problem and heavy-duty
diesel engines were a major potential source of reductions.
This problem was compounded by the nature of the prior NOx emissions
control strategy adopted by the EPA. Economist Lawrence White found
that the structure of the EPA's mobile source program created an incentive
to choose high cost, high probability of success, quick technologies over
strategies which might yield better success in the long run. 3 The quick
REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON COMMERCE, ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY'S FAILURE TO ENFORCE POLLUTION STANDARDS FOR HEAVY-DUTY
DIESEL TRUCKS app. G (2000) (noting air pollution control officials finding that it would be
"politically and logistically improbable" to make up lost emissions controls resulting from
mobile source over-emissions from cars and businesses) [hereinafter Bowman, EPA Ofl].
37. See Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,896, 59,904 (Oct. 6, 2000) (asserting importance of
reducing NO, emissions to assist ten areas with compliance with NAAQS for ozone and to
avoid more costly measures of NO, reduction).
38. Clemings, supra note 24, at 20 ("'Control of heavy-duty diesel engines is one of the
main things that needs to happen for us to meet air quality standards,' said Tom Jordan,
senior air quality planner at the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District.").
39. See American Lung Association, State of the Air: 2003 17 (2003) ("The American
Lung Association has chosen ozone as the focus of the State of the Air reports because it is
one of the most damaging and most pervasive of the common outdoor air pollutants.").
40. Id. at 22 ("In 1997, the EPA issued a revised National Ambient Air Quality
Standard for ozone, in large part due to constant legal pressure from the American Lung
Association.").
41. Id. at 23 ("On May 20, 2002, the American Lung Association and eight
environmental groups took legal action against the EPA to force them to start designating
nonattainment areas. On November 13, 2002, the EPA agreed that it would make those
official designations by April 2004.").
42. Clemings, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting environmental pressure group
representatives on the "Dump Dirty Diesels" campaign).
43. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR
VEHICLES 72-77 (1982). White concluded in 1981 that "the stringent NO, standard has been
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fixes adopted by the EPA in the 1970s, therefore did not continue to yield
improvements in NOx emissions thereafter. Thus, NOx represented a
growing problem to which mobile sources generally and heavy-duty diesels
in particular were contributing a substantial portion and whose control was
relatively costly.
C. The Mobile-Stationary Source Distinction
The Clean Air Act has different regulatory regimes for emissions from
stationary and mobile sources. Stationary sources, such as coal-fired
electricity generators, are regulated through state-issued permits for
emissions, and states are responsible for determining how much each
stationary source is allowed to emit of each pollutant, subject to technology
controls required of particular source categories by the EPA.44 For
example, a coal-fired power plant must both install emissions scrubbers on
its smokestacks under an EPA-mandated technology standard and limit its
emissions to the level specified in the relevant state SIP. Mobile sources,
on the other hand, are regulated largely through EPA-mandated regulations
requiring vehicles or engines, depending on type, to meet emissions
controls. (States can also opt to adopt a separate set of standards created by
California, whose regulatory activity predates the EPA's. 45) Sample light-
duty vehicles and heavy-duty engines are tested by the producer using
EPA-approved test procedures. Product lines are then certified as meeting
the EPA requirements.46 There is no individual permit requirement for
each mobile source, as there is for each stationary source.
The states' primary means of controlling mobile source emissions are to
impose controls on vehicle use-a politically unpopular route.47  When
either states or the EPA have incorporated such controls in SIPs, they have
generally been criticized as unrealistic. For example, the EPA's 1975
one of the costliest standards in the entire Clean Air Act-not only in the static sense ... but
also by discouraging productive research on alternative technologies." Id. at 74. White
estimated NO, standards added almost $600 per car to automobile prices in the early 1970s,
including an 8% fuel economy penalty. Id. The switch to catalyst technology for the 1975
standards lowered the cost to $280 per car. Id at 61-62. The model year (MY) 1984
standards cost was $1500 per car. Id. at 87-88.
44. A caveat or two is needed here about the many layers of control imposed by the
Clean Air Act. To the extent that they are relevant, we will deal with those later. Our intent
here is to present the broad picture.
45. A slight caveat concerning California's (and now other states') ability to impose
additional requirements on mobile sources is necessary. We will discuss this in more detail
later-for now the important thing is that mobile sources are mostly regulated at the national
level. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.090-24 (2003) (discussing test vehicles and engine families); §
86.1848-01 (2001) (discussing certification).
47. See Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2178 ("Attempts to constrain or reduce private
vehicle use through transportation control measures (TCMs) have met resistance and
produced minimal results."). States may also adopt fuel regulations or clean-fuel fleet
requirements.
[56:2
2004] EPA 'S REGULATION OF HEA VY-DUTY DIESEL ENGINES 413
mandate to Los Angeles to reduce auto traffic by 70-80 percent was widely
seen as impossible to implement.48 Even indirect controls on vehicle use,
such as inspection and maintenance programs aimed at ensuring that
individual vehicles' emissions controls are properly functioning, have
proven politically unpopular.49  Thus, unlike stationary sources, mobile
sources are primarily regulated indirectly through regulation of
manufacturers rather than directly through regulation of the sources'
emissions. Mobile sources are also relatively unregulated by the states,
largely because the political costs of use restrictions are too high for state
regulators to pay.
This division of authority and approach is logical-mobile sources are,
by definition, mobile and their contribution to pollution affects multiple
states as cars and trucks drive the nation's highways. There are also
enormous numbers of mobile sources, making individual source level
regulation administratively costly to implement.50 It also provides the EPA
with a political benefit, since it grants the EPA authority over the relatively
politically popular (at least outside of Michigan) regulatory target of
mobile source manufacturers, while leaving to the states the unpalatable
regulation of consumers' use of mobile sources.51 National regulation
comes at a cost, however, since reducing mobile source emissions
anywhere requires reducing them everywhere, even if reductions are only
48. See Carolyn McNiven, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment Deadline
Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1279-80 (1992) ("[The] EPA
began promulgating plans that fulfilled its legal obligations but that were totally unrealistic.
EPA's transportation control plan for the Los Angeles area included such draconian control
measures as gasoline rationing of up to eighty-two percent of then-current consumption
levels. Needless to say, such rationing was completely unacceptable to the residents and
businesses of the Basin which were (and still are) vehicle-dependent."); see also Eli
Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve the
Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537, 538 (1975); Roger Strelow, Reviewing the Clean Air Act,
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 583, 584 (1975). On problems with transportation controls, see generally
John Quarles, Time Extensions Not the Answer to Problems with Clean Air Act, THE OIL
DAILY, June 18, 1987, at 4:
The reality is that in several areas, particularly Los Angeles, the NAAQS for ozone
is not going to be attained-not by Dec. 31, 1987, not five years thereafter, not 10
years thereafter, not by the year 2000, not within anyone's ability to see the
horizon. The reality is that the statute commands and achievement the cost and
pain of which exceeds its value to the public. The public has rejected that
command. The statutory framework does not work.
49. See generally Todd A. Stewart, Comment, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio's Clean
Air Debate--Ohio's Battle Over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 265,
268-270 (2001) (discussing debate over state I&M program).
50. Technology may be reducing such costs. See Ken Livingstone's Gamble, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2003) (describing how technology is being used in London to
implement congestion charges for driving in the center city); Ken's Coup, THE ECONOMIST
(Mar. 22, 2003) (describing success of congestion charges). Such programs reduce traffic
and lessen emissions. Id. Advances in remote sensing programs may also produce less
costly transportation controls in the future by cheaply identifying "dirty" vehicles. Id.
51. WHITE, supra note 43, at 68 ("[T]he political stance of aiming one's regulatory fire
(and ire) at the manufacturers, rather than at users, has surely been a more popular one.").
ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
necessary in some areas, such as those out of attainment with air quality
standards.
52
The division is important for understanding the diesel regulations
because it creates a distinction between mobile and stationary sources in
terms of regulators and regulatory approaches. It also creates an unequal
competition between the categories for the ability to emit pollutants since
states' SIPs must account for emissions from both categories53 but states
lack control over manufacturers of mobile sources. The EPA and the states
are thus regularly put in a position of trading off mobile source emission
reductions and stationary source emission reductions. In these tradeoffs,
states must rely on the EPA to generate mobile source reductions that can
offset other increases from population growth or new industry.54 Without
such tradeoffs, states cannot increase other categories of emissions. For
example, the EPA's "mobile source tech review subcommittee" is
examining ways to cut heavy-duty diesel emissions to help states earn
"state implementation plan credits," 55 which can be used to allow new
52. See REGULATORY STUDIES PROGRAM, MERCATUS CENTER, GEORGE MASON
UNIVERSITY, PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENTS ON CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NONROAD
LARGE SPARK IGNITION ENGINES AND RECREATIONAL ENGINES (MARINE & LAND BASED)
SUBMITTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 6 (Dec. 19, 2001) (discussing issue in
context of other regulations and concluding that "[c]ost effectiveness-based on nationwide
emission reductions-cannot capture likely benefits because most areas of the country now
meet health-based air quality standards") [hereinafter RSP, NONROAD]; see also WHITE,
supra note 43, at 67 ("The drawback to uniform standards is that vehicle purchasers in areas
that do not have serious pollution problems are paying substantial sums for control systems
that are unnecessary or at least more stringent than are needed."). This effect has been
widespread at least in some periods. Id. For instance, a 1974 National Academy of
Sciences study found that 63% of U.S. cars probably did not require the MY 1981 standards
over the MY 1977 standards. Id. Not having uniform national regulation, on the other
hand, leads to claims of unfairness by those regulated more heavily. See, e.g., Air Pollution:
Commenters at California Hearing Urge EPA to Strengthen Diesel Regulation, 126 DAILY
ENv'T REPORT A-4 (June 29, 2000) ("A group of independent truckers testified that [the]
EPA's proposed regulation [requiring low sulfur fuel nationwide] would finally 'level the
playing field' for California-based operations."); Jess Nicholas, Low-Sulfur Diesel Meets
Opposition, 40 OVERDRIVE 131 (Nov. 2000) ("[f]rom an economic standpoint, California
truckers would benefit from the proposal" for national low-sulfur rules).
53. See, e.g., Diesel Fuel/Emissions 'Unified Model' Opens 'Boutique' Can of Worms,
DIESEL FUEL NEWS, Sept. 3, 2001, at 1, 5 (noting truckers' objections to fuel requirements,
arguing that regulators "ignored other measures-such as tougher electric utility emissions
controls in areas upwind of major cities-that would do far more to cut NO, without
causing fuel-supply crises or disrupting interstate truck commerce") [hereinafter Boutique,
DIESEL FUEL NEWS]; Reitze, I&M, supra note 19, at 1480 (noting that where nonattainment
provisions for reductions in emissions, "affected sources can be expected to attempt to shift
the required reduction to some other source or category of source using the political,
administrative, and judicial forums that may be available").
54. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,580,
45,581 (Aug. 31, 1995) (indicating that state regulators are "looking to the national mobile
source emission control program as a necessary complement to their efforts to reduce NO.,
PM, HC, and other emissions").
55. See EPA Launching Heavy-Duty In-Use Emissions Testing Workgroup for SIP
Credits, DIESEL FUEL NEWS, Nov. 12, 2001, at 6; see also Ralph Kisiel, Cloud Hovers Over
Proposed Diesel Rules, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 34 (quoting the Engine
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stationary sources or maintain current stationary source emission levels.
Disputes within categories of sources also occur, as different interest
groups attempt to allocate the cost of emissions reductions to others.56
Economic or population growth may also require changes in SIPs. States
must therefore continually rebalance emissions allocations amongst sources
in their states.
D. The EPA's Reliance on Modeling
The EPA and the states depend primarily on environmental modeling
rather than direct measurement for implementing the regulatory structure.57
The use of models is logical in a world with an incomplete air quality
monitoring system and positive costs to data collection and analysis.
Collecting sufficient accurate data on air quality to regulate the entire
country's air through command-and-control regulation would be so costly
as to preclude the entire effort if models could not be used.58 Modeling is
Manufacturers Association executive director that "[w]e very strongly suspect that various
states will want to hit the bank and go for more reductions from mobile sources").
56. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 ENVTL. L.
309, 369 (2000) (describing dispute between gas stations and car manufacturers over
whether to require onboard vehicle evaporation controls or "Stage 11" vapor recovery
systems on gasoline pumps: "The choice of Stage II or onboard controls pitted the
petroleum industry against the automobile industry, both of whom assured the motivation
and the money for a protracted political and legal battle") [hereinafter Reitze, Mobile
Source]; GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-87-151, EPA's EFFORTS TO CONTROL VEHICLE
REFUELING AND EVAPORATIvE EMISSIONS 4-5 (1987) (describing differences between oil and
motor vehicle companies). The EPA studied the issue for 14 years before issuing a
proposed regulation. Id. at 14. A good example of how sources compete for emissions is
the passage of laws in Maryland and Illinois forbidding state regulators from adopting
"Stage II" refueling controls unless required to do so by the EPA. Id. at 15.
57. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 357 ("Mobile models are used to
construct the motor vehicle portion of emissions inventories, to create control strategies, to
produce SIPs, and to demonstrate control strategy effectiveness."). For information on the
EPA's model for highway emissions, see OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY,
AP-42: COMPILATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION FACTORS, at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/ap42.htm (accessed Feb. 8, 2002), and Reitze, Mobile Source,
supra note 56, at 357-58. For a discussion of the complexity of emissions modeling,
primarily in the context of Germany, see HANS PETER LENZ & CHRISTIAN COZZARINI,
EMISSIONS AND AIR QUALITY 76-82 (1999). See also INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMME ON
CHEMICAL SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 171: DIESEL FUEL AND EXHAUST
EMISSIONS 93 (1996) ("[t]he contribution of diesel exhaust to total pollution by traffic
combustion products is generally calculated on the basis of emission factors and the
percentage of diesel fueled-vehicles.") [hereinafter IPCS, CRITERIA 171 ].
58. For example, the National Research Council committee reviewing the EPA's
modeling of mobile sources summarized the information demands for air pollution
regulation as:
An effective air-quality improvement program requires the identification,
inventory, and control of emissions sources, including mobile sources. This
requires not only a broad understanding of which pollutants are derived from which
sources, but also details about their spatial and temporal variation, the contributions
of subsets of sources, the chemical and physical characteristics that determine their
propensity to form secondary pollutants, their levels of exposure and toxicity, and
the actual effectiveness of strategies to control emissions. The large number of
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thus a necessary component of command-and-control air pollution control
and the EPA makes heavy use of modeling through its official program
known as MOBILE. 59
The result is that it is the model that governs how emissions control
measures are evaluated, not their actual results. States, for example, must
construct SIPs that satisfy the EPA's model of air quality, not deliver actual
levels of emissions.60  As developing the data to design the model is
expensive and the test procedures do not represent all driving conditions,6I
models will inevitably inaccurately predict actual emissions.
For example, if laboratory measurements of the efficacy of a type of
control did not accurately predict real-world use results (exactly what
happened in the case of heavy-duty diesel engine emissions controls),62 the
individual sources, the large variability of emissions characteristics among these
sources, and the need for emissions estimation methods to fulfill many applications
creates daunting challenges.
See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW EPA's MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS FACTOR (MOBILE) MODEL,
MODELING MOBILE SOURCE EMISSIONS 20-21 (2000) [hereinafter COMMITTEE TO REVIEW].
59. The EPA's official mobile source air quality modeling program, known as
MOBILE, "is used in the development of national, regional, and urban emissions
inventories; the simulation of regional air chemistry and microscale dispersion of pollutants;
the assessment of the effectiveness of control strategies; the documentation of emissions
reductions in State Implementation Plans (SIPs); the assessment of air-quality impacts of
transportation projects, including the demonstration of conformity of transportation and air-
quality plans; and the assessment of air-quality impacts of transportation-control measures
and projects."
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW, supra note 58, at 33.
60. See id at 58, at 29 ("Outside of California, the MOBILE model is used to estimate
emissions from on-road mobile sources as part of the SIP."); Id. at 52 ("States and, in some
cases, metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) are required to develop a demonstration
of attainment for SIPs in ozone and CO nonattainment regions. These must be submitted to
and approved by EPA.").
61. Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2173.
62. Janet Yanowitz et al., Prediction of In-Use Emissions of Heavy-Duty Diesel
Vehicles from Engine Testing, in 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 270, 270 (2002) ("[A] recent
review.., found that the measured emissions trends from in-use heavy-duty vehicles differ
considerably from those predicted from the results of the certification engine tests and also
vary considerably from those predicted by the MOBILE5 and PART5 models on a model
year basis."); see also Nigel N. Clark et al., Emissions Modeling of Heavy-Duty
Conventional and Hybrid Electric Vehicles, in DIESEL EMISSION CONTROL SYSTEMS (SP-
1641) 121, 121 (2001) ("Prediction of emissions and fuel consumption from vehicles driven
through a cycle or route is not well developed or accurate. This is especially true in the
heavy-duty sector, where engines are certified for emissions separately from the vehicle and
few data are available to describe the emissions performance of the whole vehicle.")
[hereinafter Clark et al., Emissions Modeling]; Nigel N. Clark et al., Factors Affecting
Heavy-Duty Diesel Vehicle Emissions, 52 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 84, 84 (2002)
("Presently, the heavy-duty diesel emissions inventory is based on emissions factors
developed from certification data gained using a stationary engine dynamometer, and there
is no sophisticated accounting for the application of that engine in the vehicle or the nature
of vehicle behavior.") [hereinafter Clark et al., Factors Affecting]; id. at 92 ("All present-
day truck emissions values used for inventory prediction rely on the certification data,
but ... certification data will underestimate NO, emissions in off-cycle operation .... The
real NO, value in this case was 1.8 times higher than the expected value."); Janet Yanowitz
et al., Chassis Dynamometer Study of Emissions from 21 In-Use Heavy-Duty Diesel
Vehicles, 33 ENVTL. SCi. & TECH. 209, 215 (1999) (noting that analysis of 21 engines found
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model's predictions would not match output. If the model overpredicted
control, the result would be dirtier air than predicted;63 if it underpredicted
control, 64 the result would be cleaner air.65 The divergence between model
and reality need not be solely due to errors; incomplete knowledge may
also hamper relating models to reality.66 To the extent that the model's
predictions are used to target a legal standard, such as the NAAQS,
inaccuracies in the model could mean the standard was not met in the
that emissions for NO, and particulates "do not reflect emissions improvements expected
based on the stricter engine certification test put into effect since 1985"); Nigel N. Clark &
David L. McKain, A Chassis Test Procedure to Mimic the Heavy-Duty Engine Transient
Emissions Certification Test, 51 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 432, 437 (2001) (noting
differences in idle power levels in chassis and engine-only tests mean engines produce
greater emissions in chassis tests).
63. This happened with respect to evaporative emissions from mobile sources, as initial
estimates of evaporative losses were too low. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 319-
20 ("By the late 1980s, evaporative losses became a subject of renewed concern as new
information became available that indicated evaporative losses had been underestimated.");
see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-87-151, AIt POLLUTION, EPA'S EFFORTS TO
CONTROL VEHICLE REFUELING AND EVAPORATIVE EMISSIONS 31 (1987) (noting the EPA's
use of inappropriate testing assumptions: "The widespread differences between the volatility
levels of commercial and certification gasoline are a major cause of the problem with
evaporative hydrocarbon emissions, according to [the] EPA"); id. at 45 (remarking that the
EPA certification test used lower volatility gasoline than used in operation, resulting in
lower emissions). It also happened with respect to automobile emissions systems, where
"in-use emission control systems deteriorate at a rate significantly greater than projected" by
the EPA models. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 351 (noting three-fourths of
in-use vehicles tested during the late 1980s failed to meet emissions standards); GEN. ACCT.
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-90-128, AIR POLLUTION, EPA NOT ADEQUATELY ENSURING VEHICLES
COMPLY WITH EMISSIONS STANDARDS 4 (1990).
64. This is possible because engineers commonly build in safety margins in emissions
controls. See DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK 556 (Bernard Challen & Rodica Baranescu,
eds., 2d ed. 1999) (noting that "engineers generally set emission targets below the [Clean
Air Act] standards to be sure all requirements are met. This margin is typically 80 to 90
percent of the standard limit") [hereinafter DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK]; MOTOR
VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, ASSEMBLY OF ENGINEERING, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NOx EMISSION CONTROLS FOR HEAVY-DuTY VEHICLES: TOWARD
MEETING A 1986 STANDARD 7 (1981) [hereinafter MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES
STANDARD COMMITTEE] ("Emissions of new production engines must be lower than the
standards with which they are intended to comply by a deterioration factor that accounts for
any increase in emissions as the engines age and a safety factor to account for production
line variability during enforcement audits."); id at 43 ("The audit requirement, plus
appropriate allowance for deterioration, requires low-mileage emission targets for individual
engines to be 20-40 percent below the value of the standard.").
65. See COMMITTEE TO REvIEw, supra note 58, at 1 ("Possible consequences of
inaccurately characterizing motor vehicle emissions include the implementation of
insufficient controls that endanger the environment and public health or the implementation
of ineffective policies that impose excessive control costs.").
66. See MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at
18 (explaining that translating emissions reductions into changes in atmospheric
concentrations "requires a knowledge of the emission source patterns for the region in
question, the total atmospheric loading of emissions from all sources in the region, and the
detailed transformation processes," and noting that "[s]uch knowledge is not available
now"); COMMITrEE TO REVIEw, supra note 58, at 38 ("The multiple adjustments of travel
activity results needed to produce estimates of [heavy-duty vehicle] activity by time of day
introduces an unknown level of uncertainty to emissions and air quality simulations.").
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model but was met in reality or vice versa. 67 "Real world vehicle emissions
are difficult to predict because many factors are involved., 68 In particular,
aging vehicles and deterioration of emissions control systems can lead to
significantly increased emissions. "In some high emitting vehicles HC
[hydrocarbons] and CO emissions per kilometer are over two orders of
magnitude higher than when those same vehicles were new.,
69
Unfortunately, these problems are more than theoretical with respect to
the EPA's air quality monitoring. As a 1998 review concluded, "[a]t
present, large and significant uncertainties exist in the estimates of the
mobile source emissions inventory. These uncertainties exist for all vehicle
types and classes throughout North America." 70 Similarly, another study
concluded that "[i]n recent years, it has become very obvious that
significant improvements are needed in the characterization of emissions
from heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) operating in real-world conditions, and
in the models used to generate mobile source emissions inventories.
Emission inventories have grossly underestimated the emissions from
mobile sources., 71 This underestimate has been old news for quite some
time, as most of the research that uncovered it was funded by either the
EPA or California's air regulators.72 Although "[b]illions of dollars per
year in transportation funding are linked to air quality attainment plans, 73
the EPA's models were labeled "geriatric" in 2001 by the head of the
EPA's Office of Air Quality and Monitoring.74 A committee appointed by
the National Research Council to review MOBILE concluded that
Questions have been raised about MOBILE's capability to evaluate
reliably the impacts of air-quality-improvement initiatives
Previous and current versions of the model have been criticized for their
lack of adequate documentation on underlying methodologies and data.
There has also been criticism by the U.S. General Accounting Office that
[the] EPA's policy on peer review had not been fully followed during the
67. The same problem would arise if states used some other standard, such as the
"efficient" level of air quality. Modeling issues can be addressed in part by improved data
collection. See Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2168 (describing use of remote sensing
equipment and data).
68. Id. at2167.
69. Id.
70. Id. at2178.
71. Mridul Gautam et al., Uncertainty in Real-World Particulate Matter Emission
Measurements from a Transportable Heavy-Duty Vehicle Emissions Testing Laboratory, 5
HEAVY VEHICLE SYSTEMS INST. J. OF VEHICLE DESIGN 399, 400 (1998).
72. E-mail from Joel Schwartz, Reason Public Policy Foundation (Jan. 17, 2003) (on
file with the authors).
73. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW, supra note 58, at 1.
74. Microsoft Powerpoint presentation by Gene Tierney, MOBILE6 and the NGM, slide
6, at http://www.ncvecs.colostate.edu/cac.docs/cacl8.docs/cacl7pres/Tierney.pdf (last
visited June 28, 2002).
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development of current and past versions of MOBILE.
75
Indeed, the EPA's current model was explicitly criticized in 2000 for its
inaccurate modeling of heavy-duty vehicle emissions because those
emissions were "expected to be a major target" of SIP revisions.76 For
heavy-duty engines, the EPA's models (as well as California's separate
models) were even less accurate, because "little effort has been made to
describe truck travel explicitly within travel demand models. In current
modeling practice, it is common to estimate heavy-duty truck travel as a
fixed percentage of predicted traffic volumes" despite differences in traffic
patterns from light duty traffic.77 One estimate based on fuel consumption
put on-road NOx emissions at twice what the EPA predicted in 1996.78
Moreover, the ozone-NOx relationship is complex, undoubtedly more so
than the EPA's models can currently incorporate. As just one example,
research has found that daily levels of ozone exhibit different patterns in
different cities and while some regions experience increases in ozone from
a reduction in NOx, others experience a decrease, depending on whether
ozone levels are more sensitive to the levels of NOx or the levels of volatile
organic compounds (VOCs). 79 The relationship between NOx, VOCs, and
ozone is not yet fully understood and cannot yet be incorporated into
models. There is evidence of increases in ozone levels in some cities on
weekends when NOx levels typically fall dramatically due to the drop off
in heavy-duty truck traffic. But VOC levels, which are primarily from cars,
do not drop.80 This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that lowering
NOx levels in VOC-sensitive areas increases ozone. In short, where
regions are more sensitive to VOCs than to NOx, reducing NOx levels may
increase ozone levels with the result that real-world ozone levels may rise
75. COMMITTEE To REVIEW, supra note 58, at 2.
76. Id. at 9; see also Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 830 (summarizing critiques of
the EPA and California models); W. Harrington et al., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DIscussiON
PAPER 98-47, A Behavioral Analysis of EPA 's Mobile Emission Factor Model (1998)
(detailing problems with the EPA MOBILE vehicle emissions model); W. R. Pierson et al.,
Assessment of Nontailpipe Hydrocarbon Emissions from Motor Vehicles, 49 J. AIR &
WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 498 (1999) (comparing and contrasting uncertainties and biases in
estimates of non-tailpipe and tailpipe VOC emissions from vehicles).
77. David B. Dreher & Robert A. Harley, A Fuel-Based Inventory for Heavy-Duty
Diesel Truck Emissions, 48 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 352, 352 (1998) (footnote
omitted).
78. See Andrew J. Kean et al., A Fuel Based Assessment of Off-Road Diesel Engine
Emissions, 50 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 1929, 1937 (2000) [hereinafter Kean et al.,
Assessment].
79. See BETTY K. PUN ET AL., ENVTL. RESEARCH, INC., DATA ANALYSIS FOR A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WEEKDAY/WEEKEND OZONE AND PM DIFFERENCES (2001), at
http://www.crcao.com/reports/recentstudies00-02/A36B%20Final%2OReport/FINAL.Data.
analysis.for.a.better.understanding.doc) (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
80. See Linsey C. Marr & Robert A. Harley, Spectral Analysis of Weekday-Weekend
Differences in Ambient Ozone, Nitrogen Oxide, and Non-methane Hydrocarbon Time Series
in California, 36 ATMOSPHERIC ENv'T 2327, 2334 (2002) [hereinafter Marr & Harley,
Spectral Analysis].
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due to NOx reduction measures even as model levels fall.
There are two important consequences of the necessary simplification of
modeling. First, as a result of the differences between the models and
reality, model characteristics can come to drive regulatory measures
unrelated to improvements in actual environmental quality.81 Failure to
update models to incorporate new information or new knowledge of model
inaccuracies can prevent states from receiving appropriate credit in their
SIPs for control measures that work in reality but which are not reflected in
the model,82 and so discourage effective measures. Second, control of
models' assumptions gives the EPA "significant influence" over abatement
strategies "because the agency's modeling techniques determine the
number of tons of emission reduction that will be credited for each measure
selected., 83 For example, the EPA discounts emissions reductions by 50
percent for inspection and maintenance programs that are conducted on a
decentralized basis compared to centralized programs, although there is
little empirical basis for such a dramatic difference in treatment.8 4 This 50
percent "discount" is "hardwired" into MOBILE.85 Changes in models,
because of improvements in modeling technology or new measurements of
actual conditions, can lead to states being required to reallocate emissions
in their SIPs. 86 In addition, there is a third consequence that flowed from
81. See, e.g., Boutique, DIESEL FUEL NEWS, supra note 53, at 1 (noting refiners' and
truckers' contention that inaccuracies in the EPA's model of the impact of fuel
characteristics may cause states to adopt specific fuel requirements for diesels that actually
detract from environmental quality); see also GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-72, AIR
POLLUTION, STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ISSUES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1990 25 (2000) (noting that states receive SIP credit for instituting inspection and
maintenance programs for motor vehicles, but that these credits are "based solely on [the]
EPA's model-not on validating actual emissions testing").
82. See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW, supra note 58, at 11 ("[E]missions inventories and
control strategies being developed are based on out-of-date assumptions and inaccurate
predictions, perhaps resulting in the selection and propagation of inefficient or ineffective
controls."); id. at 51 ("The development of SIPs requires accuracy in emissions inventories
and crediting of emissions reductions from controls, both of which are particularly sensitive
to errors. Little has been done to address this issue .... Users need updates [of MOBILE]
that incorporate the latest findings on factors that affect emissions and the effectiveness of
control strategies so that SIPs can be based on the most accurate information."). This also
applies to transportation plans states are required to develop under the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Id. at 54 ("Specific out-year technological
assumptions used when MOBILE5 was developed in 1993 may not be accurately represent
current assumptions. This could cause an unnecessary strain on regions, as they are forced to
meet transportation plan budget tests based on outdated forecasts.").
83. See Reitze, I&M, supra note 19, at 1482.
84. See JOEL SCHWARTZ, CAL. INSPECTOR & MAINT. REVIEW COMM., AN ANALYSIS OF
USEPA's 50-PERCENT DISCOUNT FOR DECENTRALIZED IIM PROGRAMS (1995).
85. See id. at Appendix A ("[T]he 50-percent discount for test-and-repair programs is
an input to the model and not an output of the model.").
86. See COMMITrEE TO REVIEW, supra note 58, at 62 ("Changes in the databases
underlying the models and changes in modeling methodology in each successive version
result in changes to predicted total on-road vehicle emissions. From one model version to
the next, these changes can be either increases or decreases in emissions factors, and the
420 [56:2
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the specifics of the EPA's MOBILE model in the 1980s and 1990s: the
model overpredicted control of NOx from heavy-duty diesel engines
because it relied on emissions tests done under a limited set of
circumstances.87 This contributed to the nonattainment of the ozone
standard and presented the EPA with a regulatory problem: If the EPA
revised its model to accurately predict NOx emissions from heavy-duty
diesels, the nonattainment problem would get worse. That is, either or both
groups of affected states would have to make more cuts in other sources of
NO, emissions.88 If it did not revise MOBILE, however, the model would
continue to underpredict emissions.
E. Technology-forcing
The Clean Air Act relies heavily on "technology-forcing" regulations for
mobile sources, an approach that was chosen in part because of regulators'
distrust of the automobile industry. 89  Technology-forcing regulations
require implementation of technology that does not exist at the time of the
adoption of the regulations, with the intent of stimulating innovation "by
setting future requirements that cannot be met by existing technology. 9 °
This strategy has successfully forced the development of new technology.
For example, in reaction to the model year (MY) 1980 and 1981
automobile standards, car manufacturers equipped cars
with newly designed engines whose cylinders, pistons, and other
essential components were engineered to produce fewer emissions.
Engine operating parameters were controlled more precisely through
vacuum and electronic controls and the use of fuel injection systems
became widespread. Computer systems also were used to control engine
operation, and became an important technology for controlling
emissions.91
Heavy-duty diesel regulations have been at least perceived at times as
technology forcing by the industry92 and regulators continue to call for
changes are not always in the same direction for all three pollutants (NO,, CO, and
VOCs).").
87. We discuss this issue in greater detail below. See infra notes 262-263.
88. We discuss the issue of why the EPA could not revise the heavy-duty diesel engine
standard itself for immediate gains below at note 417 and associated text.
89. ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 1 (1986).
90. Currie, Mobile-Source, supra note 18, at 902.
91. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 327.
92. See, e.g., John H. Johnson et al., Preface, in DIESEL PARTICULATE EMISSIONS:
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES, FUEL EFFECTS AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY (PT-42) i, i (1994)
(stating that "[t]he main driving force for control of diesel particulate and NO, emissions
reductions has come from the need for manufacturers to meet the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) mobile source on-highway heavy-duty diesel standards for 1994.
The 1994 standards were promulgated in 1985 and were technology forcing"); P. Zelenka et
al., Ways Toward the Clean Heavy-Duty Diesel, in DIESEL PARTICULATE EMISSIONS:
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES, FUEL EFFECTS AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY (PT-42) 3, 3 (1994)
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additional technology forcing.93
Forcing technological change has important consequences for regulation.
Because the regulatory regime depends on predicting the pace of
innovation, there is a danger that the regulators would underestimate the
time necessary to produce the needed innovations, leading to a situation in
which there is widespread non-compliance with the regulations. Indeed,
there has been a regular series of battles between source manufacturers
(especially automobile manufacturers), regulators, and environmental
pressure groups over whether the deadlines were technologically feasible,
with the EPA and Congress attempting to determine whether sources'
claims that the technology was not yet ready were legitimate or the result of
underinvestment in developing new technology.94  This is further
complicated by the interdependent nature of mobile source manufacturers'
choices regarding investment in technology and in efforts to delay
heightened regulatory standards. Investments in the former made the latter
less likely to succeed, since new technologies would undercut the claim
that the standards were impossible to attain.95 A good example of the
problems in trying to force the development of technology is the tortured
history of California's attempts to require production of all-electric cars.96
(stating that MY 1991 standards, proposed in 1981, were "understood as a 'technology
forcing standard') [hereinafter Zelenka et al., Clean]. But see ENvTL. LAW INSTITUTE, 2
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 11.07[2], at 11-186 (2001) (suggesting light duty
regulations were "merely 'technology-nudging' and heavy-duty regulations were even
more flexible); EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF COMMENTS TO THE NPRM "1983 AND
LATER MODEL YEAR HEAVY-DUTY ENGINES PROPOSED GASEOUS EMISSION REGULATIONS,"
230 (1979) [hereinafter EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS] (copy on file with authors) (noting
that "a large percentage of diesel engines on the market [in 1979] meet the 1984 target HC
levels for a 10 percent [acceptable quality level]"); National Resources Defense Council v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting claim that Clean Air Act required
adopting industry leader technology and allowing the EPA to consider industry-wide
considerations).
93. See Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 840.
94. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 332 (describing delays in
implementing automobile standards during 1970s and 1980s).
95. Lawrence J. White discussed the incentive in his examination of early emissions
control efforts in California:
In the case of emissions control, it is clear that the industry's joint interests lay in
discouraging research, delaying the development of control technology, and
controlling the flow of information to outsiders, especially to government officials
who might impose regulation. Since emissions control could only add to the cost
of a vehicle or degrade its performance, the industry's interests were in making
control look as impracticable and costly as possible.
WHITE, supra note 43, at 13.
96. For example, even a generally pro-regulatory review of California's program
concluded that the state's program pushed the wrong technology, concluding that while the
technology forcing "accelerated the development of clean vehicle technology" and despite
the initial beliefs of "both regulators and industry insiders ... that battery technology would
progress far and fast enough to be the primary technology used to satisfy the requirements
of the mandate. The anticipated breakthrough, however, never occurred. Battery electric
vehicle technology progressed, but still remains too expensive and inconvenient for the
majority of the public." Matthew Peak, Improper Incentives: Modifying the California Zero
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Moreover, although technology-forcing clearly produced new
technology, inducing technological change by regulation affects the type of
technology developed. For example, differences in the testing standards,
not just different emissions standards, in Europe and the United States
require different pollution control strategies and different technologies to
meet them.97 More generally, technology-forcing creates an incentive for
vehicle manufacturers to design vehicles simply to meet standards, instead
of creating pollution control technology to reduce emissions.9 8
In particular, as pollution control requirements grew more stringent and
emissions control technology grew more complex, manufacturers had an
increasing incentive to view federal emissions tests as the blueprint for
their products. In other words, technology-forcing regulations require
manufacturers to invest in developing features not demanded (and possibly
even rejected by) customers. Their profit-maximizing strategy, therefore,
consists of minimizing those investments as well as minimizing the
negative features introduced into the vehicle by the new technology.
Again, investing in political means of delaying requirements is one strategy
for accomplishing this goal, and was the strategy used effectively by
automobile manufacturers in the 1960s and 1970s. Investment in new
emissions control technology that both minimizes the aspects of pollution
control that customers dislike (e.g., reduced fuel economy and
performance) and which does not waste resources by over-complying with
regulations (e.g., reducing emissions outside of testing parameters) is
another.99
Gaining increased control over combustion offered a solution to this
dilemma-it both promised the ability to reduce emissions by increasing
the efficiency of combustion and provided features desired by customers
such as increased mileage.10 0  Mobile source manufacturers quickly
focused on this new technology. As Lee Iacoccoa, then president of Ford,
Emission Vehicle Mandate with Regards to Regulatory, Technological, and Market Forces:
1990-2001, GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 137, 144 (2002).
97. See Piotr Bielaczyc & Kerzy Merkisz, Euro ll/Euro IV Emissions-A Study of Cold
Start and Warm up Phases with a SI (Spark Ignition) Engine, in EMISSIONS: TECHNOLOGY,
MEASUREMENT, AND TESTING (SP-1420) 117, 127 (1999) ("Because of the differences
between the FTP75 cycle in the USA and the new cycle in Europe, solutions for Euro Ill
and Euro IV limits could differ from those applied in the USA to fulfil the requirements of
LEV and ULEV regulations.").
98. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 327 (noting that 1980s standards did not
lead to new pollution control technologies but "[r]ather, motor vehicles were designed
around the applicable emission limits").
99. Of course these investment decisions consider the probable future course of
regulations, and so may appear to over invest in control today in order to reduce costs in
meeting regulations expected tomorrow.
100. See Tom Berg, How to Justify the Cost of Fuel Economy Options, TRANSPORT
Topics, Mar. 25, 1996, at 9 (stating that electronic controllers increased fuel economy by 7-
15%).
ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
put it in 1976: "If we cannot save ourselves from unrealistic government
requirements in fuel economy and emissions, our greatest hope in meeting
these requirements is through electronics."'' ° By MY 1994, almost every
truck had electronic controllers.'0 2 As control over combustion developed,
however, engine makers could improve their designs' quality from the
customers' point of view by focusing emissions control on the tested
conditions and maximizing customer-demanded characteristics, such as
fuel economy, elsewhere in the operating cycle. As we will see, this is
exactly what the engine manufacturers did.
F. Reliance on Fleet Turnover
Mobile source regulations based on introducing changes in the design of
new vehicles require turnover in fleets before controls yield improved air
quality. For example, if a vehicle's average life is ten years, vehicles sold
in 2000 under regulations in effect at that time will still be emitting
pollutants in 2005, even if new vehicles in 2005 must meet stricter
emissions control levels. 0 3  Regulating only new vehicles, instead of
requiring retrofits of older vehicles, is easier politically for the EPA since
"[o]wners of existing equipment can organize to fight regulation that
adversely affects their interests [while] . . . [i]n contrast, future purchasers
of new equipment do not constitute as cohesive an interest group .... " 104
101. Detroit Finally Wakes Up to Electronics, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1976, at 90;
Integration of Truck Electronics: A Look at the 90's, AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING, Feb. 1988
("EPA standards are forcing engine manufacturers to use electronics to meet emissions
limits for the 1990s."); George D. Hamilton & Scott Henjum, Electronics: The Wait is Over,
FLEET OWNER, June 1985, at 50, 51 (stating that engine manufacturers have been working
on electronic fuel controls "since the late 1970s, when the Environmental Protection Agency
first threatened to greatly reduce the emissions from heavy-duty diesel trucks").
102. Kenneth Stadden, Engines with Brains, HEAVY DuTY TRUCKING, Feb. 1994, at 54.
103. Regulators were aware of this from the start. For example, in 1966, Larsen
discussed the "effects from pollutants emitted from motor vehicles," specifying carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, oxidants (unburned and partially burned hydrocarbons), sulfur
dioxide, lead, and total suspended particulates. Dr. Ralph I. Larsen, Air Pollution from
Motor Vehicles, ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 136 Art. 12, 275-301,
282-92 (1966) (stating that sulfur content in fuel would subsequently be limited, most
recently due to its negative effects on equipment that limit engine emissions). Lead, of
course, would subsequently be eliminated entirely from the fuel supply.
Previous discussion indicates that about 95% reduction of carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides will probably be needed by about 1985. Since
the life span of an automobile is about ten years, vehicles produced in 1975 would
need to meet such reductions if air quality in 1985 is to meet present standards.
This might be a good research goal: to strive for 95% reduction of carbon
monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides from all new vehicles by 1975.
Id. at 297; see also 45 Fed. Reg. 4140 (Jan. 21, 1980) ("Heavy-duty engines, particularly
diesel engines, tend to last longer than light-duty vehicles .... The end of the useful life of
a given heavy-duty engine, then, is defined by one of two limits, whichever is reached first.
Either the engine exceeds the average amount of service seen by its engine family or it
deteriorates to the point of needing to be rebuilt.").
104. CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 89, at 89.
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As a result, "even if the mobile source program as currently designed
worked perfectly, large reductions in total emissions from the fleet and in
the consequent pollutant concentrations could not be achieved quickly."
10 5
This is particularly important with respect to heavy-duty diesel engines
since "[d]iesel engines have long useful lives [with the result that] ... the
fleet turnover is slow. ' ' 10 6 Heavy duty trucks' longer lives are keeping
older trucks on the road longer. This fact, combined with fleet
management practices at many companies that sell trucks as they come out
of warranty, means that used trucks hit the market only halfway through
their expected service lives.'0 7 Large fleets have also increased use of older
trucks. 10 8 As a result, trucks tend to move from initial service in long haul
fleets to regional and short-haul fleets later in their lives. Older and thus
dirtier trucks are thus mostly found in short-haul, primarily urban markets.
Newer, cleaner trucks spend more time in highway driving. Introducing
new technology thus first reduces emissions in rural areas and only years
later reaches urban areas.
To illustrate the dynamics of large truck replacement, consider these
simplified calculations. In 1997, according to government reports, there
were 4,302,915 trucks on the road in the size six to eight categories, which
covers 19,500 to 33,001 pound vehicles. 0 9 Over the years 1995 through
2000, there were, on average, 291,000 new vehicles purchased in the size
six to eight categories. A back of envelope calculation suggests that at this
average replacement rate, without accounting for some expansion, it would
take slightly less than 15 years to replace the existing stock. If only the
larger size eight vehicles are considered, there were 2,211,283 on the road
in 1997.110 Then, on average, there were 205,000 trucks in that category
added each year from 1995-2000. Again, a rough calculation indicates it
would take slightly more than ten years to turn over the existing stock on
105. WHITE, supra note 43, at 54.
106. Timothy V. Johnson, Diesel Emission Control - Last 12 Months in Review, in
DIESEL AFTERTREATMENT (SP-1561) 33 (2001) [hereinafter Johnson, Review]; see also
HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS,
EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 5 (1995) ("[R]eductions in exposure will be gradual
because of the long life of existing heavy-duty diesel engines, and will be offset as the use
of diesel engine grows."). Heavy-duty diesel engines have remained in service up to 30
years. Robert F. Sawyer & John H. Johnson, Diesel Emissions and Control Technology, in
HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS,
EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 65, 72 (1995).
107. Tom Moore, The Used Truck Market Presents Wide Selection and Increased
Quality-An Attractive Value for Fleets, FLEET OWNER, July 1996, at 98, 99.
108. Ed Thomas & Greg Berg, Equipment Maintenance: How to Run It Longer, in
HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING 48 (2001).
109. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1997 VEHICLE INVENTORY AND
USE SURVEY, available at http://www.census.gov (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
110. Id.
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the road in 1997."'1 If we assume that the diesel share of the total market
remains about constant over the interval of the calculation, we can use the
crude turnover estimate as the number of years necessary to bring cleaner
technologies to the diesel fleet.
Fleet turnover is not quite this simple, however, for two reasons. First,
mobile source purchasers have choices among different types of mobile
sources that present different combinations of upfront costs, maintenance
costs, and vehicle life. The more complex emissions systems now in use
are more strongly affected by deterioration, and maintenance than earlier,
simpler systems.11 2  Consider the stereotypical Volvo and Kia owners.
Volvo owners must invest heavily in regular maintenance, but are rewarded
with lengthy vehicle lives-hundreds of thousands of miles longer than the
typical Kia. The extended life of a Volvo requires both a greater initial
investment and regular maintenance beyond that necessary for a Kia,
however. Volvos are not "better" than Kias; they merely present a different
combination of maintenance costs, vehicle life, and other vehicle
characteristics including safety, luxury, status, and so forth.
Second, and more importantly, vehicle life is endogenous with respect to
regulations. If new cars are more expensive, consumers will delay
purchasing a new vehicle. If emissions controls increase vehicle costs,
older vehicles with lesser controls will operate longer as consumers delay
purchasing new vehicles because of the additional expense."1 3  Most
importantly for our purposes, vehicle consumers' choices can be affected
by regulatory behavior. 14  Turnover can be delayed by requiring new
emissions controls that increase user-costs" 5 or sped up through incentives
to retire older vehicles." 6 If the purchase of a new vehicle is made more
111. Our calculation underestimates the time for turnover, as in 1997 the average age of
a truck was 8.3 years and 19% were more than 15 years old. Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at
2163.
112. Id.
113. See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 89, at 116 (noting that auto emissions control
program slowed new car sales in the 1970s and early 1980s).
114. See Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case ofAuto Emission
Standards, 72 AM. EcoN. REV. 328, 330-31 (1982) (discussing how regulatory costs on new
vehicles result in longer lives for older vehicles).
115. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 68 (noting that the regulations have had the effects of
new source performance standards-differentially increasing the costs of new vehicles,
discouraging their purchase, and encouraging the retention of the older vehicles that are the
heavy emitters in the fleet). Jeffrey Ball, Truck Firms Go on Buying Binge to Circumvent a
New EPA Rule, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002 at Al, A12 (indicating truck firms are buying
new engines early to avoid engines that meet new standards coming into effect) [hereinafter
Ball, Buying Binge]; Up in the Air, DAIRY FOODS, April 1992, at 97, 98 (stating that the
EPA emissions standards may make maintenance more expensive, and escalate "the current
trend toward transportation outsourcing, allowing fleet operators to avoid a direct
investment in specialized training for mechanics and sophisticated diagnostic equipment").
116. See Jack Dolan & Lisa Chedekel, Dirty, But Legal, Old Cars Offset Progress, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, June 3, 2001, at Al (discussing how older cars that still pass emission
tests detract from any progress that regulations may cause and describing an old-car buy-
[56:2
2004] EPA 'S REGULATION OF HEA VY-DUTY DIESEL ENGINES 427
expensive or otherwise less desirable by regulators (e.g., by requiring
emissions controls that reduce mileage), current vehicle owners will invest
in maintaining their existing vehicles' lives. 117 Using older engines tends
to increase emissions, both because older engines tend to be dirtier than
newer engines of the same design 18 and because of the trend toward
requiring engines designed to run cleaner. Increasing the cost of new
engines by requiring stricter emissions controls brings in cleaner new
engines but also has an offsetting impact by increasing the length of time
older vehicles are used and delaying their replacement by newer, cleaner
vehicles.
G. Summary
To see how these fit together to shape the EPA's incentives, consider the
following situation: Suppose some, but not all, regions of the country are
nonattainment for a particular NAAQS related to emissions that come from
both mobile and stationary sources. The EPA can require all mobile
sources in the country to be built to a more stringent standard to move the
noncomplying regions towards compliance. The impact on the
noncompliant regions of any such change will be limited, however, because
the new equipment will be phased in over time as fleets turn over. To the
extent that the new standard is technology-forcing, the delay will be
extended as time must be allowed for the technology to develop. The
benefits of raising mobile source standards will thus take time to be
realized. Moreover, mobile source regulations will only partially benefit
the nonattainment regions, as some of the reduction that results will occur
in regions already in attainment with the NAAQS. Reduced emissions in
those regions may be useful to offset growth due to emissions increases
related to population or economic growth, but such reductions are worth
less than the reductions in nonattainment regions, if only because the
NAAQS is not a binding constraint in attainment regions.
back program in Maine that gives people $1,000-$2,000 for their old car); Santa Barbara
Old Car Buyback Program, available at http://www.sbcapcd.org/ocbb.htm (last accessed
June 28, 2002) (describing old car buy back program in Santa Barbara County).
117. Ball, Buying Binge, supra note 115, at A12; see also U.S. Truck Fleet Hesitant
About 2002 Trucks, DIESEL FUEL NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, at 18 (stating that "fleet managers
worried about the performance of EPA-compliant, low-NO, trucks debuting in October...
will postpone purchases"); Diesel Technology for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy & Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. 31 (1998),
(testimony of Robert J. Crites, Condor Freight Lines) ("Like many companies, our decisions
about when to buy new equipment is based on many factors, including profitability,
depreciation, market resale value, changing customer needs, new government regulations,
driver's satisfaction, and recruitment, and manufacture warranty periods, to name just a
few.") [hereinafter Diesel Hearings].
118. IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 124 ("Increased emissions of hydrocarbons,
particulates, and PAHs have been reported from older, more intensively used light- and
heavy-duty vehicle engines in comparison with newer ones.").
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Per unit reduction of emissions in nonattainment regions is thus more
expensive if done by mobile source reductions because "extra" reductions
in attainment regions will have to be purchased along with the desired
reductions in the nonattainment areas. Per unit of reduction in
nonattainment regions, therefore, mobile source reductions are more
expensive than they would be if they could be more narrowly targeted. The
EPA will have a choice between slow-to-appear benefits from mobile
source technology-forcing regulations and requirements for stationary
sources." 19 The relative speed at which various benefits will appear will
play an important role in actual environmental quality improvement. The
EPA's models' assumptions about the speed at which benefits will appear
will determine the regulatory advantage of one method over another. The
crucial issue for states deciding how to allocate emissions among sources
will be how the EPA's models treat the allocations, not how the allocations
actually affect emissions. A policy change that cuts model emissions by
five percent but real world emissions by one percent will be preferred to a
policy change that cuts model emissions by one percent and real world
emissions by five percent. States allocating reductions will have a choice
between unpopular mobile source use restrictions and stationary source
restrictions.
The EPA has come under increasing pressure to reduce NOx emissions
because of the conflict between the upwind and downwind states, the
upward trend in NOx, and because the EPA's models overpredicted the
impact of control measures. Heavy-duty diesel engines, a comparatively
unregulated source of emissions in the mid-1990s, offered an obvious
target for the EPA's attention. Gaining additional reductions from heavy-
duty diesel engines would mean the EPA could avoid politically costly
nonattainment penalties against a large number of states, help states avoid
politically unpopular mobile source use controls, and promised to be
cheaper than squeezing more out of stationary sources. Getting new
reductions from heavy-duty diesels would take a relatively long time,
however, because of the need for the fleet to turn over before new, cleaner
engines could cut NOx emissions. Before examining how these constraints
and incentives played out in the EPA's regulatory choices, however, we
must explore how diesel engines pollute and how that pollution is
controlled.
119. Of course, it will take time to phase in new stationary source standards as well, and
there are regulatory problems with the incentives created by grandfathering old sources. See
generally Heidi Gorovitz Robinson, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You:
Environmental "Grandfather" Clauses and Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH.
U. L. REv. 131 (1995) (cataloging problems with grandfather clauses).
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II. DIESEL ENGINES & AIR POLLUTION
Diesel engines, a "mature and well-developed technology,"'' 20 operate
differently from gasoline engines.' 12  In a diesel engine, fuel is injected
directly into high-pressure air in the combustion chamber. 122 The fuel self-
ignites from the heat caused by the compression of the air within the
cylinder. 23  In a gasoline engine, by contrast, carburetion or injection
outside the cylinder is performed and the fuel-air mixture is then ignited
within the cylinder by a spark. As a result of this difference in combustion,
diesel engines require a significantly different fuel from gasoline engines
24
and have quite different combustion processes.125 They also have different
emissions, with important consequences for pollution control. 126  For
example, diesels emit more particulates and NO' 127 but less Carbon
120. 5 WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING 356 (John
G. Webster ed., 1999) [hereinafter WILEY, ENGINEERING].
121. For a basic overview of diesel technology, see Marshall Brain, How Diesel Engines
Work, at http://www.howstuffworks.com/diesell.htm (accessed June 17, 2002); see also
Kathleen M. Nauss and the HIE Diesel Working Group, Critical Issues in Assessing the
Carcinogenicity of Diesel Exhaust: A Synthesis of Current Knowledge, in HEALTH EFFECTS
INSTITUTE, DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH
EFFECTS 11, 13-14 (1995) [hereinafter Nauss et al., Diesel Exhaust]; WILEY, ENGINEERING,
supra note 120, at 357-58.
122. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 473.
123. Id.
124. Gasoline and diesel fuel are both distilled from petroleum, but diesel is made from
heavy components. Gasoline is a mixture of hydrocarbon chains from C7H16 to C,1 H24,
while diesel fuel comes from heavier components above C15. Marshall Brain, What Is the
Difference Between Gasoline, Kerosene, Diesel Fuel, Etc.?, available at http://www.how-
stuffworks.com/question105.htm (accessed June 22, 2002); see also IPCS, CRITERIA 171,
supra note 57, at 1. Perhaps the easiest way to appreciate the difference between diesel fuel
and gasoline is to consider that biodiesel, made from soybean or rapeseed oils, can be
substituted into diesel engines with few modifications to the engine, but not into gasoline
engines. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 104. Biodiesel is considerably
more expensive than diesel, however. Sharon Steele, Alternative Fuel Vehicle Fleet
Mandate, PUBLIC WORKS, March 1998, at 44, 48 (stating that the cost of biodiesel is two to
three times as great as regular diesel fuel).
125. The diesel combustion process remains poorly understood:
The processes that occur during diesel combustion are still somewhat mysterious in
spite of extensive attempts at photography and other, more advanced, optical
diagnostics. The environment in the diesel combustion chamber appears to be
designed to resist detailed investigation. It is small, hot, and subject to high
pressure and intense vibration. When windows are installed in the chamber to
observe the combustion, soot blocks the passage of light and quickly deposits on
the window, obscuring further investigation. The combustion involves gas, liquid,
and solid phases as well as complex physical processes and chemical reactions.
DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 91.
126. See Nauss et al., Diesel Exhaust, supra note 121, at 14 ("The diesel engine's unique
combustion process plays a large role in the output of pollutants."); James C. Clerc,
Catalytic Diesel Exhaust Aftertreatment, 10 APPLIED CATALYSIS B: ENVIRONMENTAL 99, 99-
102 (1996) [hereinafter Clerc, Catalytic] (noting differences in emissions); "The
requirements for diesel exhaust aftertreatment are unique from gasoline passenger car
catalysts due to emissions performance requirements, engine exhaust conditions, vehicle
application, and increased durability requirements." Id. at 113.
127. See IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 91 (up to 20 times as many particulates);
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Monoxide (CO), 128 and are more fuel efficient 129 than gasoline engines.
One important result of the differences in combustion technology is that
diesels have a higher compression ratio 30 than gasoline engines, making
them more efficient 131-so much so that the Diesel Engine Reference Book
terms them "the most efficient liquid fuel burning prime mover yet
derived."'' 32 This substantial fuel savings advantage is a major reason for
the transportation industry's preference for diesels over other possible
engine types (most notably gasoline-fueled spark ignition engines),1 33 with
diesels accounting for 80 percent of the trucks that haul freight across the
United States. Diesels are also "comparatively easy to maintain on site
without the need for fully skilled personnel except for certain nonroutine
tasks."' 134 Relative to gasoline engines, diesel use saves truckers as much as
$6,600,000 in fuel costs every year,' 35 and use only 70 percent of the fuel
that a comparable gasoline engine uses to provide the same power
output. 36  Diesel fuel economy for heavy duty engines has increased
sharply, with the typical fuel economy rising from 4.5-5 miles per gallon
(mpg) to 6.5-7 mpg between 1980 and 1990 due to aerodynamic
improvements, tire improvements, and engine improvements, particularly
electronic engine controllers.' 37 Fuel efficiency, however, is not the only
advantage diesels have over spark ignition engines. Diesel engines also
have greater packaging efficiency, 138 durability, 139 and safety. 14  As a
Nauss et al., Diesel Exhaust, supra note 121, at 14 (stating that NO, and particulates are the
"problem emissions" from diesels).
128. See Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 11 ("The diesel principle is by far the
best choice to minimize C0 2-emissions.").
129. See Kean et al., Assessment, supra note 78, at 1937 and accompanying text.
130. The high compression ratios are needed to ensure autoignition of the fuel. See
DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 473.
131. On average, diesel engines are around 25-35% more efficient than electric spark
ignition engines. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, DIESEL TECHNOLOGY AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 2 (2000); see also IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 111 ("Diesel
engines are the most efficient of all common types of combustion engines .... ).
132. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 5. Diesel fuel requires less
energy than gasoline to manufacture and has a higher energy content per gallon than
gasoline. Id. See also Diesel Hearings, supra note 117, at 8 (testimony of Dan Reicher,
Dep't of Energy) ("Most of the increase in highway transportation energy use since 1973
can be attributed to trucks.").
133. See id. at 13 (testimony of John C. Wall, Cummins Engine Co., Dep't of Energy)
(stating that diesel's fuel economy advantage is "one of the major economic factors that
drove the transition of heavy-duty trucks from gasoline to diesel in the 1970s").
134. WILEY, ENGINEERING, supra note 120, at 356.
135. The trucking industry uses over $11,000,000,000 worth of diesel fuel per year. See
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 58. Without the 35% fuel efficiency
savings, that would be $16,500,000. The difference (5.5 bn) calculated at an average US
gasoline price of $1.34 per gallon equates to $7,370,000 in savings. See U.S. Dep't of
Energy, Energy Info. Admin., available at http://www.eia.doe.gov (online data for U.S.
petroleum sales from 1994-2002).
136. See Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 810.
137. See Jim Mele, Good News for Fuel Economy, FLEET OWNER, Jan. 1991, at 80, 81.
138. Packaging efficiency refers to the higher power output levels, at low speeds, that
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result of these advantages, diesel's market share has increased significantly
since the 1970s, with its share of total highway fuel use increasing from 8.9
percent in 1973 to 20.6 percent in 2000.141 Diesel's growth in market share
was accompanied by a shift in diesel combustion technology, 142 with
turbocharged, after-cooled engines becoming dominant in the U.S. after the
1970s. 143 Although the use of turbochargers reduced NOx and particulate
emissions by approximately one-third, 44 the large increase in diesel's
market share and its greater NOx emissions relative to gasoline engines are
one of the reasons the EPA's models did not accurately predict the increase
in NOx emissions in the 1980s. Moreover, trucking deregulation brought
an increase in the volume of heavy-duty truck traffic in the 1980s and
1990s, 145 again boosting emissions outside the parameters of the EPA's
diesels are able to achieve. Diesels require less cooling than spark ignition engines and for
this reason they can generate more power at lower speeds. In the exhaust system of a typical
compression-ignition engine the temperature will average between 200 and 500 degrees
Celsius, whereas in the exhaust system of a typical spark-ignition engine the temperature
will average 400-600 degrees Celsius, and will rise to about 900 degrees Celsius at
maximum power. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 2.
139. Diesel engines are extremely durable, with an average heavy-duty truck engine
annually putting on 46,000 miles at average loads of 80,000 pounds, with average driving
speeds of 63.1 mph. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 2, 11.
140. The fuel used in diesel engines is less volatile and safer to store than other fuels.
This safety aspect to diesel engine use is attractive for certain applications including trucks
that ferry hazardous material, in fire fighting equipment, ambulances, military vehicles, and
school buses. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 2.
141. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 1999
(2000), tbs. MF-21, MF-33E annual. (Additional resources available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov). This increase is virtually entirely due to engines in trucking. See
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Diesel Hearings, supra note 117, at 3 (testimony of
Dan Reicher) ("[M]ost of the increase in highway transportation energy use since 1973 can
be attributed to trucks."). While diesel engines and diesel fuel use in passenger cars has
virtually ceased in the United States since 1988, their use in the trucking industry has gone
in the opposite direction. Today 100% of Class 8 trucks are diesel and Classes 1-7 are
increasingly diesel. Diesel use grew significantly in a relatively short period-a study of
Los Angeles trucks, for example, found 47% were diesel in 1971, up from only 22% in
1959. See WILBUR SMITH AND ASSOCIATES, HEAVY DUTY VEHICLE DRIVING PATTERN AND
USE SURVEY: PART II. Los ANGELES BASIN 23-25 (1974) (copy on file with authors).
During the 1970s diesel-powered heavy-duty trucks grew from 133,065 in 1972 to 210,144
at the end of the decade, while gasoline-powered heavy-duty trucks fell from 433,105 to
322,015 over the same period. See OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL,
EPA, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, AND NOx POLLUTANT
SPECIFIC STUDY FOR PROPOSED GASEOUS EMISSION REGULATIONS FOR 1985 AND LATER
MODEL YEAR LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS AND 1986 AND LATER MODEL YEAR HEAVY-DUTY
ENGINES 36-37 (1981).
142. Heavy-duty diesel engines have undergone "major advances" in technology over
the past 30 years, according to an EPA presentation. These include: "Near universal
turbocharging/Intercooling; Injection pressures have increased dramatically over time;
Sophisticated injection control; Completely redesigned combustion chambers; Dramatic
reductions in oil consumption; [and] Active electronic engine management." Chet France,
Engine Programs and Compliance Division, EPA Office of Mobile Sources, Accounting for
Off-Cycle NO, Emissions from Heavy-duty Diesels 4 (n.d.) (copy on file with authors).
143. Johnson, Review, supra note 106, at 79.
144. Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 827.
145. Truck registrations have grown by 70% in the past three decades, while miles
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modeling. 146
A. Regulatory Consequences
Diesel's advantages are at least partially offset by some disadvantages.
Two California regulators recently labeled diesel engines "inherently
dirty."'147  Diesel emissions are unpleasant to breathe and considered
"probably carcinogenic to humans," although "no quantitative data are
available for estimating human risk."'148 Diesel emissions appear to present
some risk to humans: in particular, diesel particulate emissions are "very
small ... making them readily respirable" and have "hundreds of chemicals
adsorbed onto their surfaces, including many known or suspected mutagens
and carcinogens."
149
The EPA, like the regulatory agencies of most other industrialized
countries, regulates four components of diesel exhaust: CO, hydrocarbons,
particulates, and NOx. The first three are the result of incomplete
traveled and fuel used has more than doubled. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 1999, (2001) tbl. MV1 and annual. (Additional resources
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov). Freight activity through the single-mode
transportation of trucks has grown 20.6% between just 1993 and 1997; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, FREIGHT USA, (2000). (Additional resources
available at: http://www.bts.gov/cfs). To give some idea of the importance of the sector to
the overall economy, in 1997 there were 104,000 establishments involved primarily in truck
transportation, employing 1.3 million people and garnering revenues totaling $141 billion.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS, SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 1997, tbl. 1 (2000). Trucking and warehousing accounted for 1.2% of the nation's
GDP in 1997. CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 9.
146. See supra note 77.
147. Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 811.
148. IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 98; see also id. at 240 ("A quantitative
assessment of the risk for humans of non-carcinogenic effects of exposure to diesel exhaust
cannot be made on the basis of studies in humans."); id. at 254 (stating that for lung cancer
"historical measurements of exposure to diesel exhaust are unreliable and exist only for
current workers in two industries. A quantitative risk assessment cannot be conducted on
the basis of epidemiological data in which job title was used as a surrogate of exposure ....
Consequently, there are no human data suitable for estimating unit risk"). Id. at 254 ("The
risk for urinary bladder cancer cannot be assessed from the available epidemiological
data."). Risk can only be based on animal studies and suggests increased risk of lung cancer
with increased exposure. Id. at 273-76. However, caution is needed in relying on animal
studies because tumors appear in rat but not mouse or hamster studies. See HEALTH EFFECTS
INST., DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH
EFFECTS 5, 7 (1995); see also Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 815-21 (discussing
literature on health effects). The health effects of diesel emissions continue to spark
controversy. See W.K.C. Morgan et al., Health Effects of Diesel Emissions, 41 ANN. OCC.
HYG. 643, 655-56 (1997) ("Summing up, in spite of the vast number of published
epidemiological studies, none has provided convincing evidence that there is an increased
risk of cancer from diesel exhaust emissions."); Michel P. Guillemin, Letter to the Editor,
42 ANN. Occ. HYG. 63 (1998) ("[lIt is unacceptable to assert that the weight of the evidence
is against" the hypothesis that diesel emissions cause cancer.); W.K.C. Morgan & R.B.
Reger, Reply, ANN. OcC. HYG. 65 (1998) (disagreeing with Guillemin).
149. HEALTH EFFECTS INST., DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS,
EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 5 (1995).
[56:2
2004] EPA 'S REGULATION OF HEA VY-DUTY DIESEL ENGINES 433
combustion; NO,., however, is a side effect of combustion.15 CO
emissions are not a significant problem for diesel engines. 151 Hydrocarbon
emissions can be solved by measures to reduce particulate emissions or
improve fuel efficiency with diesel engines.152  Particulate and NO,,
emissions are thus the major problems.1 53
Diesel emissions are the result of complex processes and, consequently,
are difficult to model. 154 Even today, modeling of diesel emissions lags
behind gasoline engine emissions modeling, 55 complicating regulation and
control. Briefly, exhaust emissions are the sum of the emissions
formulated in the initial fuel spray, together with additional formations
from the cylinder and the exhaust system, less emissions eliminated in the
cylinder and exhaust system due to further combustion and chemical
reactions. 56  Different pollutants form at different locations in the
150. See DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 479.
151. See id. (stating that diesel CO emissions "are normally well below legislated limits
and not of much concern" due to lean fuel mixture).
152. See id. ("Engine changes that reduce particulate emissions and fuel consumption
also tend to reduce HC emissions: all derive from combustion inefficiency.").
153. See id. at 480 ("Particulate matter (PM) is the other diesel emission-along with
NOx--of most concern."); see also IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 138 ("Particulate
matter appears to be the most relevant fraction of diesel exhaust for the general
population."). Trucks also contribute disproportionately to NOx problems. For example, in
1991 trucks were estimated to contribute 33% of NO,, emissions but only 8% of smog
constituent gases in the Los Angeles area. Mark Larson, Truckers Warily Eye Proposed
Clean-Air Standards, THE BUSINESS JOURNAL SERVING GREATER SACRAMENTO 16 (1991).
They also contribute significantly to particulate emissions, with 1998 data suggesting diesel
emissions make up 6% of total ambient regulated particulates and 23% of particulates
excluding "natural and miscellaneous sources." U.S. EPA, NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL.
ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., EPA/600/8-90/057E, HEALTH ASSESSMENT
DOCUMENT FOR DIESEL EXHAUST 1-2 (draft July 2000).
154. Clark et al., Emissions Modeling, supra note 62, at 122, states that:
The task of emissions modeling is quite complex given the high number of factors
that affect the emissions signature of an engine during operation. Clearly an
engine's emissions will vary as a function of engine operating conditions (i.e.
speed, load, and their transients), engine operating temperature, ambient
atmospheric conditions, engine control, and fuel. Design variations between
different engine models such as port and piston-head geometry, fuel injectors, and
fuel injection control strategies will also effect emissions. Research ... showed
emissions to vary slightly for the same engine exercised through the same test cycle
with a different stock electronic controller.
See also IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 93 ("[D]iesel exhaust is a complex mix of a
great variety of compounds .. "); HEALTH EFFECTS INST., DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 5 (1995) ("Diesel engine
emissions are highly complex mixtures. They consist of a wide range of organic and
inorganic compounds distributed among the gaseous and particulate phases.").
155. See Clark et al., Factors Affecting, supra note 62, at 84 ("Prediction of heavy-duty
diesel vehicle emissions inventory is substantially less mature than the prediction of
gasoline passenger car emissions.").
156. The effect of further reactions during the process generally adds NO, and eliminates
incomplete oxidation products. See N.A. Henein, Diesel Engines Combustion and
Emissions, in ENGINE EMISSIONS: POLLUTANT FORMATION AND MEASUREMENT (George S.
Springer & Donald J. Patterson, eds., 1973) 211, 228 [hereinafter Henein, Combustion].
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process.157  How much of each is produced and emitted depends on a
variety of factors, including oxygen concentration, temperature, timing, the
amount of mixing of fuel and air, and fuel characteristics. 58 As an engine
operates, conditions change and therefore the amount and mix of emissions
change. 59 Thus, as the load on the engine increases, the emissions of total
unburned hydrocarbons falls but the mixture of types of hydrocarbons
changes, with more of some and less of others. 60  Other emissions are
similarly affected in complex ways.' 6' The impact of various technologies
varies with operating conditions. 62  Multiple characteristics of diesel fuel
also have an impact on emissions. 63 Finally, as with all mobile sources,
157. See P.S. Myers et al., Engine Exhaust Emissions, in ENGINE EMISSIONS: POLLUTANT
FORMATION AND MEASUREMENT (George S. Springer and Donald J. Patterson, eds., 1973) 1,
9-10 [hereinafter Myers et al., Engine Exhaust] (stating that NO, emissions are determined
by their level of formation during the early, high-temperature portion of the combustion
process.); Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 6.
158. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 228; Myers et al., Engine Exhaust,
supra note 157, at 11 ("[I]gnition timing exerts a strong influence on NO levels due both to
its influence on the time available for NO formation and on temperatures."); DIESEL ENGINE
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 461 ("[F]uel properties are also capable of influencing
smoke emissions."); IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 1 ("The quality and composition
of diesel fuel influence the emissions of pollutants from diesel engines considerably.");
Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 813 ("The exact composition of exhaust depends on
operational parameters, such as speed, motor load, engine and vehicle type, fuel
composition, ambient temperature, and relative humidity.").
159. See IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 92 (discussing that "exhaust emissions
depend on driving cycle (transient or steady state), engine conditions (injection and
aspiration techniques, maintenance, total mileage), and fuel composition (sulfur content,
aromaticity, volatility); adjustment of the engine plays a major role").
160. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 229-32; see also Clark et al., Emissions
Modeling, supra note 62, at 122 (stating that "[c]learly an engine's emissions will vary as a
function of engine operating conditions (i.e. speed, load, and their transients), engine
operating temperature, ambient atmospheric conditions, engine control, and fuel. Design
variations between different engine models such as port and piston-head geometry, fuel
injectors, and fuel injection control strategies will also effect emissions. Research...
showed emissions to vary slightly for the same engine exercised through the same test cycle
with a different stock electronic controller"). Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157,
at 11 ("Nitric oxide formation rates tend to increase with increasing pressure. Therefore
engine emissions tend to increase with increasing load.").
161. Increasing the fuel-air ratio first lowers, then increases CO emissions. See Henein,
Combustion, supra note 156, at 234. Likewise, "nitric oxide formation in the diesel engine
is influenced by the combustion pressure and temperature, and by the time available for
combustion. For this reason, nitric oxide levels tend to increase with advanced injection
timing and with increased compression ratio or increased manifold temperature." See also
Myers et al., supra note 157, at 14. Smoke emissions, the first diesel emission regulated by
the federal government, are affected by factors such as injection timing, nozzle size, ratio of
nozzle hole length to diameter, air temperature, and after-injection of fuel. See Henein,
supra note 156, at 238-240.
162. See Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 6 ("At full load.., decreasing fuelling
results in reduced NO, emission, whereas at part load ... NO. initally increases before
diminishing later on."); see also Johnson, Review, supra note 106, at 25 ("[A]mbient
temperatures can impact nanoparticle number, wherein the colder temperatures result in
higher nanoparticle concentrations.").
163. See Rob Lee et al., Fuel Quality Impact on Heavy Duty Diesel Emissions: A
Literature Review, in DIESEL EMISSIONS (SP-1397) 13, 14 (1998) [hereinafter Lee et al.,
Fuel Quality].
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driver behavior dramatically affects emissions.' 64 Control strategies and
emissions modeling must consider all these factors. The key point to take
from this discussion is that diesel combustion has been and continues to be
poorly understood compared to spark ignition engines' combustion and
therefore the solutions to emissions problems require relatively larger
advances in scientific understanding. Moreover, diesel exhaust's
characteristics make post-combustion treatment more difficult than for
spark-ignition engines.
Because of the differences in technology and combustion between diesel
and gasoline engines, regulators in the United States, European Union, and
Japan have regulated diesel emissions separately from gasoline engine
emissions. 165 Although today diesels are recognized as a significant source
of air pollution,' 66 diesels were initially regulated much less heavily than
gasoline engines. 167 Indeed, at least one early report on air pollution
depicted diesels as preferable to contemporaneous gasoline engines., 68 As
164. See LENZ & CozzARrm, supra note 57, at 96-97 (1999).
165. Diesel emissions are different from gasoline engines:
Diesel-powered engines emit significantly less CO than comparable gasoline
engines. HC emissions from diesels are comparable to those of gasoline vehicles,
but diesel engines generally produce more of the kinds of HC emissions associated
with cancer. NOx emissions from diesels, however, are considerably higher than
from comparable gasoline vehicles due to the higher temperature combustion, the
oxygen concentration, and residence time of the fuel.
Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 395 (citations omitted). Particulate emissions are
much greater from diesel engines. Id. at 396.
166. See, e.g., Michael P. Walsh, Global Trends in Diesel Emissions Regulation-A
2001 Update, in DIESEL EXHAUST EMISSIONS CONTROL: DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATION AND
CATALYTIC SYSTEMS (SP-1581) 1, 2 (2001) [hereinafter Walsh, Global Trends] (Diesel
vehicle emissions are a significant source of both NO, and particulate pollution problems);
Union of Concerned Scientists, Diesel Engines and Public Health, at http://www.ucsusa.
org/cleanvehicles/trucksand buses/page.cfm?pagelD=238 (accessed June 17, 2002) ("With
mounting evidence that diesel exhaust poses major health hazards, reducing diesel pollution
has become a public priority."). Ambient data is "sparse" but measurements in Los Angeles
in the 1980s found "diesel emissions accounted for approximately 3% of the mass of total
particulate matter and 7% of the mass of fine particles emitted into the atmosphere," results
that accord with the EPA models. HEALTH EFFECTS INST., DIESEL EXHAUST: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF EMISSIONS, EXPOSURE, AND HEALTH EFFECTS 6 (1995).
167. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERV., ENVTL.
HEALTH SERV., NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR
CARBON MONOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDE, AND HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS FROM MOBILE
SOURCES 3-6 (1970) ("By comparison with the effort expended with respect to the gasoline
engine, very little has been done regarding control of hydrocarbon, CO and NO, emissions
from diesel engines.").
168. See Ralph I. Larsen, Motor Vehicle Emissions and Their Effects, 77 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 963, 968 (1962) (noting that automobiles are "far" from meeting California air quality
standards, while "lean-fuel" engines, including diesels, "can meet both carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbon standards"); see also MARTHA JOHNSON, IMPROVING MOTOR TRUCK
SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC UTILIZATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 86 (1975)
("One of the major areas of research in recent years has been the search for alternative
powerplants to replace the gasoline engine."); PHILIP S. MYERS, THE DIESEL ENGINE FOR
TRUCK APPLICATION 4 (1975) (making only the brief note during a lecture surveying diesel
engines that they must be "ecologically acceptable under the determined operating
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a result, diesel emissions control standards and technology have lagged
behind gasoline engine control standards and technology. 169 As total and
per-engine emissions from gasoline engines declined due to control
measures, the relative share of diesel engine emissions in total pollutant
loadings has increased. The absolute and relative share of diesel engines in
the marketplace also increased, prompting the Los Angeles Times to call it
"one of the last great problems in complying with federal clean air
mandates."1
70
Reasons for the difference in treatment include diesel's small market
share in the 1970s and the perception that diesel engines had fewer
emissions problems than gasoline engines, which focused regulators'
attentions elsewhere. Consequently, most scientific attention was focused
on gasoline engine emissions, and relatively little was known about the
science of diesel engine emissions into the 1970s.17 2 Even today the Diesel
conditions-it must not put out unacceptable exhaust emissions or noise while providing the
performance demanded of it").
169. Sawyer & Johnson, supra note 106, at 69 ("Heavy-duty vehicle emission standards
have lagged behind those for light-duty vehicles, both in time of introduction and
stringency.").
170. See Bravo for Diesel Emission Rules, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at B8; see also
Sawyer and Johnson, supra note 106, at 66; MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD
COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at x ("Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the California Air Resources Board predict that, because of reductions in NO, emissions
from other sources, the relative importance of NOx emissions from heavy-duty vehicles will
increase over the next decade."); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and
New Motor Vehicle Engines: Certification and Test Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,292 (May
24, 1976) ("As standards on light duty vehicles and light duty trucks are made more
stringent, a larger portion of these pollutants will come from heavy duty vehicles."). In
1968 diesel emissions from all diesel motor vehicles were estimated to be 400,000 tons/year
out of 32,000,000 tons/year of hydrocarbons (1.25%); 200,000 tons/year out of 100,100,000
tons/year of CO (0.2%); and 600,000 tons/year out of 20,700,000 tons/year of NO, (2.89%).
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERVICE, ENvTL. HEALTH
SERVICE, NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR CARBON
MONOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDE, AND HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS FROM MOBILE SOURCES 2-15,
tbl. 2-3 (1970). By 1995, on road heavy duty diesel engines accounted for approximately
one quarter of US mobile source NOx emissions and one twelfth of total man-made
emissions of NOx. Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2174:
171. See, e.g., NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.,
AND WELFARE, CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR CARBON MONOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDE, AND
HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS FROM MOBILE SOURCES 5-19 to 5-21 (1970) (reporting expert
opinion that prospects for developing emissions control techniques for diesels were poor in
most cases); Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157, at 16 ("Generally, in well-
designed diffusion combustion systems,... total hydrocarbon emissions are not a serious
problem, at least relative to the spark-ignition engine."); CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 89, at
1 (noting that he distrust of automobile manufacturers that drove some of the regulatory
agenda of the 1960s and 1970s may not have extended to the heavy-duty engine industry).
172. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 212 ("A review of the literature on
transportation engine emissions shows that most of the work has been related to the spark-
ignition (SI) engine in which a flame propagates in a homogeneous fuel-air mixture. Few
studies have been directed to the mechanisms of emission formation in other systems, such
as diesel engines and gas turbines, in which the mixture is heterogeneous."). "Most of the
data related to [spray formation and droplet size distribution in] diesel engines was
published about 35 years ago." Id. at 260. A review of testing procedures in 1979 noted
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Engine Reference Book describes diesel combustion processes "still
somewhat mysterious." 173  "Only in the late 1970s, when domestic and
foreign motor vehicle manufacturers announced that they would be
introducing diesel-powered passenger cars into the United States, did the
research and regulatory communities become concerned about the
carcinogenic potential of diesel exhaust"'' 74 and launch major research
programs into the health effects of diesel exhausts.175 Diesel emissions
regulation is thus a relatively late development in Clean Air Act mobile
source regulation.
B. Emissions Controls
Emissions controls for diesel engines were initially relatively primitive.
For example, the odor of diesel engines has long been a problem,1 76 but the
EPA initially regulated only "soot" emissions. 77 Since the 1970s it has
been known that engine conditions, including whether the engine is
accelerating or decelerating, significantly affect diesel emissions. 178 This,
coupled with customer demand for fuel efficiency,179 led to the initial
control of diesel emissions being done largely through changes in the
combustion process rather than changes in the postcombustion
techniques. 80  These combustion process controls were relatively
that much of the development of measurement techniques for SO, and particulates
developed during the mid-to-late 1970s as the result of the EPA-initiated research. See
Harry E. Dietzmann & Frank M. Black, Unregulated Emissions Measurement Methodology,
in THE MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL OF DIESEL PARTICULATE EMISSIONS, PART 2 165, 180
(1981).
173. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 91.
174. Nauss et al., supra note 121, at 16.
175. Id. The EPA's "first comprehensive review of the potential health effects from
ambient exposure to exhaust from diesel engines" did not even reach draft form until mid-
2000. See EPA, NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV.,
EPA/600/8-90/057E, HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR DIESEL EXHAUST 1-1 (draft July 2000).
176. See, e.g., Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157, at 21 ("Ever since the first
diesel engine was developed, the odor from its exhaust has been recognized as
undesirable.").
177. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 33 Fed. Reg. 8306 (June 4, 1968) (establishing that hydrocarbon and CO standards
for heavy-duty gasoline powered engines (Subpart D) differentiated from heavy-duty diesel
exhaust emissions standards contained in Subpart E. "Attention on the visible sooty exhaust
emissions, and their associated health risks, typically associated with diesel engines, led to
the introduction of controls on smoke and particulates." DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK,
supra note 64, at 473.
178. See, e.g., Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157, at 25 (describing emissions
cycles for naturally aspirated and turbocharged diesel engines).
179. Market demand for fuel efficiency rose to 7-8 mpg in 1994, up from 5-6 mpg five
years earlier. See DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 555 (comparing 1994
market demand of 7-8 miles per gallon to market demand of 5-6 miles per gallon five years
earlier).
180. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 260; Sawyer & Johnson, supra note
106, at 73 ("emissions reductions to date have resulted from modifications to the combustion
processes.").
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inexpensive.' 81 By comparison, emissions control of gasoline engines was
largely accomplished with post-combustion techniques, such as catalytic
converters and fuel modifications, such as removing lead from gasoline.
The more stringent diesel standards of the future will likely require new
post-combustion techniques, 82 and hence, new technologies. 83 These
controls are more expensive. For example, lifetime costs for the pull-ahead
MY 2004 engine standards, including fuel economy penalties caused by
emissions controls, are estimated to be between $3,000 and $5,000.184
Emissions control regulations now dominate engine manufacturers'
decision making; in fact, one independent industry analyst concluded that
"[i]t is redundant to say that almost every action taken by the diesel engine
181. Lawrence White estimated their cost at approximately $500 per vehicle in 1981.
See WHITE, supra note 43, at 65-66.
182. See Don Lang, Suppliers Doubt They Can Meet 2007 Diesel Emission Standards,
TRANSPORT ToPics 1, 11 (Dec. 18, 2000) (2007 standards cannot be met by changes to
engine alone according to two engine manufacturers). Franz X. Moser, Theodor Sams and
Wolfgang Cartellieri, Impact of Future Exhaust Gas Emission Legislation on the Heavy
Duty Truck Engine, in DIESEL EXHAUST EMISSIONS CONTROL: DEVELOPMENTS 1N
REGULATION AND CATALYTIC SYSTEMS (SP-1581) 53 (2001) [hereinafter Moser et al.,
Impact] (mandated emissions reductions "cannot be achieved by internal engine measures
alone"); Charles Schenk et al., High-Efficiency NO, and PM Exhaust Emission Control for
Heavy-Duty On-Highway Diesel Engines-Part Two in DIESEL EMISSION CONTROL
SYSTEMS (SP-1641) 39 (2001) [hereinafter Schenk et al., High-Efficiency] (MY 2007
standards "will likely require highly efficient catalysts and other exhaust emission controls
that can provide an order of magnitude reduction in diesel emissions beyond the 2004
emissions standards"); P. Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 9 (discussing need for
aftertreatment of exhausts); see also Diesel Technology for the 21st Century 1, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong., 14
(1998) (testimony of John C. Wall, Cummins Engine Company, Inc.) ("We're working on
two fronts to try to reduce emissions. One is working on combustion development .... The
second is after-treatment technology, where we process the exhaust after the combustion
process with essentially chemical plants, if you will, in the exhaust system."); Sawyer et al.,
supra note 26, at 2169 ("[N]ew after treatment systems will likely be required" to meet new
standards.).
183. See Josd M. Desantes et al., Influence of the EGR Rate, Oxygen Concentration and
Equivalent Fuel/Air Ratio on the Combustion Behaviour and Pollutant Emissions of a
Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine, in COMBUSTION IN DIESEL AND SI ENGINES (SP- 1549) 51 (2000)
("To meet these future emission standards, the introduction of new technologies seems to be
mandatory, considering that specific fuel consumption must, at least, be kept at current
levels, if not improved."); Schenk et al., High-Efficiency, supra note 182, at 39 (stating that
MY 2007 standards "will likely require highly efficient catalysts and other exhaust emission
controls that can provide an order of magnitude reduction in diesel emissions beyond the
2004 emissions standard"); Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 6 ("It is obvious that
current fuel systems cannot fulfil the ideal requirements. Herein new systems are needed.
Further reductions in NOx-emission standards may well force the development of new
injection systems with rate shaping techniques .. "); Walsh, Global Trends, supra note
166, at 10 (indicating that the MY 2007 particulate standard "is projected to require the
addition of highly efficient PM traps to diesel engines;" NO, standard "is projected to
require the addition of a highly efficient NO, emission control system to diesel engines").
The EPA acknowledged that new technologies will be needed to meet the NO, standard in
its proposal: "our proposed NO, standard represents an ambitious target for this
technology." 65 Fed. Reg. 35,430, 35,435 (June 2, 2000).
184. See David Cullen, The '02 Engine Decision: High Stakes at Risk, FLEET OWNER,
April 2002, at 20-21.
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manufacturer is related to or governed by emissions issues.'' 85
Because of the importance of combustion techniques in controlling
diesel emissions, 186 the development of engine controls has been, and will
continue to be, critical to the ability to improve emissions control.
87
Electronic engine controls created an entirely new level of ability to control
combustion in both diesel and gasoline engines and eventually did so
relatively inexpensively. 88  As microprocessor costs fell, the use of
electronic controls became viable in more vehicles.189  "Since the first
185. RHEIN Assocs., INC., THE FUTURE OF DIESEL ENGINES 16 (5th ed., 2002)
[hereinafter RHEIN, 5TH EDITION]. Rhein continued to consider this to be true, repeating the
statement in the November 2003 edition of its report. RHEIN Assocs., INC., THE FUTURE OF
DIESEL ENGINES 16 (7th ed., Nov. 2003) [hereinafter RHEIN, 7TH EDITION].
186. See Steve Sturgess, On-Highway Emissions Drive New Intros, CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT, Apr. 1994, at 26, 27, stating that to achieve emissions reductions:
[E]xtremely sensitive fuel controls have been developed along with internal engine
hardware changes. Fortunately, the adoption of more-accurate fuel control, made
possible in part through the use of electronics, addresses many of the areas that
cause NO, and particulates while positively impacting fuel economy. Hence the
widespread adoption of on-engine electronics for 1994.
187. Moser et al., Impact, supra note 182, at 53 (noting that "sophisticated electronic
control strategies will be required" to meet future emissions requirements). "The electronic
fuel system control offers the well known freedom to minimize the various trade-offs (HC-
NO,-Particulates-BSFC) as a function of speed, load and ambient conditions in steady state
and in transient operation. For the latter, the control of fuel metering and injection timing
during cold starting, warming-up, acceleration (load pick-up), and at altitude operations will
be a necessity for the clean diesel engine." Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 5. Ruud
Verbeek et al., DAF Euro-4 Heavy Duty Diesel Engine with TNO EGR System and CRT
Particulates Filter, in DIESEL EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGY (SP-1626) 89, 91 (2001) ("The
control of EGR during transients is very important, because it affects NO, and PM emission
and driveability. For example, if EGR is continuously enabled during a step-load (0 to 100%
torque), the NO, emission will be very low, however the PM emission will dramatically
increase and/or the torque response will deteriorate. Therefore EGR needs to be disabled
during these kinds of transients."); Sturgess, supra note 186, at 27 ("Adoption of electronic
controls has meant more accurate injection. Timing and duration are now varied to tailor the
engines' performance and economy characteristics."); Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36,
Appendix J (noting "an electronic timing control system can significantly improve on the
NOx/particulate and NOx/fuel economy trade-offs possible with static or mechanically
variable injection timing"); IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 92 (stating that
"adjustment of the engine plays a major role" in determining exhaust emissions); Sawyer &
Johnson, supra note 106, at 76 ("Electronic fuel system control is also necessary for
minimizing trade-offs among hydrocarbons, NO,, the solids or carbonaceous fraction, and
fuel consumption as a function of speed, load, and ambient conditions."); Motor Vehicle
Nitrogen Oxides Standard Committee, supra note 64, at 24 (technical experts "reported
improvements in [the 10 to 15%] range when the latest generation of mechanical controls
were replaced by electronic systems"); WILEY, ENGINEERING, supra note 120, at 362 ("The
modem critical needs for fuel economy and environmental compliance have led to
increasing sophisticated governor systems being developed.").
188. See Detroit Finally Wakes Up to Electronics, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1976, at 90
(quoting Chrysler engineer that "[n]o matter how we calculate the cost of various engine
control schemes, the lowest-priced system uses a microprocessor").
189. See id. at 91-92 (noting that it was cost that delayed introduction of
microprocessors); Detroit's New Appetite for Electronic Controls, Bus. WK., Aug. 29, 1977,
at 65 (noting that microprocessor in 1977 was a "costly addition to a product where costs are
calculated to fractions of a cent" and where microprocessors added up to $400 to a car's
cost).
439
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
introduction of fully controlled electronic engines in 1983, the changes in
engine control... have been revolutionary."' 90 The EPA endorsed this
view of electronic controls as critical to emissions control in a 1981
technical review: "In short, the field of electronic controls-which have
already revolutionized the light-duty fleet and which will certainly be
carried over into the heavy-duty gasoline engine fleet is a control strategy
which the EPA believes will permit significant NO, reductions to be
realized at minimum [fuel economy] penalty."' 91 Similarly, two California
air quality regulators concluded in 2001 that "[e]lectronic computer control
has also improved emissions."'
' 92
These controls, which developed in response to emissions controls,
193
allowed for the first time variations in a number of engine parameters to
meet performance criteria, such as emissions standards or maximizing fuel
economy. 194  Engine manufacturers tout these controls as allowing
manufacturers to "tailor the performance of [their] engines to the individual
needs of their customers"' 95 and to prevent sacrificing fuel economy to
meeting more stringent emissions standards.' 96  Controllers can save
190. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 556.
191. EPA OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, REGULATORY ANALYSIS,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, AND NO,, POLLUTANT SPECIFIC STUDY FOR PROPOSED
GASEOUS EMISSION REGULATIONS FOR 1985 AND LATER MODEL YEAR LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS
AND 1986 AND LATER MODEL YEAR HEAVY-DUTY ENGINES 76 (1981).
192. Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 827.
193. Jim Mele, Integrating Vehicle Electronics: Plugging into the Network, 92 FLEET
OWNER 60, 62 (1997) ("Pushed by emissions requirements, engine makers were the first to
develop sophisticated electronic controls for heavy trucks .. "); Detroit Finally Wakes Up
to Electronics, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1976, 91 (noting that electronic controls in cars
developed in response to emissions regulations).
194. See, e.g., Frank Najlepszy, Dynamic Diesels, MACHINE DESIGN, Oct. 22, 1998, at 1,
3 (describing Cummins' Signature 600 engine as "designed around and for electronic
controls" that "monitors and controls the fuel, air and combustion subsystems for each
individual cylinder .. "); DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 555 (stating
that engine manufacturers have met demand for fuel economy "mainly through the use of
electronic controls, advanced materials, and innovative design approaches, coupled with
more aerodynamic vehicles and matching the entire driveline for a given set of operating
requirements"); Michael P. Walsh & Ron Bradow, Diesel Particulate Control Around the
World, in SAE International Congress & Exposition, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DIESEL
PARTICULATE CONTROL 1, 10 (1991) ("The advent of computerized electronic engine control
systems has greatly increased the potential flexibility and precision of fuel metering and
injection timing controls. In addition, it has made possible whole new classes of control
functions, such as road speed governing, alterations in control strategy during transients,
synchronous idle speed control, and adaptive learning-including strategies to identify and
compensate for the effects of wear and component to component variation in the fuel
injection system.").
195. See, e.g., CUMMINS 1997 ANNUAL REPORT: SHAREHOLDERS LETTER at 5 (copy on
file with authors); see also George L. Snyder, Engine Makers Push for More Efficiency,
FLEET OWNER, Sept. 1987, at 104, 108 (discussing that engine controllers allow
manufacturers to optimize engine for power, fuel economy, or faster response).
196. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MONCELLE & G. CLARK FORTUNE, SAE TECHNICAL PAPER
SERIES 850,173, CATERPILLAR 3406 PEEC (PROGRAMABLE ELECTRONIC ENGINE CONTROL)
10 (1985) (stating that a 4,7% decline in fuel economy happens under more stringent
California standard with mechanical controller; fuel economy penalty "can be significantly
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"thousands of dollars per truck in fuel costs a year."' 197  By allowing
upgrades to in-use engines, existing engines can easily be made to run
cleaner if new engine settings were found that improved emissions
control.
198
Engine controls can now engage in adaptive learning to optimize
performance, further complicating regulatory measures that rely on fixed
performance criteria. 199  Electronic controls also complicate emissions
predictions200 and make far greater demands on emissions testing
0
'
because they enable the engine to operate quite differently depending on
conditions, leading to large differences in emissions under different
operating conditions. With the evolution of electronic engine controls
came the concern that the controls might be too sophisticated for existing
emissions test cycles. 202 A 1993 Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) report, for example, noted that it was now
possible
for a manufacturer to formally meet the legal requirements and at the
same time circumvent these for engine conditions that are not prevalent
in the cycle. Traditionally with gasoline and diesel vehicles this was of
little concern, since the relatively crude means to adapt engine settings
reduced" by electronic controller).
197. See William B. Cassidy, Electronic Engines Get High Marks, FLEET OWNER, Aug.
1988, at 68.
198. See Cat Tackles Emissions, FLEET OWNER, August. 2001 ("Cat also announced new
electronic calibrations that it said will cut NO, levels by as much as 7% on most 1993-1998
Cat midrange and heavy-duty truck engines. 'The new calibrations will greatly reduce NO,
emissions from in-service engines,' said [Caterpillar marketing manager David] Semlow,
'but will in no way affect performance, reliability or fuel economy.' He said all that is
required is a simple recalibration that can be performed at any Cat authorized dealer."); Jim
Mele, The First Look at 1991 Engines, FLEET OWNER, Nov. 1989, at 76, 79 (noting Detroit
Diesel electronic controllers could be reprogrammed to meet MY 1991 emissions standards
and drivers will be unable to tell the difference).
199. See Sawyer et al., supra note 26, at 2164 (explaining the adaptive learning process).
200. See Clark et al., Factors Affecting, supra note 62, at 94 ("Timing variations in
electronically controlled diesel engines present the single greatest obstacle to present-day
mobile source emissions inventory prediction.").
201. See Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36, at app. J ("A potential drawback of the
increasing use of electronic controls is the demand that it places on the emissions test
procedure [because it could be programmed to recognize test cycles] . . . . The earlier
mechanical controls were incapable of such sophisticated control strategies.").
202. Not surprisingly, given that the federal test procedures (FTPs) specified exact
conditions under which engines would be tested, the EPA sometimes had to revise
procedures to account for emissions from conditions not being tested. For example, in its
1995 support document for the revised test standard for light duty vehicles, the EPA noted
that particular types of driving previously not tested had been discovered to be the source of
higher emissions. "One possible explanation of these emission increases is that the engines
were not calibrated for emission control during the higher engine loads associated with
aggressive driving, as these loads are not encountered during current FTP testing." EPA,
OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, OFFICE OF MOBILE SOURCES, CERTIFICATION DIVISION,
SUPPORT DOCUMENT TO THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR REVISIONS TO THE FEDERAL TEST
PROCEDURE: DETAILED DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS app. J. (1995) (copy on file with
authors).
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(e.g. injection timing) to engine conditions (e.g. load) did not allow for
this. With the advent of electronic engine controls, however, engine
manufacturers can make their engine control strategies almost arbitrarily
complex. A test procedure which measures only at a limited number of
specific operating conditions, or which concentrates in selected areas of
the operating range, makes it easy for a manufacturer to optimize for
emissions only in the conditions being tested. For example, in a steady-
state test, a manufacturer could optimize for emission in the speed/load
plane around each test point, while in the remainder of the speed/load
plane optimizing for fuel economy and performance instead.
203
The diesel engine development story is thus quite straightforward:
Emissions controls developed in response to technology-forcing mandates
from the EPA. The natural avenue for diesel engine emissions regulation
was increasing the efficiency of combustion rather than changing the post-
combustion treatment of exhaust or the composition of diesel fuel.
Developing sophisticated electronic engine controls was thus the natural
outcome of the EPA's technology-forcing mobile source regulations.
Much as the space program also produced spin-off benefits like Tang,® a
byproduct of the technology needed to meet emissions standards the engine
controllers allowed engine manufacturers to also improve engine
performance in customer-demanded characteristics such as fuel economy.
Because of the structure of test procedures, engines could simultaneously
satisfy the EPA's test requirements and customers' demands for fuel
economy by minimizing emissions during test cycle conditions and
maximizing mileage at other times. This result was the natural outcome of
the structure of the EPA's regulations and market forces. Indeed, any
engine manufacturer that had not adopted such a strategy would have
suffered market share losses as customers would have chosen competitors'
more desirable engines. Our analysis is thus not merely hindsight, and, as
the 1993 OECD report quoted above indicates, it is consistent with
contemporaneous analyses.
C. Tradeoffs in Controls
Because there are tradeoffs between control of different pollutants,
increasing controls on one may increase emissions of another. For
example, one early study found that earlier injection of fuel in the
combustion cycle reduced smoke exhaust but increased NOx emissions,
while retarding injection timing reduced NOx but increased unburned
hydrocarbons.20 4 Similarly, exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) systems 20 5 can
203. Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36, at 5 app. J.
204. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 255-56; see also Reitze, Mobile
Source, supra note 56, at 324 ("[T]he deliberate detuning of an engine, such as occurs when
the spark timing is retarded, results in reduced NO,, although HC and CO can rise ... using
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reduce NO, emissions, but may increase soot and CO emissions.2 6 EGR
systems can also potentially shorten engine life207-the catalysts needed to
regenerate filters for nanoparticles oxidize SO 2 to form sulfates, often
resulting in more soot in engine oil.20 8 The Diesel Engine Reference Book
even refers to a "natural tradeoff between particulate emissions and NOx"
as "one of the critical challenges in the design of diesel combustion
engine modifications to control NO, usually increases HC and CO emissions which are then
subject to cleanup using post-combustion controls such as catalytic converters."); DIESEL
ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 93 (noting that soot can be reduced by higher
injection pressure but that it will produce more NO.); MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES
STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 75 ("Hydrocarbons interact with sunlight and NO2
to form oxidants, which in general produce the same kinds of lung damage as NO2. Hence, a
rise in hydrocarbon emissions tends to vitiate the health benefits of reduced NO,
emissions."). Similarly, using super high pressure injection systems can reduce soot, but
increase NO,. See Hajime Fujimoto et al., New Concept on Lower Exhaust Emission of
Diesel Engine, in DIESEL ENGINE COMBUSTION AND EMISSIONS FROM FUEL TO EXHAUST
AFTERTREATMENT (SP- 1113) 65, 65 (1995). Timing changes to reduce particulates can
increase NO.. See Clark, et al., Factors Affecting, supra note 62, at 92; Kashmir S. Virk &
Donald R. Lachowicz, Testing of Diesel Fuels for Their Effects on Exhaust Emissions and
Engine Performance, in EMISSION PROCESSES AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES IN DIESEL
ENGINES (SP- 1119) 169, 169 (1995) ("[I]n general, NO, emissions increase and particulates
decrease when injection timing is advanced."); see also CARCINOGENIC AND MUTAGENIC
EFFECTS OF DIESEL ENGINE EXHAUST 506 (Norburu Ishinishi et al, eds., 1986) ("[T]he
countermeasures against NO, and the countermeasures against HC and soot are in the
relationship of a tradeoff, which makes it very difficult to simultaneously reduce the two
different substances.").
The EPA recognized these tradeoffs in settling the diesel litigation. See EPA,
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of Motion to Enter
Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments 13, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999) ("While it is feasible to program new engines
with modified fuel injection timing that lowers NO, emissions, doing so likely would have
significant collateral consequences. These include increased engine overheating and
decreased engine life due to sooting, excessive engine wear, decreased fuel economy, and
the need for changes to the truck chassis to deal with these changes in engine operation.").
205. See Sawyer, et al., supra note 26, at 2164 (noting that in EGR systems, "[tihe
exhaust-gas recirculation (EGR) system directs a small fraction of the exhaust back into the
engine to dilute the intake charge and reduce peak combustion temperature, hence reducing
the engine-out NO,").
206. See Desantes et al., supra note 183, at 58 ("EGR increase reduces NO, emissions in
a linear fashion, but increases Soot emissions, CO emissions, and [brake specific fuel
consumption]."); see also C. Arcoumanis and A. Nagwaney, Effect of EGR on Spray
Development, Combustion and Emissions in a 1.9L Direct-Injection Diesel Engine, in
EMISSION PROCESSES AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES IN DIESEL ENGINES (SP- 1119) 99, 116
(1995) (discussing tradeoffs between NO, and soot, CO, C0 2, and HC emissions).
207. See Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 12 ("There is some concern about
increased wear rate when introducing EGR on heavy-duty diesel engines."); see also
Arcoumanis and Nagwaney, supra note 206, at 99 ("There are limits to the amount of
exhaust gas that can be reintroduced into the engine before power-output and fuel economy
are adversely affected. There are also questions about the wear implications of the
recirculated soot particles.").
208. See Johnson, Review, supra note 106, at 26; see also Mike Brezonick, Centrifugal
Filters Target Heavy-Duty Mobile Equipment Applications, 64(6) DIESEL PROGRESS NORTH
AMERICAN EDITION 18, 20 (1998) (quoting Dominic Jephcott of Federal-Mogul Oil
Conditioning Systems, that "[w]ith the emissions regulations, there can be much more soot
going into the [engine] oil").
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systems.' ' 209  Another example is that the engine timings2 '0 and fuel
characteristics 21I necessary to minimize NO, are different from those
needed to minimize particulates. Regulators and manufacturers thus face
important tradeoffs among pollutants and regulatory standards.2 12 Indeed,
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments recognized these tradeoffs among
pollutants, altering the requirements for California's waiver of federal
standards to allow the state to swap NO, control for CO control.1 3 Taking
these tradeoffs into account is important, as "[m]ost trade-off curves are
approximately hyperbolic in shape, so that the first increment of control
produces only small degradation of performance while later increments
cause accelerating degradation of performance. '2 14 Progressive tightening
of diesel emissions standards, as the EPA has done over the last 30 years
with NO, 2 15 will eventually move tradeoffs onto the less favorable portion
of the curve where large increases of other pollutants are the price to pay
for small increases in NO, control.
Emissions control also requires tradeoffs across different engine designs
and operating modes. For example, quiescent combustion systems, used in
marine diesel engines, are being investigated for use in heavy-duty trucks.
These engines offer an attractive combination of fuel economy and low
emissions under heavy loads and at high speed, but at lower speeds and
partial loads they increase NOx emissions and noise levels. 216 Similarly,
some filter-based approaches require regular regeneration cycles that
produce temporarily increased emissions.21 7 Particular control measures
may also affect other parts of the industry-some control technologies, for
209. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 93. See also Nauss et al., supra
note 121, at 24 ("One of the problems with controlling diesel emissions is the tradeoff
between emissions of particulate matter and emissions of oxides of nitrogen.").
210. Virk and Lachowicz, supra note 204, at 170.
211. Id. at 177 (stating that higher cetane numbers lower NO. but raise particulate
emissions under high load conditions). "The cetane number determines the ignition
performance of transport fuels" based on a relative scale. IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note
57, at 19.
212. Auto makers are considering expanding diesel use in light duty vehicles to meet the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards imposed upon them by Congress. See
Richard Truett, Redoing the Diesel, 75 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS 2i, 2i (2001) ("Because diesels
typically deliver 25 percent to 35 percent greater fuel economy than a similar-sized gasoline
engine, automakers view diesels as a way to boost their Corporate Average Fuel Economy
figures.").
213. ENVTL. LAW INST., 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 11.07[2] at 11-189
(2001).
214. MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 23.
215. See infra notes 311-365 and accompanying text (describing tightening of
standards).
216. Kazutoshi Mori et al., New Quiescent Combustion System for Heavy-Duty Diesel
Engines to Overcome Exhaust Emissions and Fuel Consumption Trade-off in COMBUSTION
IN DIESEL AND SI ENGINES (SP- 1549) 39 (2000).
217. Verbeek et al., supra note 187, at 96,
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example, depend on significantly reducing sulfur in diesel fuel218 and many
measures for reducing emissions require redesigning engine oils. 219 Indeed,
engine makers cannot design their emissions control systems without
knowing the sulfur content of the fuel to be burned.22°
218. Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 13 ("The oxidation catalyst concept is only
feasible if low-sulfur fuel will be available in due time."); Johnson, Review, supra note 106,
at 26 ("Perhaps the best solution [to nanoparticles] is to reduce sulfur in the fuel and
lubrication oils as much as feasible."); id. at 33 (indicating that NO, control systems require
ultralow sulfur fuel or particulate emissions increase); IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at
93 ("Catalytic converters require fuels with low sulfur content, as sulfur poisons the active
centres of the catalyst."). The EPA has required significant reductions in diesel fuel sulfur
content by 2006 and 2010. See Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 9. See 66
Fed.Reg. 5002 (Jan. 18, 2001) ("These standards are based on the use of high-efficiency
catalytic exhaust emission control devices or comparably effective advanced technologies.
Because these devices are damaged by sulfur, we are also reducing the level of sulfur in
highway diesel fuel significantly by mid-2006."). These regulations are currently being
challenged in court. Major Mobile Source Issues of 2002, BNA's ENVIRONMENT REPORTER,
Jan. 25, 2002. For an overview of fuel regulation and mobile sources, see generally Arnold
W. Reitze, Jr., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean
Air Act, 29 TULSA L.J. 485 (1994).
.These regulations have been justified, in part, by the EPA's prediction that the new
technologies that will develop to meet the higher standards will require low sulfur diesel
fuel to prevent sulfur from damaging the pollution control equipment. REGULATORY
STUDIES PROGRAM, MERCATUS CENTER, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, PUBLIC INTEREST
COMMENTS EPA HEAVY-DUTY ENGINE AND DIESEL RULE SUBMITTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 4 (2000) [hereinafter RSP, HEAVY-DUTY]. Fuel changes are,
however, particularly costly means of improving diesel emissions control. DIESEL ENGINE
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 93 (indicating that because the cost of the fuel burned
by a typical diesel engine significantly exceeds the cost of the engine, it is more cost
effective to invest in engine technology than in all but the most inexpensive fuel changes).
Diesel Technology for the 21st Century, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Environment of the Committee on Science, 105th Congress 23,24 (Testimony of Ronald J.
Robinson, Texaco) (stating that improvements in emissions controls directly from fuel
changes are unlikely). Moreover, the impact of fuel changes may be dependent on the test
procedure used to measure them. One study found that reducing sulfur content hardly
affects emissions in a light-duty engine under the European test procedure but does affect it
under the US procedure. See R.H. Hammerle et al., Emissions from Diesel Vehicles with and
without Lean NO, and Oxidation Catalysts and Particulate Traps, in EMISSION PROCESSES
AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES IN DIESEL ENGINES (SP- 1119) 197, 199-201 (1995).
219. Engine oil is a good example of the complexity of changes required by increased
emissions control. Consider the following description from Lubrizol, an engine oil
manufacturer, of the consequences of other changes in heavy-duty engines to reduce
emissions:
While design changes are helping to reduce emissions, the lubricants-which must
protect the engine first and foremost-are subjected to even greater stresses. These
include a more hostile combustion environment and higher operating temperatures
and pressures. Greatly reduced oil consumption will mean that the lubricant must
reside in the ring zone longer with consequent greater thermal exposure. Reduced
engine oil top-up will mean less additive replenishment via the new-fill oil
compared to engines in the past. The changes made for combustion management to
reduce NO, (nitrogen oxide) emissions are reported to increase the amount of soot
and combustion byproducts introduced into the lubricant, which will affect
lubricant performance demands.
P.M. Lewinsky, Exhaust Emissions Challenge Heavy Duty Engine Oil Formulators, THE
OIL DAILY, Jan. 28, 1991 at B6; see also Emissions Will Stress Lubes, 96 FLEET OWNER 44,
44(2001).
220. See John Wislocki, Bush Team Reopens Diesel Sulfur Rule, TRANSPORT TOPICS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW
Changes in one aspect of emissions controls can have far-reaching
impacts on other pollution problems. For example, significantly lowering
sulfur content in diesel fuel has implications for the pipeline system used to
transport various fuels, since low sulfur fuel could be contaminated through
contact with higher-sulfur fuels or residues left in the pipeline. 221
Moreover, requiring equipment that demands extremely low sulfur fuel has
national implications, even if only some regions are not in attainment for
the pollutant to be controlled by the equipment, 222 since the low sulfur fuel
will have to be sold exclusively nationally to avoid fouling equipment
needed inside the nonattainment areas when it is refueled outside the
nonattainment areas.
There are also tradeoffs between engine types, with diesel engines
offering some environmental advantages over gasoline engines because of
their greater fuel efficiency.223 Had the United States ratified the Kyoto
Treaty, for example, increased use of diesel engines to reduce CO2
emissions would likely have resulted.224 Improving fuel efficiency can also
adversely affect pollution control measures. 225  For existing heavy-duty
trucking diesels there is a general tradeoff between fuel economy and
emissions, with greater emissions control reducing fuel economy.22 6 Of
Jan. 29, 2001, at 1, 33.
221. RSP, HEAVY-DUTY, supra note 218, at 17-18.
222. Id. at 5. The comment notes that 44 of 50 states have no areas failing to meet the
particulate standard, making particulates "a regional, rather than a national problem" and
that AEPA's "modeling predicts that more than half of the total population [Band most
Americans living west of the Mississippi River B] will live in ozone attainment areas for the
foreseeable future under existing programs," making NO, control a regional issue as well.
Id. at 8-9. The EPA does not necessarily consider reducing emissions in attainment areas an
unnecessary cost. For example, in comparing a regulatory strategy of requiring "Stage II"
refueling emissions controls on gasoline pumps in nonattainment areas with one of requiring
such controls on all automobiles, the EPA considered their impact in attainment areas to be
a benefit rather than an unnecessary cost. GEN. AcCT. OFF., EPA's EFFORTS TO CONTROL
VEHICLE REFUELING AND EVAPORATIVE EMISSIONS 21 (1987).
223. Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 11 ("[T]he diesel principle is by far the best
choice to minimize C0 2-emissions."); Nauss et al., supra note 121, at 14 ("[D]iesel engines
emit approximately 10% to 25% less carbon dioxide than gasoline engines, an important
factor when considering global warming trends."). But see Walsh, Global Trends, supra
note 166, at 1-2 ("Even the potential global warming benefits of diesel vehicles, due to their
substantial fuel economy benefits relative to gasoline fueled vehicles, have been undercut by
recent studies, which indicate that diesel particles may by reducing cloud cover and rainfall,
more than offset any CO 2 advantage.").
224. See RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 26.
225. See Johnson, Review, supra note 106, at 27 (stating that "heavy-duty diesel exhaust
temperatures usually are hot enough in normal driving conditions to oxidize the soot without
active regeneration in modem filters. However, heavy-duty diesel exhaust temperatures are
decreasing as the engine efficiency increases, so active regeneration strategies" may be
needed in the future).
226. See, e.g., DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 91 (discussing that
"[t]he two principal driving forces behind modem diesel engine design are the desire for
lower exhaust emissions and improved fuel economy. These goals, often conflicting .... );
see also Mori et al., supra note 216, at 39 (discussing fuel economy-emissions tradeoff); see
also Moser et al., Impact, supra note 182, at 53 (stating that "[w]ithout a technological
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course, some improvements may not require tradeoffs; 227 the point is
merely that heavy-duty diesel trucks are complex systems in which any
change may have significant consequences for other parts of the system.
Finally, there are tradeoffs with unrelated regulatory measures. For
example, prior to interstate trucking deregulation, there were more "empty
backhaul" trips by trucks, increasing fuel used and thus emissions. Using
1987 data, empty backhaul trips accounted for 18-21 percent of fuel used;
some estimates are that deregulation reduced this to 13-15 percent of fuel
used by 1995.228
The existence of these tradeoffs is important for several reasons. First, it
suggests that making the tradeoffs through a regulatory agency is likely to
cause the choices to diverge from those that would result from the
consumer-choice tradeoff. Thus, the EPA may opt for less fuel economy
and more emissions control, more NOx control and less CO control,229 or a
more maintenance-intensive form of emissions control than engine
consumers would in the absence of regulatory controls.230 Indeed, if the
EPA does not expect its choice to be different from market outcomes, there
is no reason for the EPA, rather than consumers, to make the choice at all.
This tradeoff has occurred. In a review of diesel emission issues, two
California regulators concluded that "some fuel combustion efficiency has
been traded for lower emissions to attain standards."231 Justifying shifting
the choice from consumers to the EPA therefore requires identification of a
breakthrough the required drastic NOx reduction will deteriorate fuel economy and increase
engine cost considerably"); see also IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 19 (finding that
there is also a tradeoff in fuel design, with higher density fuels providing more engine power
output but also increasing particulate emissions).
227. See, e.g., Sturgess, supra note 186, at 27 ("Past emissions strategies found that
improved fuel control to manage particulates and NO, resulted in better combustion-and
an overall increase in economy.").
228. See Duleep, supra note 30, at 190.
229. The EPA's choices differ significantly from those of regulators in other countries.
For example, in the 1990s Japan required 50% more stringent CO controls but allowed more
than 100% more hydrocarbon emissions and seven times as much particulate emissions. See
IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 134, tbl. 30.
230. See WILEY, ENGINEERING, supra note 120, at 364 (John G. Webster ed., 1999)
discussing that maintenance is critical to operation of emissions controls:
Although great efforts are being made to produce more environmentally friendly
diesel fuels and lubricants, better engine designs and emissions control equipment,
these measures by themselves will not ensure perpetual environmental compliance
throughout the operational life of an engine. Operational vigilance is most
important, including planned maintenance, inspection and emission monitoring,
and the enforcement of good working practices.
Maintenance of both the emissions control systems and the engine can have a significant
impact on emissions. Id. See also IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 127 (finding that
"up to twofold increases in emissions of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and particulate
matter have been measured even in the absence of a significant effect on power or fuel
consumption... Malfunction of the fuel injection system may contribute markedly to
higher emissions").
231. See Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 827.
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market failure.232
Second, the market failure cannot be identified solely by noting the
difference between the EPA's and the customers' choices 233 since each
tradeoff presents its own advantages in terms of emissions control.
Consumer preferences for fuel economy, and hence lower CO emissions,
control CO at the expense of NO,, for example.234 A preference for CO
control over NOx control reflects a different balance in emissions control,
not a simplistic choice between "clean" and "dirty" engines. An individual
primarily concerned about global warming would likely prefer higher NOx
emissions to higher CO emissions in many instances, for example, while an
individual concerned most with urban human health issues would prefer the
reverse.
235
Third, to the extent possible, engine manufacturers "move last" in the
design of engines, i.e., they make choices about engine design after the
EPA has announced regulatory requirements. Because customers demand
choices the EPA attempts to prohibit, market pressures will lead engine
manufacturers to emphasize the features customers desire at the expense of
those that the EPA desires.23 6 For example, "[o]ne of the most commonly
232. See RSP, NONROAD, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing issue, in the context of other
regulations: "Without market failure, competition would ensure that over the long term all
energy/maintenance savings-that do not require customers to sacrifice an equal or greater
reduction in the value of other desired attributes (e.g., reliability, safety, acceleration,
comfort, durability, and so forth) would flow through to customers").
233. See id. at 7 (discussing issue, in context of other regulations, noting:
"energy/maintenance savings [flowing from mandated technology] estimated by the EPA
may actually represent money that consumers want to pay to obtain other desirable vehicle
attributes such as safety, acceleration, durability, and so forth"); see also DIESEL ENGINE
REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 555 (finding that "[m]arket demands for heavy-duty
diesel engines used in trucks and buses include: size, weight, cost, durability, reliability,
performance and fuel economy, gaseous and noise emissions, and amenities such as
electronic controls and features").
234. See Bruce R. Judd, Decision Analysis of Auto Emissions Control, 11 SOc. EcoN.
PLAN. ScI. 123 (1977) (noting that consumers never selected the EPA's emission control
strategy regardless of cost and always preferred an alternative approach).
235. See Lloyd & Cackette, supra note 26, at 839 ("In the United States, increased diesel
penetration has been proposed as one way to reduce CO2 emissions and associated global
climate change impacts from the transportation sector."). However, particulate emissions
may offset this benefit, as diesel particulates may modify cloud cover and increase rainfall,
and thus alter the earth's albedo and offset at least some of the improvement in CO
emissions. See id. at 823.
236. See Diesel Technology for the 21' Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. 45 (1998) (explaining that
customers do not yet buy diesel "for low emissions yet; they buy it for better fuel economy,
they buy it because of better durability, better performance"). There are other tradeoffs to
be made in designing engines:
In designing a heavy-duty diesel, the picture becomes complicated by the question
of-what customer does one design the engine/truck package for? An owner-
operator may be willing to compromise on fuel economy in return for higher
performance and better passing and hill-climbing ability, while the owner of a fleet
of 50 or 100 trucks, with an annual fuel bill in the hundreds of thousands of dollars,
is likely to be much less concerned with saving a few minutes of trip time than with
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used approaches for setting injection timing for a diesel engine is to
optimize it for a given speed to obtain optimum fuel consumption, power
output and emissions. 237  However, because engines typically "exhibit
minimum specific fuel consumption and particulate and NOx emissions at
different injection timings, '2 38 engine designers must tradeoff the three
criteria against each other. Engine manufacturers are likely to come as
close as possible to the fuel-economy optimum for timing at highway
speeds, consistent with meeting the EPA's announced emissions tests.
Even if greater NOx reduction were possible, customer pressure would
prevent engine makers from optimizing engines at the expense of fuel
economy.
Given the limits of the EPA's ability to specify all the parameters
involved in engine design, it is likely that engines will diverge from the
regulators' preferred design if consumer preferences differ from regulators'
preferences. Market pressures will push engine design towards consumer
preferences and the increasing complexity of engine design and enhanced
control over engine operation offered by the sophisticated controllers
necessary for emissions reduction will produce numerous opportunities for
satisfying consumer preferences at the expense of regulators' preferences.
Fourth, these tradeoffs will influence how manufacturers implement
regulations. A European engine manufacturers' association paper noted
this effect:
The final choice always results from a compromise between
environmental targets (low exhaust emissions) and users' requirements
(power availability, fuel consumption). The tool available to
development engineers for the definition of this compromise is the test
cycle. The test cycle identifies the engine operating conditions during
which emission aspects must take the predominant role in selecting the
technological solutions. Different test cycles often result in different
technological solutions and as a consequence different engine
performance.239
As a result of the differences in tradeoffs made by regulators and
consumers, manufacturers will be driven by market pressures to match their
choices to regulators' preferences only at the points specified in test
squeezing the maximum number of miles out of a tank of fuel. The fleet driver, on
the other hand, is inclined to favor (and perhaps take better care of) trucks with
higher-powered engines which can reduce his gear-shifting effort, get him home to
his wife and children earlier, and generally provide better driveability.
Larry Givens, The Diesel Engine: Today and Tomorrow, 84(6) AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING
30,31 (1976).
237. Virk & Lachowicz, supra note 204, at 169.
238. Id.
239. ASSOCIATION DES CONSTRUCTEURS EUROPtENS D'AUTOMOBILES G.I.E., TEST CYCLE
TO MEASURE EMISSION LEVELS OF CV DIESEL ENGINES: AN INDUSTRY NOTE 2 (1994) (copy
on file with authors) [hereinafter ASSOCIATION, TEST CYCLE].
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procedures, or at points necessary to reach such performance. Elsewhere,
they will match the choices among tradeoffs to consumer choices. As a
1972 EPA memorandum concluded,
[T]he standard Federal test cycle and procedure are exactly that-the
standard. They are the yardstick by which all vehicles are measured.
They serve as design criteria for vehicle manufacturers. If the test cycle
and procedure do not evaluate what the EPA desires them to, the
manufacturers can hardly be blamed.
240
Thus the test cycles selected by the regulator will have consequences for
off-cycle emissions as well as on-cycle emissions, making the former
higher than if they had been included in the test cycle.24 1
Finally, the widespread existence of tradeoffs among pollutants requires
that a rational regulatory policy consider the relative costs of reducing
particular pollutants from different classes of sources.242
D. Industry Characteristics' Influence on Regulation
The structure of the industry also has an important influence on how
heavy duty diesel engines are regulated. There are only a few heavy-duty
diesel engine manufacturers in the United States market. World markets
are fragmented, with "every major industrialized country" having "its own
11243
range of diesel engines, although this may be changing and the
international market may increase. 244 The major manufacturers of diesel
240. Memorandum from the EPA Office of Air Programs, Characterization and Use of
Emission Control Systems that Operate Only Under Specific Ambient Conditions or
Vehicle Operational Modes 7 (July 7, 1972).
241. See ASSOCIATION, TEST CYCLE, supra note 239, at 4 (stating "[e]ngine technologies
are to be selected on the basis of the emission standards and the test procedure legally
adopted to measure engine exhaust emissions. This choice will have an influence on the
emission performance of the engine when it is operated under conditions that substantially
differ from those of the legal test cycle").
242. See MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARDS COMM., supra note 64, at 18
(stating that regulators should "consider the cost of reducing a given amount of NO,
emissions from heavy-duty vehicles compared to the cost of the same reduction of NO,
emissions from other sources").
243. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 5. U.S. heavy-duty engines
differ significantly from European and Japanese heavy-duty engines, for example. See Lee
et al., Fuel Quality, supra note 163, at 13 (explaining that U.S. engines "tend to have large
displacements and have a high degree of electronic control whilst in Europe, where
mechanical control still dominates, they tend to be more highly rated and have smaller
displacements"). U.S. and European engines are turbocharged and aftercooled, whereas
"the Japanese market is dominated by large displacement, naturally aspirated HD diesel
engines" and the cetane quality of U.S. diesel fuel is "significantly lower than in other parts
of the world." Id. See also David L. Sparkman, Focus on Finding a Fleet, 42(5) TRANSP. &
DISTRIBUTION 41, 44 (May 2001) [hereinafter Sparkman, Focus] (noting difficulty of selling
used U.S. trucks outside the U.S. because of different configurations and equipment). U.S.
diesel fuel is also different from European fuel. IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 1
("The specifications of commercial diesel fuel differ considerably from in different
countries.").
244. See RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 38 (predicting a "steady increase" in
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engines for use in trucks in the United States today include Caterpillar,
Cummins, Navistar, Detroit Diesel, and Volvo. 24 5 While a few decades ago
there were over fourteen manufacturers and importers,246 today these five
companies produce virtually all of the heavy-duty and medium- duty
market.247  The trend is toward fewer firms due to regulatory and
competitive pressures to cut costs, 248 including the increasing demands on
engine manufacturers to develop products with improved efficiency and
environmental standards. 49  One industry observer predicts that either
Caterpillar or Cummins, the remaining independent engine manufacturers,
will exit the market before 2007.250 As Cummins continues to lose market
share,25' its future in the heavy duty market seems most in doubt.
Diesel truck manufacturing has not traditionally been a fully vertically
integrated industry. Some firms manufacture only heavy-duty diesel
engines (e.g., Caterpillar, Cummins, and Detroit Diesel), some manufacture
only truck bodies (e.g., Ford, GM, PACCAR, and Western Star Trucks),
and others manufacture both (e.g., Volvo). Some firms offer truck lines
with a choice of engines from different manufacturers (e.g., Navistar). 52
import share of market); RINE, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 24-25 (discussing
globalization of diesel market).
245. See RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 11-15 (explaining that in 2001, Volvo
merged with two other firms in the U.S. market, Mack and Renault, reducing the number of
firms that manufacture diesel engines from six to five); see generally ITS AMERICA, Volvo
to Join Forces with Renault VI and Mack (April. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.itsa.org/ITSNEWS.NSF/0/feec7fff21 c42cd3852568cd005e5a62?OpenDocume-
nt (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Volvo to Join].
246. See A Buyer's Market, HEAVY DuTY TRUCKING, Sept. 2000, at 78.
247. See RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 32, 39 (identifying Mercedes, Perkins,
Daewoo, Isuzu and Hyundai as other important international players).
248. See generally Volvo to Join, supra note 245.
249. See id. It became necessary for companies attempting to take advantage of
economies of scale to spread investments over larger volumes of production. For example,
Volvo merged with RenaultVl/Mack on January 2, 2001. The merger nearly doubled the
volume of Volvo's truck business and strengthened its global presence. Its market share in
North America doubled to 24%. Id. As Volvo's Chief Executive Officer at the time, Leif
Johansson stated:
The transaction ... increases Volvo's competitiveness in the medium heavy truck
segment and in heavy diesel engines. Mack is an ideal partner for continuing
expansion of our North America truck operations. Mack is one of the world's
strongest brands in the industry and it has its own production of engines, which was
a very important factor for us. We intend to achieve further critical mass in the
engine sector that will permit us to make aggressive investments that will better
enable us to meet demands from our customers and from society.
Id. Other companies in the industry also formed alliances and compacts to help survive the
increasing competition. Caterpillar formed a global alliance with DaimlerChrysler Engines
in 2000, Cummins was chosen by DaimlerChrysler in 2001 to be their diesel engine supplier
for Dodge Ram pickup trucks, and Navistar in 2001 joined forces with Ford Motor
Company to create a subsidiary, the Blue Diamond Truck Company. Also in 2000
DaimlerChrysler bought out Detroit Diesel, in the process delisting the company's stock on
the New York Stock Exchange.
250. RIEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 38.
251. Id. at 100.
252. Navistar sells trucks with both its engines and engines made by some other
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The lack of vertical integration complicates truck manufacture because
truck and engine designers often do not work for the same firm. Placing an
engine into a truck is not simply a matter of tightening a few bolts, as new
engines often require extensive redesign of the existing truck body-a
process that can take years.253 Redesign is necessary to accommodate the
shape of the truck body to the engine and other components-especially the
cooling system, and to accommodate the location of the other engine
compartment components to the engine (moving wires away from
particularly hot areas, for example).254 Truck customers often insist on
extensive testing opportunities for new models before committing to
purchases.255 For example, when Detroit Diesel introduced one of the first
companies.
253. See Gail Kachadourian, Truckmakers Seek Delay on Diesel Engine Rule,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Mar. 26, 2001, at 17 (explaining that "[o]nce the truckmakers receive
prototypes, they still have to modify the trucks. One likely modification will involve
changing the cooling system, because the engines are expected to run at higher
temperatures. The trade group says truckmakers need at least two years to modify and
validate their vehicles. Only 18 months remain until the October 2002 deadline"); see also
Detroit Diesel Corporation Confirms 2002 Series 60 Program, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 5, 2002,
(quoting Detroit Diesel officials):
At the time we signed the consent decree in 1998, DDC was concerned that the
time allowed to meet the new standards was minimal in comparison to normal
development and testing. But consistent with our initial commitment, we have met
our objectives. Having said that, we still believe the industry would be well-served
by a longer period of time for customers to test our new engines and prove to
themselves that the 2002 Series 60 continues the engine's long tradition of
excellent performance, fuel efficiency and low cost of operation. Unfortunately,
given the compressed development schedule, it is apparent that our industry will
face another up and down cycle due to pre-buying and delayed buying.
Id. See also Max Heine, Emissions Rules Affect Truck and Sales Says Volvo Chief
OVERDRIVE 14 (June 2002) ("Truck manufacturers may have to limit their designs to one
truck, one engine for the federally mandated round of emissions reductions in 2007.");
Declaration of Steven Matsill, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 98-2544,
98-2546, and 98-2546 (Nov. 27, 2002):
The design of the engine and truck are closely related. The engine affects the
overall truck performance including important attributes such as fuel economy,
gross vehicle weight rating, transmission selection, rear axle ratio definition,
physical profile, maintenance schedule, noise level, and speed ... Likewise, the
truck design affects the engine designs that are acceptable candidates for use in a
given vehicle. The truck design must have enough room to accommodate an
engine, must have adequate heat removal capability, and must not generate
excessive noise.
Id at 6-7; Declaration of Michael von Mayenburg, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil
Action Nos. 98-2544, 98-2546, and 98-2546 (Nov. 27, 2002), at 6 ("The designs of the
engine and truck are closely related.").
It is worth noting that the EPA underestimated the redesign of engines in other areas as well.
See, e.g., RSP, NONROAD, supra note 52, at 8 (noting the EPA's claim that higher standards
for off-road engines could be met by "converting existing engines to accept known emission
control technologies (such as those used on automobiles)" while simultaneously predicting
that substantial R&D expenditures will be needed to comply).
254. See, e.g., Domino Effect, 94(11) FLEET OWNER 69, 69-74 (1999).
255. See Ball, Buying Binge, supra note 115, at A12 (noting fleet plans to purchase only
a few new trucks with MY 2003 emissions controls for testing purposes); see also Detroit
Diesel Corporation Confirms 2002 Series 60 Program, PR NEWSWIRE (April 5, 2002);
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electronically controlled engines in 1985, it had done more than nineteen
million miles of dynamometer testing and more than 4.5 million miles of
fleet service on the new engine.256 Before adopting electronic engine
controllers in the 1980s, fleets did extensive testing with small numbers of
vehicles.257 Design changes thus require lengthy lead times before they can
appear in production models.258 Indeed, one reason emissions regulations
are driving a trend toward vertical integration is because of the increased
difficulty in integrating new engines into trucks.25 9 The lack of vertical
integration has consequences for emissions control, as testing in a non-
vertically-integrated-manufactured vehicle is more complex. Engines and
trucks are not designed together; as a result, testing actual vehicles would
require significantly more testing than simply testing engines alone 260 since
an engine may be used in multiple trucks and a truck model may be
available with several different engine types. As a result, the EPA chose to
certify engines rather than trucks. 261 The lack of vertical integration also
complicates modeling, as engine emissions must be measured in lab tests
and vehicle emissions estimated from test results.262 Because such testing
is more costly than measuring emissions with the engine installed in a
truck, "no effort has been made to monitor the change in emissions from
Declaration of Steven D. Duley, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 98-
2544, 98-2546, and 98-2546 (Nov. 27, 2002), at 3 (large trucking company purchasing
executive noting that field tests for MY1991 engines, which introduced new emissions
controls, took up to 30 months and 200,00 miles of testing); Declaration of Steven Matsill,
United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 98-2544, 98-2546, and 98-2546 (Nov.
27, 2002), at 10 (noting that GM typically takes 3.5 years to integrate a new engine into its
fleet); Declaration of Michael von Mayenburg, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil
Action Nos. 98-2544, 98-2546, and 98-2546 (Nov. 27, 2002), at 10 (noting that Freightliner
typically needs two years to complete validation and testing work after an engine design is
finished).
256. Hamilton & Henjum, Electronics: The Wait is Over, supra note 101, at 58.
257. Truck Electronics: Fleets Give New Engines High Marks, FLEET OWNER, June
1985, at 65.
258. Jim Mele, Integrating Vehicle Electronics: Plugging into the network, 92 FLEET
OWNER 60, 64 (1997) ("Faced with new heavy-duty diesel emissions standards in 2004,
'we're going to need new ECMs by 2003, and it takes about three years for a development
program'....").
259. See Sparkman, Focus, supra note 243, at 42 (quoting a former president of Volvo
Trucks that "[wie are no longer dealing in a plug-and-play environment, where you can just
drop any engine into any vehicle. It takes a very close match of components and new
technology, such as new cooling systems, to meet those tough [emissions] regulations");
RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 17 ("As we approach the 2004 and 2007/10
regulations and beyond, it is becoming apparent that the need for an overall vehicle or
equipment approach to emissions is required (European model)... A captive or exclusive
engine will be preferred or required.").
260. DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 473 ("To avoid the problem of
having to test every possible engine, transmission, chassis, and body combination the
engines themselves are tested on a test bench."); see also Clerc, Catalytic, supra note 126, at
99-100 (noting that heavy-duty vehicles vary in design more than passenger cars, producing
a "wide range of engine types and transmission types for a particular vehicle").
261. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 401.
262. See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW, supra note 58, at 25.
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engines as they age, using the FTP. Consequently, estimations of older
heavy-duty vehicle contributions to the emissions inventory remain
suspect, and the degradation of PM (particulate matter) and NOx emissions
performance over time remains poorly documented.,
263
The industry is changing, however, in part due to the costs of the
research and development (R&D) necessary to meet new standards.264
Vertically integrated truck companies are growing and independent engine
makers are increasingly under pressure. For example, DaimlerChrysler
now owns the Dodge, Freightliner, Sterling, and Western Star truck and
engine brands; General Motors owns the Chevrolet and GMC truck brands;
49 percent of Isuzu International, an engine manufacturer, owns its own
engine maker, but has offered Caterpillar and Cummins engines in the past;
and Volvo owns the Volvo and Mack truck brands and engine brands, but
has also offered Cummins engines in the past.265 Although these many
brands have offered Cummins and Caterpillar engines in the past, the
continued willingness of DaimlerChrysler to continue to do so is
questionable since Cummins and Caterpillar sales come at the expense of
its own engine brands. Moreover, as engine technology grows more
complex, the independent engine makers' sharing of engine technology
with competitors to facilitate truck construction will grow more difficult.
A market forecast suggests that "[m]ost truck manufacturers would like to
have only two engine choices at the most for medium and heavy duty
,266trucks." As a result, truck manufacturers are paring their engine
offerings, with, for example, the DaimlerChrysler brands recently dropping
Cummins for heavy duty trucks.2 67 This consolidation made the two
independent engine makers particularly vulnerable to EPA pressure in the
months leading up to the October deadline. If truck manufacturers
intended to reduce the number of engines they offered, losing market share
due to a failure to gain a certificate or to large noncompliance penalties
(NCPs) could lead to permanent loss of a market.
Most importantly, heavy-duty diesel engines are used in the market in a
different way from other types of engines. Heavy-duty trucks using diesel
263. Clark & McKain, supra note 62, at 432.
264. RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 10:
The advent of emissions regulations that started with the Clean Air Act of 1990 has
led to a flurry of R&D activity that requires cash. Without sufficient volume to
write-off these expenses, many companies would be going out-of-business and
some have. As a result, major worldwide manufacturing companies are increasing
their captive and committed volume by mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures.
Id
265. RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 12-13.
266. Id. at 12.
267. Id. at 13.
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engines are expensive, often costing substantially more than $50,000.268
Their durability gives them exceptionally long useful lives, 269 much longer
than the Clean Air Act models and regulations assumed.270 Many smaller
trucking companies primarily purchase used trucks, 2 7 1 extending truck lives
even further. The market thus follows the life-cycle of trucks. New trucks
are typically purchased by long distance shipping companies, including the
large national fleets. Large fleets typically operate the trucks through the
engine warranty period.272  This relieves the large fleets from having to
maintain the trucks, since most work is done under warranty.273 Trucks are
then sold to regional trucking companies and other shorter-haul users.2 74
Eventually used trucks sometimes find their way to small companies that
need occasional transport.275 The important thing is that heavy-duty trucks
have long lives and gradually migrate into the short-haul market, precisely
where NOx emissions are of greatest health concern.
E. Summary
Diesel technology influenced the regulatory options available to the EPA
in four key ways. First, because diesel combustion was poorly understood
relative to spark ignition engines, tightening emissions standards required a
268. See Diesel Technology for the 21st Century 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy & Env't of the House Comm. on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th
Cong. 31 (1998) (testimony of Robert J. Crites, Condor Freight Lines) (asserting that truck
cabs cost over $67,000 for "our largest line haul over-the-road tractors" before taxes).
269. See DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE BOOK, supra note 64, at 555 (noting current engine
life goal is 1,000,000 miles, up four times from the 1970s); Diesel Technology for the 21st
Century 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Env't of the House Comm. on
Science, 105th Cong., 47 (1998) (explaining that diesels today have more than a million
miles before a significant rebuild and that "[h]eavy duty engines stay around for a long
time"). However, most of the mileage is accumulated in the early part of a truck engine's
life. Id. (stating that most mileage occurs before an engine is five years old).
270. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 407 ("Heavy-duty diesel engines are
regularly rebuilt so that the actual mileage accumulated normally exceeds their statutory
useful life, while light-duty diesel engines and gasoline engines are rarely rebuilt.").
271. See Diesel Technology for the 21" Century 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy & Env't of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong., at 32 (1998) (testimony of
Robert J. Crites, Condor Freight Lines) ("[Miany small companies and independent owner-
operators in particular tend to purchase their vehicles from used fleet equipment."); see also
The 2000 Used Truck Market: It's For Buyers, 40 OVERDRIVE 1-S (July 2000) ("Any driver
running local deliveries, hauling cross-country or state-to-state loads buys used trucks.").
272. Ed Thomas & Greg Berg, Equipment Maintenance: How to Run It Longer, HEAVY
DUTY TRUCKING 48 (May 2001).
273. See Sparkman, Focus, supra note 243, at 44 (explaining that "[o]ver the last two
decades, many fleets fell into the habit of trading in their trucks every three years,
eliminating the need for heavy maintenance and expensive shops staffed with trained diesel
mechanics. If any heavy maintenance was needed, they could have it performed by OEM
dealers under warranty").
274. Sean Kilcarr, Going Once... Going Twice... Sold!, TRANSPORT TOPICS 18 (Feb.
21, 2000) (describing the secondary market for trucks).
275. The 2000 Used Truck Market: It's for the Buyers, 40 OVERDRIVE 1 (2000)
(describing secondary market for trucks).
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greater degree of technology-forcing than for other mobile sources. As a
result, manufacturers had to invest in developing technology to which their
customers were indifferent or hostile.
Second, regulatory choices for diesel engines involve important tradeoffs
across pollutants controlled. Increasing control of one may "cost"
regulators increased emissions of another. Such tradeoffs are generally not
linear. Regulations specified in terms of satisfying specific test standards
provide an incentive to design engines to the standards.
Third, heavy-duty diesel engines' cost advantages, independent of
pollution control considerations, led to a significant increase in their market
share from the early days of clean air regulation to the present. As a result,
diesel emissions' relative importance to regulators increased, making it
increasingly likely that the EPA would seek to reduce emissions from them
in the 1990s.
Finally, diesel engines are relatively worse than other engines with
respect to NO, emissions. The growth of diesel's market share and in fuel
use generally thus increased NOx emissions during the 1990s, the time
when the EPA began to feel pressure to find new ways to reduce NO,
emissions. Heavy duty engines' greater cost means that fleet turnover
slows the impact of new emissions controls on real world conditions.
III. EXPLAINING THE EPA's REGULATION OF HEAVY-DUTY DIESEL
ENGINES
Regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines has had five phases, involving
non-regulation and all the forms of federal regulation: regulation-by-
rulemaking, regulation-by-negotiation, and regulation-by-litigation. The
first phase was the pre-Air Quality Act of 1967 period, during which diesel
emissions were left unregulated. The second was the period of regulation-
by-rulemaking from the Air Quality Act of 1967 through the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments. The third phase was a brief flurry of formal and
informal regulation-by-negotiation after the 1990 Amendments. The
fourth, involving regulation-by-litigation, began with the EPA's suit
against the heavy-duty engine manufacturers in 1998. The fifth is the post-
1998-consent decree period, a return to regulation-by-rulemaking. In this
section we describe the substance and history of the regulations produced
by each of these forms, subdividing several of the broader periods
according to the various major amendments to the Clean Air Act. Having
provided this historical summary, we then attempt to explain why the EPA
selects one form over the other.
Over the course of the last four decades, regulation of heavy-duty diesel
emissions has gone from virtually nonexistent, to an initial opacity test for
"smoke," and then through a series of increasingly stringent standards for
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NOx, hydrocarbons, and particulates. NO, emissions standards have fallen,
for example, from a combined 16 grams per brake horsepower hour (g/bhp-
hr) for NO, and hydrocarbons in MY 1974276 to separate limits of 0.20
g/bhp-hr for NOx and 0.14 g/bhp-hr for nonmethane hydrocarbons.277
Particulate standards have fallen from 0.6 g/bhp-hr in 1988278 to 0.01
gibhp-hr for MY 2007.279 Regulations have also tightened in other ways:
new test procedures required greater emissions controls 280 and the
regulatory-defined "useful life" of heavy-duty diesel engines-during
which emissions must meet standards-grew from five years, 100,000
miles, or 3,000 hours to ten years, 435,000 miles, or 22,000 hours.28'
Just as important as the level of emissions is the method of determining
that level. Test standards are extremely important for understanding
emissions generally, since they specify the means of measurement. They
are particularly important for heavy-duty diesel engines, as it is the engine
rather than the vehicle that is tested. "Any test procedure for mobile source
emissions represents a compromise between the need for accurate
representation of on-the-road emissions (which might dictate a long and
complicated test procedure) and the need for a test procedure that can be
easily and inexpensively performed by manufacturers and control
,,282agencies. The specification of the test standard can have a significant
influence on the outcome.283 For example, when the EPA switched from
the steady state to transient testing in MY 1984, engines that had been in
compliance with hydrocarbon regulations could not pass the new test.
2 84
A. Early Air Pollution Regulatory Efforts
Until the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, federal air pollution efforts
were primarily directed at providing information to support state pollution
276. 40 C.F.R. § 85.974-1 (1974). As the EPA explained, "the unit, 'g/bhp-hr,' is a unit
of emissions per unit of work performed by an engine." Memorandum of Law of the United
States of America in Support of Motion to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public
Comments 9, n.4 (Apr. 30, 1999) (copy on file with authors). According to the EPA, a 4.0
g/bhp-hr standard "translates to about 2 lbs. of NO, per hour for a loaded 18-wheeler
operating at highway speeds." Id.
277. 40 C.F.R. § 86.007-1 1(a)(l)(A)(i), (ii) (2001).
278. 40 C.F.R. § 86.088-11 (1988).
279. 40 C.F.R. § 86.007-11(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2001).
280. See infra note 374.
281. 40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2(l)(4)(v) (2001).
282. MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 89.
283. See, e.g., R.H. Hanimerle et al., Emissions from Diesel Vehicles with and without
Lean NO, and Oxidation Catalysts and Particulate Traps, in EMISSION PROCESSES AND
CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES IN DIESEL ENGINES (SP-i 119) 197, 199-212 (1995) (describing
different results of various tests under European and U.S. test protocols on light duty diesel
engines); IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 91 ("It is difficult to obtain artefact-free
samples, as exhaust constituents can undergo chemical reactions, adsorption and desorption
processes, and condensation and diffusion.").
284. EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 14.
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control efforts.285 For example, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955
authorized the Surgeon General "to prepare or recommend research
programs for devising and developing methods for eliminating or reducing
air pollution.,,286 As the Senate Public Works Committee stated in its
report:
The committee recognizes that it is the primary responsibility of State
and local governments to prevent air pollution. The bill does not
propose any exercise of police power by the Federal Government and no
provision in it invades the sovereignty of States, counties, or cities.
There is no attempt to impose standards of purity.
287
The 1955 act was extended twice through 1964, while Congress studied
and then negotiated over more comprehensive federal approaches. 288 The
auto makers took steps to avoid imposition of control technology, at one
point in the 1950s creating a cross-licensing agreement for emissions
technology that deterred innovation. 289 California lost patience with the
automobile industry before the federal government did, enacting a
requirement for control of"blowby" emissions in the early 1960s.
290
These early efforts at support through providing information identified
heavy-duty diesel engines as a source of concern. At a conference held in
December 1961 to present "current research findings on quantities and type
of air pollutants from motor vehicles and the effects of these pollutants on
the health of man, plants, and laboratory animals, ' ' 291 for example, one
study identified diesel exhaust odorants and eye irritants and relating their
concentrations to engine operations. "Concentrations were presented for
particulate, low-molecular-weight hydrocarbons, formaldehyde, acrolein,
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and nitric oxide.,
292
Heavy-duty diesel engines were still comparatively rare, however, and
despite their visible smoke and odor would not have been likely to be seen
as a major source of air pollution.
Mobile sources generally were an early issue of concern.293 The focus,
285. See Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 276-77.
286. Air Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 84 -159,
§2, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), reprinted in 15 U.S.C.C.A.N. 351.
287. S. REP. No. 389 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2457, 2459.
288. Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 277.
289. See WHTrE, supra note 43, at 12-13 (recounting how patent pool worked to
discourage research).
290. See id. at 12 (describing history of California regulators' efforts).
291. Larsen, Motor Vehicle Emissions and Their Effects: Conference Report, 77 PUB.
HEALTH REP 963 (1962).
292. Id.
293. The 1963 Clean Air Act, for example, required the Secretary of HEW to
encourage the continued efforts.., to develop devices and fuels to prevent
pollutants from being discharged from the exhaust of automotive vehicles.., the
Secretary shall report to Congress on measures being taken toward the resolution of
the vehicle exhaust pollution problem... [and] his recommendations for additional
[56:2
2004] EPA 'S REGULATION OF HEA VY-DUTY DIESEL ENGINES 459
however, remained on federal assistance to state efforts. As a result, there
was relatively little interest group activity at the federal level other than a
general opposition to federal enforcement authority by industry groups. As
one author summarized this period, the interest groups "did not coalesce
strongly" in the lobbying over the 1963 act.294
Throughout the 1960s concern over mobile source emissions, including
diesel emissions,295 continued to grow, eventually prompting the 1965
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, which granted authority to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations
"as soon as possible" that would, "giving appropriate consideration to
technological feasibility and economic costs," regulate "the emission of
any kind of substance, from any class or classes of motor vehicles or new
motor engines, which in his judgment cause or contribute to, or are likely to
cause or contribute to air pollution which endangers the health or welfare
,,296of any person .... The first national regulation of mobile sources went
into effect with 1966 regulations for MY 1968 vehicles. Despite the broad
mandate, however, the first set of regulations covered only cars.297
Like the dog who did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes mystery, this first
round of federal involvement in mobile source air pollution regulation is
notable largely because the federal government did not act. Although this
appears strange today, in the pre-1970 world the absence of federal
regulatory action was the norm, not the exception. States regarded air
pollution as their responsibility and, although they welcomed federal
dollars and accepted federal research, they did not see a need for a federal
regulatory role. Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s the primary
advocate of environmental legislation was former governor Senator
Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), whose initial efforts focused on channeling aid
to state governments. 298 The lack of national regulation of heavy-duty
diesels in this period was thus less a conscious decision than simply the
status quo and a reflection of the comparatively small market share of the
legislation, if necessary, to regulate the discharge of pollutants from automotive
exhausts.
Clean Air Act, P.L. 88-206, § 6, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 433,
440.
294. Robert G. Dyck, Evolution of Federal Air Pollution Control Policy 1948-1967, at
58 (1971) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs).
295. House Report No. 899 indicates the bill (S. 306) would "amend the Clean Air Act
to require standards for controlling the emission of pollutants from gasoline-powered or
diesel- powered vehicles .. " H.R. REP. No. 899 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3608.
296. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, P.L. 89-272, § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 983, 984.
297. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 328.
298. Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 279-80.
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heavy-duty diesel engines.
B. Regulation-by-Rulemaking: 1967 to the 1990s
The first federal regulatory efforts covering diesel engines were a series
of regulation-by-rulemaking restrictions on heavy-duty diesel engine
emissions under the Air Quality Act of 1967 (AQA) and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990.
1. The Air Quality Act of 1967
The first major national regulatory effort on air pollution was the Air
Quality Act of 1967, which established a complex approach based on
national ambient air quality criteria and state ambient standards.2 99 The
most important set of regulations, for our purposes, is the AQA, which
addressed a major concern of mobile source manufacturers: the threat of
inconsistent state standards that could lead to having to outfit vehicles
differently for sale in different states. California had adopted auto tailpipe
emissions standards for hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide in 1966 and
begun regulating mobile source emissions in 1961,300 spurred by Los
Angeles' smog problems. With the growing interest in air quality, the auto
industry feared other states would begin to do so as well.30 1 The AQA
preempted all state regulatory efforts to regulate motor vehicle emissions,
except for California's, 30 2 which presented a special case by virtue of its
299. Id. at 280-82.
300. See CAL. AnR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA'S AIR QUALITY HISTORY KEY EvENTs, at
http://arbis.arb. ca.gov/html/brochure/history.htm (accessed June 30, 2002) ("The first
automotive emissions control technology in the nation, Positive Crankcase Ventilation(PCV), is mandated by the California Motor Vehicle State Bureau of Air Sanitation to
control hydrocarbon crankcase emissions. PC withdraws blowby gases from the crank.").
301. C. Stewart Gill, Comment: California or Bust!: Federal Preemption of State
Authority to Regulate Nonroad Engines and Vehicles Under the 1980 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act-Engine Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 6 DICK. J. ENV. L. & POL'Y.
189, 193 n. 22 (1997) ("the original bill did not contain the federal preemption provision for
motor vehicles. Once the topic was brought up, however, intense debate developed between
the states, which were adamant that they retain primary control over the regulation of motor
vehicles, and the manufacturers, which insisted that a patchwork of state regulations would
place a tremendous strain on auto-makers").
302. Air Quality Act of 1967, P.L. 90-148, § 208(a), 81 Stat. 485, 501 (1967):
Section 208 (a) No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt
to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this title .... (b) The Secretary
shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this
section to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission
standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless he finds that such State does not
require standards more stringent than applicable Federal standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions or that such State standards and
accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 202(a) of
this title.
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existing regulatory structure and particular environmental conditions.3 °3
The price of preemption for the mobile source manufacturers was
agreement to national regulatory efforts. Mobile source emissions
standards would in the future be created only at the national level and this
time regulation included diesel emissions.
The initial concern with diesels was "smoke"--the heavy, black exhaust
visible from some diesel exhausts.30 4 Smoke standards for diesel engines
began with standards applicable to MY 1970.305 To measure "smoke"
required HEW to specify the conditions under which measurements of
exhaust would be made. The measurements could then be compared to the
standard and the engine evaluated. HEW's proposal, issued January 4,
1968,306 required that heavy-duty diesel engines
shall not reduce the transmission of a beam of light by more than 20%
except that reduction of light transmission of not more than 40% for a
total of not more than 5 seconds shall be permitted during the running of
the two dynamometer tests described in section 85.122(a) (2) and (3). 07
The final regulations took the same approach,308 but specified separate
measurements for "engine acceleration mode" and "engine lugging
mode., 30 9  An initial standard was set for MY 1970- MY 1973, and a
stricter level for MY 1974 and forwards. These standards for diesel
exhaust smoke would remain the same through model year 1973, even after
the passage of the next major piece of air pollution legislation, the Clean
303. Since the 1977 amendments other states may also adopt the more stringent
California standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2001).
304. "Smoke" was defined by the regulations as "the solid or liquid matter in exhaust
emissions which obscure the transmission of light." 33 Fed. Reg. 8304, 8305 (June 4, 1968).
Diesels in the 1960s, at least in our recollections, almost uniformly emitted such smoke. It is
much rarer today.
305. Regulation of other pollutants from diesel engines would not start until MY 1974,
when standards were set for emissions of hydrocarbons (HC) and oxides of nitrogen (NO.)
combined, as well as individual emissions of carbon monoxide (CO).
306. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Proposed 1970 Standards for Exhaust Emissions, Fuel Evaporative Emissions, and
Smoke Emissions, 33 Fed. Reg. 110 (Jan. 4, 1968).
307. Id. at 112. The proposed standards also included defined terms such as exhaust
emissions, model year, smoke, and heavy-duty vehicle (a commercial vehicle of more than
6,000 lbs. gross vehicle weight). Id. at 111.
308. The final rule included Subpart J: Test Procedures for Engine Exhaust Emissions
(Diesel Engines for Use in Heavy Duty Vehicles). 33 Fed. Reg. 8304, 8319-24 (June 4,
1968). Technical amendments and corrections to the testing procedure were published on
July 1, 1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,096-98 (July 1, 1969). The current smoke emission standards
are at Subpart 1, 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.884-1 to 86.884-14 (2001).
309. "The opacity of smoke emissions from new diesel engines subject to this subpart
shall not exceed: (1) 40% during the engine acceleration mode. (2) 20 % during the engine
lugging mode." Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor
Vehicle Engines: Standards for Exhaust Emissions, Fuel Evaporation Emissions, and Smoke
Emissions, Applicable to 1970 and Later Vehicles and Engines, 33 Fed. Reg. 8304, 8306
(June 4, 1968).
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Air Act Amendments of 1970. 310
The 1967 Air Quality Act thus created the format that diesel engine
regulation follows to this day: specific standards for specific pollutants,
standard lab tests to measure the emissions, and standard sets of conditions
under which the tests were to be conducted. Given what regulators were
attempting to do, this format represented a reasonable set of choices:
standardization of procedures and consistency in test conditions was
necessary to prevent manipulation of engine operations and to provide
fairness to engine manufacturers. The focus on "smoke," which today
seems remarkably vague, addressed what was then seen as the most
important pollutant-the highly visible emissions from tailpipes. Smoke
emissions were largely solved through introducing turbochargers by the
mid-1970s, 31I rendering the smoke rules less relevant.
31 2
2. Regulation-by-Rulemaking Under the 1970 Clean Air Act & the EPA
Major changes to air pollution regulation came about in 1970. The
Nixon Administration created the EPA and transferred air pollution control
to it from HEW.313 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 established
the basic approach to mobile sources that continues today. The statute
mandated reductions of 90 percent of hydrocarbon, carbon monoxide, and
NO,, with an initial target of 1975; mobile source air pollution was to be
primarily controlled through federally mandated technology standards on
new vehicles. 31 4 States were left with the regulation of in-use vehicles, a
politically difficult issue and authority they were not eager to exercise.
315
310. See, e.g., 36 Fed. Reg. 22,452 (Nov. 25, 1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 24,295 (Nov. 15,
1972).
311. JOHNSON, supra note 168, at 88 ("The problem of diesel smoke has been overcome
to a great degree by turbocharging.").
312. Despite smoke's status as the first diesel pollutant regulated, no standard in-use test
for smoke emissions existed until 1996. Mike Osenga, Going After Gross Emitters of Diesel
Smoke, 62(2) DIESEL PROGRESS ENGINES & DRIVES 18, 18 (Feb. 1996).
313. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 established the EPA, and transferred the
functions of The National Air Pollution Control Administration to it from Secretary and
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623-24 (Oct. 6, 1970).
314. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 added new controls on carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons from "light duty vehicles and engines manufactured during or after model
year 1975" and emissions of oxides of nitrogen from "engines manufactured during or after
1976." Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690-92,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1954 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994)).
The statute also allowed for a "suspension for one year only of the effective date of any
emission standard required .. " The standards would also prove to be subject to future
modification by legislation. The oxides of nitrogen requirement for automobiles would
ultimately be changed to a reduction of "at least 75 percent." See DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR
POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS 2-51 (1981). The Amendments also provided the
definition of "model year," as well as a semblance of a definition of "light duty vehicle."
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1691. The term "light duty vehicles and engines" means
new light duty vehicles and new light duty motor vehicle engines, as determined under
regulations of the Administrator, i.e. automobile and light truck.
315. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 329-30.
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Even under the new statute, heavy-duty diesel engines continued to
receive less stringent treatment than gasoline passenger cars through the
early 1970s, 31 6 with only smoke regulated until the 1974 model year
engines, when hydrocarbon, NO, and CO emissions would begin to be
regulated. 31 7 The lack of attention to diesel emissions is not surprising,
given their small contribution to U.S. air pollution at the time: only 1.75
percent of total particulates, 0.02 percent of CO, 1.9 percent of
hydrocarbons, 4.8 percent of NO,,, and 0.4 percent of SOx in the early
1970s.3"' Unlike today, when diesel engines power 91 percent of the
heavy-heavy-duty transportation sector,319 in 1967 they comprised only a
small fraction of trucks in use. 32 0 The EPA's limited concern with diesels
can be seen from the fact that the agency ordered diesel emissions from
heavy-duty trucks reduced by much less than the equivalent reductions in
passenger car emissions.3 21
After the 1970 Amendments, the smoke exhaust emission standard was
tightened for model year 1974 and later engines.322 The new regulations
continued the format of specifying emissions levels for specific "modes" of
operation both for smoke and for the newly regulated substances.323 This
316. EPA, 230/3-74-013, PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
EMISSION STANDARDS THROUGH JUNE 1974, at IV-8 (1974) ("Separate emission control
regulations have been in effect since 1970 for new heavy-duty gasoline and diesel truck
engines manufactured for use in over-the-highway trucks and buses of over 6,000 lb. gross
vehicle weight (GVW).").
317. See id. at IV-10 to IV-12 (finding that "through 1970-1973, federal standards for
heavy-duty diesel truck engines covered smoke emissions only. In 1974, the standards were
revised to include HC, NO, and CO, emissions as well as more stringent smoke emissions.
The permissible gaseous- emissions levels are the same as for heavy-duty gasoline engines
for 1974, but the test procedure is different").
318. See Henein, Combustion, supra note 156, at 211 (providing a table comparing the
contributions of transportation diesel engines to air pollution in the United States).
319. See CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 131, at 10 (noting that the larger the
truck is, the more likely it will have a diesel engine).
320. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERVICE, ENVTL.
HEALTH SERVICE, NAT'L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR
CARBON MONOXIDE, NITROGEN OXIDE, AND HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS FROM MOBILE
SOURCES 2-4, Table 2-1 (1970) (noting diesel trucks made up only 416,454 out of
16,998,546 trucks in use). Finding comparable numbers on diesel usage across time has
proven challenging and we were not able to locate a more precise figure.
321. See Gale M. Reed, Note, 1976 Congressional Action on the Clean Air Act:
Automobile and Truck Emission Standards, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 353, 361 (1976) (noting that NO,
and hydrocarbon reduction of 15% and CO reduction of 57% compared to 80% reduction
for cars of both).
322. See 40 C.F.R. § 85.874-1 (1974) (stating that the opacity of smoke emissions from
new diesel engines shall not exceed: (i) 20% during the acceleration mode. (ii) 15% during
the engine lugging mode. (iii) 50% during the peaks in either mode); see also Control of Air
Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and Engines, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,574, 27,579 (June 30,
1975) (discussing the current, 2002, smoke emissions standards). See also EPA
VOLUNTARY DISEL RETROFIT PROGRAM 1974 STANDARDS, at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
retrofit/1974.htm (accessed March 9, 2002) (showing a Diesel Timeline that tracks heavy
duty diesel regulation).
323. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 85.974-1 (1974) (stating that "exhaust
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first set of emission standards issued by the EPA would be in effect through
MY 1978.324 By this time the academic community had recognized that
more realistic test standards were needed 325 and emissions standards for
automobiles were being specified in terms of a driving cycle, by California
since 1960 and by the federal government since 1968.326 The new test
standards thus evolved from the original opacity test with the creation of a
steady-state test, thereby simulating highway driving conditions. 327
Already, however, the EPA was concerned with the potential
inconsistencies between test- cycle performance and off-cycle performance
for other engines-concerned enough to issue an advisory circular warning
light-duty vehicle and light-duty truck manufacturers that "the rapid
advance in the introduction of more sophisticated emission control systems,
especially those that offer new flexibility in control capability," a
development that the EPA thought would be incorporated into "most, if not
all, motor vehicles and engines" by the early 1980s, could be considered
illegal "defeat devices. 328  Controllers were not illegal, the EPA
concluded, if NOx emissions under the Highway Fuel Economy Test were
within a specified range of test protocol emissions or could otherwise prove
to the EPA's satisfaction that the equipment was not a defeat device.329
The EPA was thus concerned, as early as December 1978, about the
gaseous emission from new heavy duty diesel engines shall not exceed: (i) Hydrocarbons
plus oxides of nitrogen (NO 2). 16 grams per brake horsepower hour. (ii) Carbon Monoxide.
40 grams per brake horsepower hour. (2) The standards set forth in paragraph (a) of this
section refer to exhaust gaseous emissions generated under the conditions set forth in §
85.974-9 through § 85.974-18 and measured and calculated in accordance with those
procedures"); see also Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and Engines, 40
Fed. Reg. 27,574, 27,588 (June 30, 1975).
324. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and Engines, 40 Fed.
Reg. 27,574, 27, 598 (discussing the 1977 standards); see also 40 C.F.R. § 86.078-11 (1981)
(discussing the 1978 standards); see also Control of Air Pollution From New Motor
Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,906, 32,907 (June 28, 1977). A
later technical amendment in the Federal Register was necessary to confirm that these
standards "also apply to later model year engines." Control of Air Pollution From New
Motor Vehicles and Engines, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,574 (June 30, 1975) (referring to § 85.801).
This highlights the problem of careful drafting.
325. See Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157, at 27 (stating that "[ildeally the
driving cycle or cycles employed in vehicle emissions tests should represent an average or
composite of vehicle operation typical of the driving of a large segment of the driver
population ... Not only does typical vehicle operation vary inter-regionally, or even intra-
regionally, but in addition the relative importance of each of the several types of pollutants
may vary geographically").
326. See id. at 27-28.
327. See Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36, at Al (reporting the lack of attention the
EPA has paid to the large amount of NO, pollution when diesel rigs cruise steadily down the
highway).
328. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND WASTE MGMT., OMSAPC ADVISORY CIRCULAR 24-2, at 1(1978), reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, app. A; see also EPA, SUMMARY
AND ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 6-7 (noting development of transient test began in 1972).
329. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR AND WASTE MGMT., OMSAPC ADVISORY CIRCULAR 24-2, at 3
(1978), reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, app. A.
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potential for controllers to create excess emissions in off-test-cycle
conditions.
The Clean Air Act as recreated by the 1970 Amendments was largely the
result of a game of political one-upsmanship between Republican President
Richard Nixon and Democratic Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), who
anticipated being rivals in the upcoming 1972 presidential election.
330
Although the Amendments imposed emissions standards on mobile
sources, they were not a serious blow to the auto industry. The automobile
makers prevailed on a number of key conference committee issues,
including deleting the requirement of testing each new vehicle in favor of
prototype testing and preventing public disclosure of emissions control
testing results and equipment costs. 33 1  Most importantly, the 1970
Amendments left open the possibility of delays in the new standards-
delays the auto industry lost little time in seeking.332 Particularly given the
anti-car attitudes in 1970 (one Congressman called the internal combustion
engine the "most serious and dangerous source of air pollution in the
[n]ation today"), 333 the degree of regulation of mobile sources that resulted
was comparatively mild. Moreover, the constant battles over automobile
emissions that resulted as the industry sought repeated extensions of
deadlines likely helped distract the EPA from the comparatively small
heavy-duty diesel engine sector. Heavy-duty diesel engine regulation
under the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments thus seems mostly an
afterthought, with most of the regulatory energy going into the bruising
battles over automobile emissions. Nonetheless, the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments established several of the crucial features that set the stage for
the later conflicts over heavy-duty diesel emissions.
3. Regulation-by-Rulemaking Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
Dissatisfaction with the 1970 version of the Clean Air Act prompted a
major effort at reform in 1976. Although the proposed 1976 Amendments
were blocked from final passage by Western senators unhappy about the
impact on western development during a midnight marathon session at the
close of the 1976 session of Congress, the measures were reintroduced and
a revised version was enacted in 1977. 334 Relaxing mobile source
regulations on automobiles was an important purpose behind the 1977
Amendments.335
330. See Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 282-83.
331. See id. at 286.
332. See id at 286-87.
333. Id. at 289.
334. See id. at 295-96.
335. See Currie, Mobile-Source, supra note 18, at 819 ("One of the principal motive
forces behind the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act was the auto industry's utgent cry
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For our purposes, the important parts of the 1977 Amendments were
those that delayed the unmet mobile source reductions mandated in 1970
until the 1980s, required inspection and maintenance programs, and added
an explicit requirement for regulations requiring "the greatest degree of
emission reduction achievable" consistent with cost, technical feasibility,
noise, energy, and safety factors for heavy-duty diesel engines.336 The lack
of the EPA's regulatory activity in the heavy-duty diesel sector in particular
prompted Congress to directly specify reductions.337 The Amendments
called for significant reductions from heavy-duty diesel engines of
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide (during and after model year 1983 of at
least 90 percent), oxides of nitrogen (during and after model year 1985 of
at least 75 percent), and particulate matter (during and after model year
1981 or earlier, if practicable). 338 Despite the tightening of the standards,
the EPA's proposals for 1980 did not require new technology to meet the
new standards.
339
that further postponement of the light-duty-vehicle- emission standards was necessary to
avoid a disastrous shutdown.").
336. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-95), 91 Stat. 685, 765
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994)). Section 224 amended § 202(a) of the
Clean Air Act by adding the following:
(3)(A)(i) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations under paragraph (1) of this
subsection applicable to emissions of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and oxides
of nitrogen from classes or categories of heavy-duty vehicles or engines
manufactured during and after model year 1979. Such regulations... shall contain
standards which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable
through the application of technology which the Administrator determines will be
available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of applying such technology within the period of time
available to manufacturers and to noise, energy, and safety factors associated with
the application of the technology.
Id. See also Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 330-31.
337. See Currie, Mobile-Source, supra note 18, at 848 ("Congress in 1977 was
dissatisfied with the emission standards for trucks and buses set by [the] EPA under the
general authority of section 202(a)."). The 1977 Amendments' congressional findings
included that:
[H]eavy-duty truck and bus emissions have not been adequately reduced. Although
standards applicable to new heavy-duty engines have been promulgated, their
requirements are much more lenient (even in terms of per cent reduction from
uncontrolled levels) than the statutory requirements for light-duty vehicles ... The
1977 Federal standards require no reduction of HC, NO., or CO from uncontrolled
diesel- powered engines.
H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 271-72 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1350-51.
See also Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 402 ("[L]ittle regulation occurred even
after the passage of the CAA, which led Congress to more specifically require HDEs to be
regulated in the 1977 CAA Amendments.").
338. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 224, 91 Stat. 685,
765.
339. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4144 (Jan. 21, 1980):
EPA projects that 36 percent of the diesel engine families will emit at or below
target emission levels ... The approaches that EPA anticipates for achieving the
targets are not new: such things as injector spray pattern and sac volume, after-
cooling of turbocharged intake flows, and turbocharging of naturally-aspirated
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The Amendments allowed the new standards to be revised starting in
1979 and again every subsequent three years.3 40 Although the statute
imposed more stringent standards, two "escape valves"' 341 were also
included in the statute, allowing the EPA to temporarily or permanently
revise the statutory standards for several reasons, including for reasons of
cost.342 The EPA "liberally" used the former but did not use the latter.
343
Congress also imposed extensive reporting and other requirements relating
to fuel efficiency costs. 344  Importantly, Congress also created the
requirement of a four-year lead time requirement for changed standards.
345
When the EPA set out to implement its new mandate to further reduce
diesel emissions, part of its approach was to propose extensive changes in
test procedures and instrumentation requirements to make the tests more
346closely resemble engine use conditions. Test procedures are important
not only because of the role they play in establishing whether a particular
engine receives certification, but because the EPA continued to rely on its
test procedures to check compliance as well as to formulate the standards
themselves. 347 Using its models, the EPA translated the new standards into
changes in air quality, predicting substantial reductions in emissions.348
engines are available paths to compliance.
Id. The same was true for automobile standards through the 1990s. See also Reitze, Mobile
Source, supra note 56, at 327 (explaining that new pollution control technology did not
achieve this reduction, rather, the motor vehicles used current engine technology to work
around and achieve the emission limits).
340. See 91 Stat. 685, 766 (1977) (as amended 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(6) (2000)) (stating
the reason an Administrator may use to warrant revising the current standard).
341. ENVTL. L. INST., 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §11.07[2] at 11-186
(2001).
342. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(B) (temporary revisions) (1976); 42 U.S.C. §
7521 (a)(B)(i) (permanent revisions).
343. ENvTL. L. INST.,supra note 341, at 11-187.
344. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(3)(C) (2000) (fuel economy); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(c)(3)
(reporting to Congress); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7521(c)(1)-(3) (requiring that the National
Academy of Sciences has not issued report to contrary relating to costs and fuel economy).
345. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(C) ("Any standard promulgated or revised under this
paragraph and applicable to classes or categories of heavy-duty vehicles or engines shall
apply for a period of no less than 3 model years beginning no earlier than the model year
commencing 4 years after such revised standard is promulgated.").
346. See U.S. EPA Final Rule, Certification and Test Procedures for Heavy Duty
Engines for 1979 and Later Model Years, 42 Fed. Reg. 45,132 (Sept. 8, 1977).
347. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4137 (Jan. 21, 1980):
The HC and CO standards were derived from a 'baseline' test program. Twenty-
three 1969 model year gasoline heavy-duty engines, chosen in numbers
proporational to their sales fractions in the 1969 market, made up the sample;
engines representing 81.5 percent of the sales were tested. Once these uncontrolled
emissions had been measured on the transient test procedure, it was a
straightforward matter to reduce the HC and CO numbers by 90 percent and arrive
at the final standards.
Id
348. 45 Fed. Reg. 4136 (Jan. 21, 1980):
We estimate that the implementation of these regulations will reduce the lifelong
HC emissions from the average heavy-duty gasoline fueled engine by one ton and
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Industry comments on the EPA's proposal were highly critical. One of the
most important comments "claimed that there is insufficient lead time to
comply with the regulations as proposed for the 1979 model year."3 49 After
consideration, the EPA concluded that the industry was correct 350 and
allowed "the continued use of the existing test procedures and
instrumentation to demonstrate compliance for 1979. All subsequent
demonstrations of compliance (1980 and later) will be only by the new test
procedures (with the exception of small volume manufacturers)., 35' The
EPA also made extensive changes to the testing procedures in response to
industry comments.352  Nonetheless, the industry remained critical of the
new test procedures.353
The most important development was the EPA's creation of the transient
engine test standard in 1979, designed to simulate urban driving
conditions. 354  Under steady-state operation, temperatures of engine
components and the fuel have reached an equilibrium value that varies only
slightly and randomly from one cycle to the next. However, under
transient conditions, fuel pressures and temperatures and engine component
CO emissions by 29 tons. Similarly, the average heavy-duty diesel engine will
experience a reduction of 0.8 tons [sic] in HC. These gains translate into average
urban mobile source HC and CO reductions of 17% and 30%, respectively, by the
late 1990s [sic]. As a result, the average urban ambient air quality will improve
some 2% in ozone and 7% in carbon monoxide.
Id.
349. Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 45,132 (Sept. 8, 1977).
350. See id. ("EPA's analysis supports the manufacturers' claim that lead time... is
tight.").
351. Id. at 45,132-33. See also id. at 45,133 ("[C]ompliance may be demonstrated to the
originally proposed standards (1.5 HC, 25 CO, 10 HC+NOx or the more stringent levels 5.0
HC+NOx, 25 CO) at the option of the manufacturer.").
352. "The commentators questioned the need for the extensive test procedure and
instrumentation changes proposed .... EPA has made the following major revisions to the
heavy-duty NPRM:
(a) The requirement for use of a specified analysis system designed without
deviation in accordance with EPA's schematic diagram has been deleted. Instead,
minimum requirements and performance specifications are substituted ... (c) A
chemiluminescence analyzer or high performance NDIR analyzer with an NO2 to
NO converter is specified for NO, measurement. An option to allow the use of
current NDIR analyzers with an NO2 to NO converter is also included ... (d) The
CO 2 measurement is made optional for Diesel engines.
42 Fed. Reg. 45,133 (Sept. 8, 1977). For MY 1980, only low volume manufacturers, as
defined in 40 C.F.R. § 86.080-11(a)(2) (1981), had the option of using either testing
procedure. 40 C.F.R. § 86.080-11 (1981).
353. See MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at
88 ("The committee has received many criticisms of the cycle from engine manufacturers
who disagree sharply with the conclusions of EPA [regarding the appropriateness of the test
cycle].").
354. See Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36, at A l (reporting the EPA's fear that, due to
inadequate testing procedures, it had grossly underestimated the amount of pollution caused
by diesel rigs); see also U.S. EPA Proposed Rulemaking, Control of Air Pollution from
New Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Engines, 44 Fed. Reg. 9464-65 (Feb. 13, 1979)
(discussing the need for urban air improvements and actual on road improvements).
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temperatures vary "progressively rather than randomly from cycle to
cycle. 355 Since diesel emissions are sensitive to temperature, pressure, and
the like,35 6 transient and steady-state testing have different results for the
same engine.
The new test was introduced because of the EPA's concern that "[t]he
mandated 75 percent reduction will be difficult for the manufacturers of
diesels, and the incentive to design around the test will be great.
357
Under a steady-state test protocol, an engine manufacturer could optimize
the engine's emissions performance for precisely the specification. An
overly-simplified example can clarify the engineering problem for the
EPA: with mechanical engine controllers, an engine manufacturer could
optimize the engine's emissions control performance for operation at 45
miles per hour.358  Emissions at other speeds would be higher. Since
engines operate at multiple speeds, overall emissions would thus be higher
than the test predicted. "Transient testing will be needed to assure that the
reductions mandated by Congress [will] actually [be] achieved ....
The transient test would, again oversimplifying the variables, test the
engine at several speeds.
[The] EPA's theory at the time was that urban emissions likely would be
greater and, by controlling those emissions, one would also control
emissions under highway, or steady-state conditions
360
A theory that even the highly critical House Commerce Committee
Report Asleep at the Wheel later termed "plausible given that, in the 1970s,
heavy-duty diesel engines were controlled by unsophisticated mechanical
carburetors such that emission levels when the engine was not performing
on the designated test cycle were not likely to vary much from emission
levels experienced when the engine was operating on the test cycle. ' 36 I
The culmination of five years' development by [the] EPA (and, in part,
by the heavy-duty manufacturing industry), the transient test exercises
the engine through a continually changing series of speed/torque
conditions as emissions are sampled. The new testing and sampling
355. Myers et al., Engine Exhaust, supra note 157, at 23.
356. See Marr & Harley, Spectral Analysis, supra note 80.
357. 45 Fed. Reg. 4138 (Jan. 21, 1980)
358. Actual optimization would be more complex and depend on multiple factors such as
load.
359. 45 Fed. Reg. 4138 (Jan. 21, 1980).
360. ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 5. See also OECD, Control of Emissions
from Heavy-Duty Vehicles 44 (1993), reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36,
app. J ("Control of heavy-duty emissions over the specific U.S. transient cycle is considered
to provide proportional control also of emissions under driving conditions not explicitly
represented by the transient cycle itself."). Urban exposure levels to diesel exhaust are
significantly higher in both the United States (1-2 ug/ m3vs.. less than 0.6-1 ug/ i 3 ) and
Germany (5-10 ug/m3 vs. less than 1.5 ug/ m3). IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 94.
361. ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 5-6.
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requirements differ so greatly from those currently in place that the
development of an entirely new set of regulations has been necessary.
362
The transient system was designed to make the tests more representative
of in-use conditions.3 63 The EPA selected the specific test conditions after
a survey of 44 trucks and 7 buses driven in New York City and Los
Angeles. 364 These 2 cities were selected as representing "the extremes of
urban traffic flow., 3 6 5 Performing well on the test meant that an engine
met the EPA standards for driving conditions likely to be encountered in
urban conditions.
The transient test also required new test equipment366 and the delays in
obtaining the equipment prompted the EPA to delay introduction of the
new test. 367 As the EPA described the procedure:
Transient engine tests are performed in the laboratory using a
dynamometer, a computer- based controller, and an emissions sampling
apparatus. The dynamometer is simply an electric motor which is linked
to the drive shaft of the engine (with the transmission removed) to either
absorb the engine's energy or to drive the engine .... By properly
controlling the dynamometer, the engine can be subjected to conditions
which simulate the operation of an engine in a vehicle on the road ....
It is the transient-control computer that "drives" the dynamometer
through the cycle in a repeatable manner .... The exhaust flow of an
engine is conducted through a machine called a constant-volume sampler
(CVS), from which a small proportional sample is withdrawn. This
method of sampling is dictated by the varying exhaust flow which
accompanies transient operation .... To compute mass emissions
during transient testing, the total volume of sample, diluted in the CVS,
must be measured .... Hydrocarbon emissions are measured using a
flame ionization detector (FID); CO and CO 2 using a non-dispersive
infrared analyzer; and NO, using a chemiluminescence analyzer. The
resulting pollutant concentrations found in the sample are applied to the
total diluted flow to yield, after conversion, the mass emissions during
the test.
362. 45 Fed. Reg. 4137 (Jan. 21, 1980).
363. See Michael P. Walsh, Worldwide Developments in Motor Vehicle Diesel
Particulate Control, in DEVELOPMENTS IN DIESEL PARTICULATE CONTROL SYSTEMS (SP-775)
1, 3 (1989) [hereinafter Walsh, Worldwide].
364. See TAD WYSOR & CHESTER FRANCE, EPA TECHNICAL REPORT HDV-78-02,
SELECTION OF TRANSIENT CYCLES FOR HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLES, 1 (1978) (copy on file with
authors).
365. Id.
366. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4138 (Jan. 21, 1980) ("Unlike the gasoline engine
manufacturers ... diesel manufacturers may have to completely replace their present
equipment....").
367. See EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 179-85 (determining that
although some certification could occur for the 1983 MY, it would involve too much risk for
missing the deadline to be practical).
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The gasoline and diesel test cycles (Appendix I) are composed of
second-by- second sequences of engine speed/torque pairs, with values
given in normalized (percent of maximum) form. These cycles were
computer-generated from a large data base of urban heavy-duty engine
operation.
368
The resulting test "consists of a second-by-second listing of prorated
speeds and torques, through which the engine must be exercised within
statistically acceptable limits." 369  Despite the EPA's argument that the
transient test was needed to make testing reflect real world conditions, the
EPA not only did not attempt to validate its new test but denied that
validation was desirable:
Heavy-duty truck operation, and therefore heavy-duty emissions, are
application-specific. The objective of CAPE-21 was to arrive at an
"average" duty cycle for an "average" urban truck. Any given
application wouldn't necessarily correlate with emissions measured on
the average cycle. To choose an on-road application identical in duty
cycle to the test procedure itself would prove nothing.
370
Engine manufacturers were critical of the EPA's proposal for transient
testing.371 Their comments during rulemaking "centered around the
justification for the tests, their representation of real life operation, their
validation, their repeatability, and the lack of current knowledge upon
which to base comments. 372 They also regularly expressed concerns about
the lead time necessary to implement new standards and procedures.
373
368. 45 Fed. Reg. 4138 (Jan. 21, 1980) (providing a complete summary of the testing
procedure).
369. Clark & McKain, supra note 62, at 433.
370. EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 31.
371. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4147 (Jan. 21, 1980) ("Transient testing requirements were
roundly criticized by both gasoline and diesel engine manufacturers (and others)."); EPA,
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note. 92 (summarizing the industry desire to retain the
steady-state procedures).
372. 45 Fed. Reg. 4147 (Jan. 21, 1980). See also EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra
note 92, at 2-6 (listing the complaints of the manufacturers for each category).
373. See 48 Fed. Reg. 1408 (Jan. 12, 1983):
Manufacturers of HDDEs expressed the need for timely decisions on potential
relaxation of the optional steady-state standards and possible revisions of other key
regulatory provisions in order to keep their 1984 model year development and
certification programs on track . .. both LDT and HDE manufacturers requested
expeditious action on EPA's proposal to revise the AQL applicable during SEA
testing and on the useful-life requirements. Also due to leadtime constraints, the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) requested a 1-year
postponement of the full-life useful-life regulations. The majority of the
manufacturers strongly urged that EPA announce its 1984 model year requirements
as soon as possible after the close of the comment period.
Id. at 1406. The manufacturers' concerns included the amount of leadtime for 1987 MY
standard, the environmental need for revising the HD NOx standard, and the technological
feasibility of a 4.0 g/BHP-hr standard for HDDEs. See also 50 Fed. Reg. 10,622-23 (Mar.
15, 1985) (listing other comments made about fuel economies penalties associated with the
proposed standards, particularly for diesel engines, the costs of standards, and statutory
leadtime provisions).
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The transient test introduction made a major change in engine emissions
testing. Testing engines under both the old and new standards found
"[t]here is no general correlation between emissions measured on the two
cycles; correlations are different for different emission species, for different
engine types, and even for different manufacturers., 374 Initially there were
also large differences in emissions test results under the new procedure
between laboratories.375 The transient test procedure did appear to produce
approximately 10 percent lower NOx levels than did the steady-state test.
376
This difference suggests the critical importance of designing engines to the
test procedures for engine manufacturers, since sales of their engines
depend on receiving the EPA certification that their engines met the
standards. Later analysis in Europe determined that the transient test cycle,
while more realistic of U.S. driving conditions, was also more vulnerable to
engine controller strategies aimed at test passage rather than emission
reductions.377
Over the next decade, the EPA continued to tighten heavy-duty diesel
emission standards under the transient test. From HEW's regulation of
only "smoke" in 1970, the diesel emission regulations evolved into a
complex and stringent list of regulations covering hydrocarbons, CO, NOx,
and particulates. Leadtime to meet new standards continued to be an
important issue. After the EPA promulgated the 6.0 g/bhp-hr NO, heavy-
duty diesel engine standard on March 15, 1985,378 the Engine
Manufacturers Association sued the EPA for not providing four years
leadtime as required by the Clean Air Act. The EMA prevailed in the D.C.
Circuit, which ruled that the NO, standard for all heavy-duty engines could
not go into effect until the 1990 model year.379 Not all the EPA proposals
374. MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 8; see
also JOHN DEERE & Co., 2 EPA AIR DOCKET A-91-24, DEERE & COMPANY COMMENTS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING "CONTROL OF
AIR POLLUTION: EMISSIONS OF OXIDES OF NITROGEN AND SMOKE FROM NEW NONROAD
COMPRESSION-IGNITION ENGINES AT OR ABOVE 50 HORSEPOWER," (1993) (copy on file with
authors) (noting that steady state and transient test cycles "could cause the EPA to reach
entirely different decisions during the [engine] certification process").
375. See MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at
29 (stating that NO, differed 15%; particulates and hydrocarbon results by "as much as a
factor of two").
376. See MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at
29.
377. See ASSOCIATION, TEST CYCLE, supra note 239, at 8 ("The test cycle configuration
should be such as to bring about results in terms of low engine emissions that are as far as
possible independent of the patterns of use of the engine. This objective is better fulfilled by
a test cycle based on a set of steady state modes than by a transient cycle.").
378. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 50 Fed.Reg. 10,606 (Mar. 15, 1985).
379. Natural Res. Defense Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d. 410, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
see also 52 Fed. Reg. 47,858 (Dec. 16, 1987) ("In response to the Court's remand, this
technical amendment package changes the 1988 effective date of the NO, standards to the
1990 model year. This delay in the effective date applies to heavy duty engines and heavy
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for regulations resulted in action; neither a proposed particulate standard
nor revision of the NO, standard in January 1981 were adopted.38° Table 1
lists the major regulations. MY 1988 brought the first particulate standards
for heavy-duty diesels, 38 1 five years after the EPA imposed the first diesel
particulate standards in the world on cars and light duty trucks.382 "In
1984, with no HDE standards yet promulgated, the NRDC successfully
sued to obtain a court order to compel [the] EPA to publish final NO, and
PM standards by March 15, 1985."383
MY 1991 standards tightened the NO,. standard to 5.0 g/bhp-hr, and
introduced an innovation: allowing the averaging and trading of emission
credits, with "not to exceed" levels for engine families (FELs).384 These
"innovative, voluntary programs" allowed engine manufacturers "who
reduce emissions below regulatory requirements for a particular model year
for a particular engine to offset these reductions against emissions in a later
model year or to trade credits for these reductions to other manufacturers of
similar engines. 3 85 Limited banking was allowed starting in 1990. The
value of the programs was reduced by the requirement of a 20 percent
discount required by the EPA "as an added assurance that the incentives
created by the program will not only have no adverse environmental effect
but also provide an environmental benefit. 386
One reason the EPA continued to tighten the standards was the
increasing importance of diesel engines in the heavy-duty truck market. As
the EPA noted in 1981:
As diesel engines continue over time to power an even greater portion of
the nation's heavy-duty vehicles (on-the-road trucks and buses whose
gross vehicle weight rating exceeds 8,500 pounds), their contribution to
ambient levels of total suspended particulate (TSP) will increase over
levels that are already significant. Current heavy-duty diesels emit more
than twice the particulate per mile emitted by heavy-duty gasoline
engines operated on leaded gasoline.
387
Gasoline burning engines were being heavily regulated by the EPA and
light-duty trucks having a gross vehicle weight exceeding 6,000 lbs.").
380. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 46 Fed. Reg. 5838 (proposed Jan. 19, 1981); see also Control of Air Pollution
From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engies, 46 Fed. Reg. 1910 (proposed
Jan. 7, 1981).
381. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,607 (Mar. 15, 1985).
382. See Walsh, Worldwide, supra note 363, at 3.
383. Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 403.
384. 55 Fed. Reg. 30,622 (July 26, 1990).
385. 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584 (July 26, 1990).
386. Id.
387. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 46 Fed. Reg. 1910 (proposed Jan. 7, 1981).
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their emissions were being reduced. The increasing use of diesel engines,
however, threatened to wipe out these gains.3 8 Even without the changes
in market share, as gasoline engines' emissions declined, diesel engines'
relative share of total emissions increased.389
If current trends continue, EPA expects the use of diesel engines in
heavy-duty vehicles to increase dramatically over the next 15 years.
While diesel engines currently power about one-third of all new heavy-
duty vehicles sold in the U.S., EPA expects this percentage to increase to
57-69 percent by 1995. This move toward more diesels will increase
nationwide particulate emissions from heavy-duty diesels to an estimated
218,000-266,000 metric tons per year by 1995. Urban areas would be
the most heavily affected by these emissions.
390
Truck manufacturers managed to meet the increasing standards through
the 1980s through improvements in combustion without adding post-
combustion treatment of exhaust.391 Indeed, the first particulate standards,
effective in 1988 "required little reduction from the emission levels of
uncontrolled engines for most vehicles. 392
One important result of the tougher clean air standards was the
increasing reliance on electronic controls in mobile source engines to meet
standards 393 and improve performance. 394  While the first electronic
388. See id.
Beginning with the 1984 model year, heavy-duty gasoline engines will for the most
part be equipped with catalysts in order to comply with stringent standards for
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide. These engines will then be operatingon
cleaner burning unleaded gasoline and their particulate emissions will decrease by
95-98 percent. Thus, without regulation, heavy-duty diesels will emit 40-100 times
the particulate emitted by these 1984 and later model year gasoline engines.
Id.; see also John H. Cushman, Jr., Record Penalty Likely Against Diesel Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at Al ("Environmentalists and [g]overnment officials say diesel
engines were passed over in emission standards until the 1990s because they caused much
less smog than did cars and smokestack industries. But since car emissions of hydrocarbons
and nitrogen oxide began to be regulated in 1970, diesel engines have increasingly emerged
as a greater problem."). Diesel engines emit similar levels of particulates to comparable
gasoline engines, but the introduction of emissions controls on the latter created a disparity.
C.A. Amann et al., Some Rudiments of Diesel Particulate Emissions, in THE MEASUREMENT
AND CONTROL OF DIESEL PARTICULATE EMISSIONS, PART 2, at 3 (1981). NO, emissions,
however, are greater from uncontrolled heavy-duty diesel engines than from uncontrolled
heavy-duty gasoline engines. MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE,
supra note 64, at x.
389. See White, supra note 43, at 13 (discussing the lack of incentive for a firm to
partake in its own independent research in emissions control technology preventing it from
significantly competing with rivals).
390. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 46 Fed. Reg. 1910-11 (Jan. 7, 1981).
391. See, e.g., Stephen E. Plumb & Stewart Siegel, They May Growl, But Bulldogs Can
Be Friendly, 28(3) WARD'S AUTO WORLD 111, 111 (1992) (describing new Mack engine
and noting that Mack, Cummins, Caterpillar, and Detroit Diesel all had developed engines
that reduce emissions "without an after-treatment device or significant price increase").
392. Sawyer and Johnson, supra note 106, at 69.
393. See supra notes 101-02; see also Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 363
("Manufacturers of automobiles began to use onboard computer[s]" for emissions control).
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controls were simply add-ons to existing engines, by the late mid-1980s
engine manufacturers began to introduce fully electronic control systems.395
Electronic engine controls also allowed manufacturers to price discriminate
among customers, since engines were programmed differently for
conditions that would result in higher warranty claims.39 6
The pattern of regulation through the 1980s reflected the institutional
structure of clean air regulation outlined earlier. Initial regulatory efforts in
mobile sources focused on the largest contributor-automobiles. As
further reductions in automobile emissions became increasingly costly as
regulation moved up the marginal cost curve, regulators also turned to the
cheaper gains in air quality possible in the heavy-duty diesel sector.
Indeed, we would not be surprised if one of the reasons for the growth in
heavy-duty diesel engines' market share in transportation was their
comparatively light regulatory burden into the early 1980s. As diesel's
relative importance in emissions grew, however, so did regulatory
attention.
The EPA's choice of regulatory means is also easy to explain. Into the
1980s the EPA used only regulation-by-rulemaking and had no need for an
alternative method. The fights in mobile source regulation in the 1970s
were primarily political disputes over allocation of emissions between
stationary and mobile sources, fought out in the halls of Congress, with the
EPA having little discretion in how it implemented congressional directives
to reduce mobile source emissions by specific percentages. The EPA's
alternative in the 1980s, the new, informal forms of negotiated rulemaking
being experimented with, were not desirable for highly politicized disputes
over the levels of reduction in mobile source pollutants, particularly given
the intense congressional interest in the EPA's activities in the area. Since
Bob Deierlein, The Show Must Go On, 112 BEVERAGE WORLD 106 (1993) (describing the
Detroit Diesel electronic system as "evolved as a result of a unique set of events
[including] ... the need to meet increasingly stringent air quality standards...").
394. See ROBERT N. BRADY, HEAVY-DUTY TRUCKS: POWERTRAINS, SYSTEMS, AND
SERVICE 818 (1997) ("Electronic systems optimize control of critical engine functions that
affect fuel economy, exhaust smoke, and emissions. These electronic systems provide the
capability to protect the engine from serious damage resulting from conditions such as high
engine coolant temperatures, high oil temperature, and low engine oil pressure conditions.")
[hereinafter Robert N. Brady].
395. See id at 817-18.
396. See id at 835:
If an engine horsepower setting is altered, or if major alterations to the engine
parameters are required while the engine is still under warranty, the OEM needs to
know what changes are being made. This reprogramming can cost the engine user
from several hundred to several thousand dollars, particularly if a higher
horsepower setting is desired, because experience proves that higher horsepower
engines tend to cost more because of service failures than do lower power-rated
engines. The user pays extra dollars to cover the anticipated possible failure costs
charged back to the OEM while the engine is under an extended warranty period.
Id. at 835.
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negotiated rulemaking was not formally recognized until 1990, it is not
surprising that the EPA opted not to use it for the major mobile source rules
in the 1980s.397  This period is thus primarily about creating the
circumstances that would later shape the EPA's choices among regulatory
instruments once the EPA had such a choice.
4. Regulation-by-Negotiation
As it tightened standards during the 1980s, the EPA modified its
approach to accommodate the need for greater flexibility in engine and
truck manufacture. Initially, the EPA had simply required manufacturers to
meet regulatory deadlines and then fought over pushing deadlines back.
The EPA introduced delays in implementation to accommodate economic
conditions in the industry 398 and to accommodate manufacturers' need for
lead time. 399  The EPA also introduced "noncompliance penalties" that
allowed engines that exceeded the standards (but which did not pollute
beyond an "upper limit" of acceptable pollution) 400 to be sold despite their
failure to meet the standards. 40 1 The NCPs were intended to ameliorate
problems with developing technology to meet the "technology-forcing"
regulations.40 2 This innovation was the result of the EPA's first "negotiated
397. See The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570; Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3870, 3873-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561).
398. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 48 Fed. Reg. 1406 (Jan. 12, 1983):
At the time the initial final rules were being prepared, the industry had just finished
a year of record sales (1978) and sales continued strong into 1979. However, in
late 1979 and early 1980 a general economic downturn occurred . .. Engine and
truck sales have dropped dramatically and most manufacturers have reported
operating losses for 1980 and 1981.
Id. In response to this economic crisis, the Administration announced a number of
regulatory relief initiatives aimed at reducing the cost of government regulations.
399. See 48 Fed. Reg. 1408 (Jan. 12, 1983):
[T]he remaining leadtime is inadequate for HDDE manufacturers to comply with
1984 HDDE emission standards and regulatory provisions ... [the] EPA has
therefore decided to revise the 1984 HDDE standards and other related regulatory
provisions to 1983 levels for a period of one year. As in the case of HDGEs, the
current 1984 emission standards and regulatory provisions remain optional.
Id.
400. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985) ("An 'upper limit' is an emission level,
established by regulation and appropriate to a specific pollutant, above which an HDE or
HDV cannot be certified.").
401, On Aug. 30, 1985, the EPA promulgated the generic aspects of a nonconformance
penalty (NCP) rule to:
[A]llow a manufacturer of heavy-duty engines (HDEs) or heavy-duty vehicles
(HDVs) whose engines or vehicles fail to conform with certain applicable
emissions standards, but which do not exceed a designated upper limit, to be issued
a certificate of conformity upon payment of a monetary penalty.
50 Fed. Reg. 35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985).
402. Control of Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines,50
Fed. Reg. 35,374 (Aug. 30, 1985) ("In placing section 206(g) in the Clean Air Act,
amendments of 1997 Congress intended NCPs as a response to perceived problems with
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rulemaking" exercise.4 °3 Agreement on the rule was reached in four
months.4 °4
The NCPs were conditioned on three findings by the EPA:
[A]n emission standard must become more difficult to meet, either
because the standard itself has become more stringent or because
compliance with it has been made more difficult because of another
standard which has become more stringent; EPA must find that
substantial work is necessary to meet the standard; and EPA must
determine that there is likely to be a technological laggard.4°5
Why did the EPA choose regulation-by-negotiation for these rules? One
factor was surely the promotion of regulation-by-negotiation itself within
the agency. The push for regulatory negotiation in the 1980s meant there
were advantages within the agency to adopting a strategy favored by
agency administrators. With hostile forces within the Reagan
Administration and Congress, the Agency had little political capital to lose
in giving more control to the industry in the NCP negotiations. The cost of
regulation-by-negotiation was thus low. Moreover, these issues fit our
profile of the type of circumstances under which regulation-by-negotiation
is desirable for agencies. The NCP rule was merely a negotiation over how
much the industry would have to pay to exceed the standards - akin to a
purely financial settlement of a lawsuit. Regulation-by-negotiation's
structure was perfectly suited to this issue. The EPA had to satisfy the
environmental pressure groups by showing that it was not letting the engine
makers buy their way out of stricter pollution controls (or at least not doing
so too cheaply). The structure of regulation-by-negotiation created the
circumstances under which a dialogue between the pressure groups and the
industry could take place, one more conducive to credible commitments
than a sequential filing of public comments.
technology-forcing heavy-duty emissions standards. (Footnote omitted) Following
International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Congress realized
the dilemma that technology-forcing standards were likely to cause ... NCPs were intended
to remedy this potential problem .... ").
403. See50Fed. Reg. 35,374(Aug. 30,1985):
This rule is the result of an innovative rulemaking process called Regulatory
Negotiation, the concept of which is to allow the parties interested in or affected by
the outcome of the rule an opportunity to participate in its development through
face-to-face negotiations. This rule, which was proposed in 50 [Fed. Reg.] 9204
(March 6, 1985), is based upon the consensus that was reached during the
Regulatory Negotiation process. This is [the] EPA's first completed rulemaking
under this new regulatory process.
Id.
404. See GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 213 (1995).
405. Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,375 (Aug. 30, 1985).
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5. Regulation-by-Rulemaking Under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
The next set of major amendments to the Clean Air Act came in 1990,
after more than a decade of political stalemate due in part to Michigan
Congressman John Dingell's attempts to weaken mobile source regulation
and stall tighter rules 40 6 and regional divisions over acid rain.407 When the
stalemate finally broke, the result was a large, complex bill that addressed
multiple major programs: 40 8 "an eight-inch pile of approximately 1,500
pages of typescript., 40 9 As part of that rewrite, the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments added a number of new programs to mobile source
regulation. 410 Most of these were not relevant to the heavy-duty diesel
engine industry, but new fuel mandates did come into being41 1 and
412
standards were tightened again. Many of the mobile source provisions
affected consumers rather than manufacturers and helped stationary sources
413
shift burdens onto mobile sources. The 1990 Amendments shifted
heavy-duty diesel regulation to § 202 generally, except for NOx, which
removed the requirement for specific reductions in emissions.414 The effect
of the 1990 amendments was "to freeze the newly established provisions
for 14 years.,
4 15
Section 201 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 revised the
standards applicable to emissions of HC, CO, NO,, and particulate matter
from heavy-duty vehicles or engines manufactured during or after model
year 1983 to ones "which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator
determines will be available for the model year to which such standards
apply, giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety
406. BRYNER, supra note 404, at 110; see also Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 303.
407. Id. at 111.
408. Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 305-06; GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-00-72,
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ISSUES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 5
(2000) ("In large part, the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act were intended to meet
unaddressed or insufficiently addressed problems.").
409. Timothy E. Wirth, Energy and Politics in the Clean Air Bill, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
209, 209 (1991).
410. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 333-38 (describing 1990 amendments
mobile source provisions); see also Wirth, supra note 410, at 210 ("[T]he regulation of
pollution from cars and trucks was one of the issues that dominated the politics of the [1990
amendments].").
411. See 104 Stat. 2399, 2490 (as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(i)(1) (1995)) (describing
that § 217 of the 1990 amendments prohibits diesel fuel which contains a concentration of
sulfur in excess of .05 percent (by weight)).
412. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and subsequent regulations tightened the
standards by decreasing the permissible NOx level for MY 1998 and the particulate
standards starting in MY 1994. (See Table 1 for details). The regulations also applied the
standards to engines' "useful life," making them more stringent.
413. See Morriss, Politics, supra note 15, at 309.
414. See ENVTL. L. INST., 2 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 11.07[2], at 11-211
(2001).
415. See FRANK P. GRAD, 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2.06[D] (2001).
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factors. ' ' 4 16  The Administrator was also given the authority to revise
heavy-duty vehicle or engine standards "promulgated under, or before the
date of, the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (or
previously revised under this subparagraph)." The Amendments also set
stability of at least three model years and a lead time of no earlier than the
model year commencing four years after promulgation of a revised
standards.417 After the 1990 Amendments, the EPA added regulations
forbidding the use of "defeat devices" that would interfere with emissions
controls in automobiles and light trucks. 1 8 Similar regulations were added
for MY2000 heavy-duty diesel engines.4 9
There were two important developments that changed the EPA's attitude
toward diesel emissions in the 1990s. First, by 1997 the EPA was reporting
that heavy-duty diesels were the largest sources of particulates and NO,
among mobile sources, 420 and additionally that the disparity in regulations
between gasoline and diesel vehicles was becoming an issue.42' Second, by
the early 1990s, scientists' views about the carcinogenicity of diesel
emissions had changed significantly. Diesel exhaust particulates had been
thought to be a carrier of chemical carcinogens. Now, however, based on
the results of rat studies it was thought that the respirable particulate matter
in diesel exhaust was itself a carcinogen.422
Although the EPA had used regulation-by-negotiation for the NCP rule
in the 1980s and continued to use it for other rulemaking in the 1990s, it
reverted to regulation-by-rulemaking for the standards under the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. This choice was not surprising given what
was at stake: heavy-duty diesel engines were now one of the major sources
of NOx. The combination of the gap between the EPA's model and reality
on NOx, and the problems with nonattainment of the ozone standard led to
increasing pressure to find new sources of NOx reduction. Reductions of
heavy-duty diesel NOx would benefit other categories of mobile sources as
well as stationary sources, and even a negotiation limited to NOx sources
was unlikely to produce agreement on who was going to pay for further
NOx reductions. Moreover, technology-forcing regulations are built
around not believing industry's predictions about what can and cannot be
416. See Section 201, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399,
2472 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (1995)).
417. See Section 201, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399,
2472 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(C) (1995)).
418. See 40 C.F.R. § 86.094-16(a) (2001) (light duty vehicles and trucks).
419. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.000-16(a), 86.004-16(a) (2001) (new vehicles including heavy-
duty engines).
420. Diesel Engines Pollute Most, 112(4) IMPLEMENT & TRACTOR 9 (1997) (finding that
engines in industries such as construction and farming are to blame for about half of all
mobile emissions of particulate matter and NO.).
421. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 341.
422. Nauss et al., supra note 121, at 7.
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done - the opposite of the credible commitment function of regulation-by-
negotiation.
6. Negotiations over Principles
Although not formally regulation-by-negotiation under the Statute, the
EPA did engage in further cooperative efforts with the engine
manufacturers and California regulators. In 1995, the engine
manufacturers, the EPA, and the California Air Resources Board (CARB)
negotiated a "Statement of Principles" (SOP) for future regulation of
heavy-duty diesel emissions. The SOP intended to provide the
manufacturers with greater stability in the regulatory environment.423 At
the time, the EPA termed the SOP "an historic agreement" and "an
example of the type of private/public and federal/state partnership approach
to environmental regulation that EPA is pursuing., 424 The Statement of
Principles included a commitment to a 50 percent reduction in NOx and
non-methane hydrocarbons by MY 2004, an averaging, banking and
trading system for emissions credits, and improvements in fuel quality.425
In return for agreeing to the reductions in NOx, the engine manufacturers
secured agreements from the EPA not to reduce particulate standards and
from California to delay a reduction in NOx standards. 426  Most
importantly, the SOP gave the manufacturers more stability.427 These
features were critical to the engine manufacturers' support for the SOP, as
well as the EPA's use of a "dual" standard that gave manufacturers the
choice between two standards for MY 2004 engines. 428 When the EPA
later proposed additional regulations, however, the engine makers had "a
sense of betrayal" and called on the EPA to honor its "gentleman's
423. See Control of Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, Appendix: Statement of
Principles, 60 Fed.Reg. 45,580, 45,602-04 (proposed Aug. 31, 1995) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 80, 86, and 89). The EPA signed a similar agreement with manufacturers of
small spark-ignition engines used in lawn, garden, and utility applications. See also Mike
Brezonick, Engine Manufacturers Sign Statement of Principles Covering Small Engines, 63
DIESEL PROGRESS-NORTH AMERICAN EDITION 60 (Feb. 1997).
424. See EPA Air and Radiation Office of Mobile Sources, EPA, California Air
Resources Board, and Manufacturers of Heavy-Duty Engines Sign "Statement of
Principles ", (July 1995) EPA420-F-95-010a, available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/hd-
hwy/noxsop2.txt (providing the environmental fact sheet of the SOP between the EPA,
CARB and the manufacturers of heavy-duty engines).
425. Statement of the Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, EPA Doct A-95-27, Control of Emissions of
Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-Duty Engines 2-3 (1996).
426. See Breakthrough Agreement Reached in Limiting Bus, Truck Emissions, ENERGY
REPORT, July 17, 1995, available at 1995 WL 8063311.
427. Id. ("'The rules won't change on us part-way through the game,' said Daniel Ustian
with Navistar International Corp. of Chicago.").
428. Statement of the Engine Manufacturers Association, EPA Doct A-95-27, Control of
Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-Duty Engines 8-9 (Sept. 12, 1996) ("The
flexibility provided by the option [between standards] is critical .... Indeed, consensus was
reached on the standards proposal only after the option was created.").
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agreement.,
429
As in the earlier NCP negotiations, the EPA had little bargaining power
to lose by cooperating with CARB and the industry on the SOP, since
CARB could act on its own. The potential gains from coordinating efforts
were large, since the total cost of regulation for the industry could be
reduced by adopting rules that were consistent across jurisdictions.
Moreover, the potential gains from cooperation increased after the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments freed the EPA from the straightjacket of
Congressionally mandated specific reductions in emissions, since both
pressure groups and the industry could stall the EPA's efforts through
litigation over new rules.43 °
7. Regulation-by-Litigation & Engine Controllers
The EPA's regulatory efforts failed to reduce diesel emissions enough to
solve the ongoing NOx regulatory problem. The EPA acknowledged this
when the EPA's engine programs director told a California group of
pollution specialists that diesel emissions were not declining, as the EPA
had predicted, but increasing. 431 Although some of the EPA staff's initial
approach to the issue of reducing NOx emissions had been conciliatory,
identifying "to more actively engage industry" as a necessary step,432 the
EPA soon took an aggressive position that the use of electronic controllers
to increase fuel economy during non-urban driving conditions amounted to
illegal "defeat devices" under the Clean Air Act.433 Abandoning both the
consensus-based approach of regulation-by-negotiation and traditional
rulemaking, the EPA sued the seven U.S. engine manufacturers then
operating, which together were makers of over 95 percent of U.S. heavy-
duty diesel engines.434 Since the EPA's test simulates only urban driving
conditions, the EPA contended the controllers were able to allow the
engines to pass the EPA's test without impairing long-haul fuel economy
429. Ralph Kisiel, Cloud Hovers Over Proposed Diesel Rules, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Jan.
27, 1997, at 34.
430. The EPA, the CARB, and the engine manufacturers recently negotiated an
agreement over the development of a new set of "in use" test protocols. Although space
precludes an extended discussion of this negotiation, it is exactly the type of topic our theory
predicts would be suited to regulation by negotiation, given its primarily technical nature.
See Engine Manufacturers Reach Innovative Accord with EPA and California to Help
Assure Cleaner Air, BUSINESS WIRE, June 11, 2003 (explaining that the EPA, the CARB,
and the engine manufacturers recently negotiated an agreement over the development of a
new set of "in use" test protocols).
431. See Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36.
432. CHET FRANCE, ENGINE PROGRAMS AND COMPLIANCE DIVISION, EPA OFFICE OF
MOBILE SOURCES, ACCOUNTING FOR OFF-CYCLE NO, EMISSIONS FROM HEAVY-DUTY DIESELS
19 (copy on file with authors).
433. See James Kennedy, $1 Billion Settlement with Engine Makers Includes Largest
Civil Penalty Under Air Act, 29 BNA's ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 1285-86 (Oct. 30, 1998).
434. See RHEIN, 5TH EDITION, supra note 185.
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by reducing emissions only under test conditions. 435 EPA Administrator
Carol Browner claimed that the engine manufacturers "programmed the
engine so that it knew when it was being tested and when it was on the
road., 436 The EPA estimated that the practice improved fuel economy by
4-8 percent.437 Although the engine manufacturers denied the EPA's claim
that the controller use was illegal,438 on October 22, 1998, seven U.S.
heavy-duty engine manufacturers settled the enforcement actions by
agreeing to substantial fines439 and to retrofit the vehicles when they were
rebuilt.440 They also agreed to a parallel settlement with California.
441
Understanding the EPA's approach to diesel NOx emissions requires a
consideration of the engine controller issue that formed the basis of the
EPA's lawsuits, one that is far more complex than the EPA's public
comments on the issue suggests. We next outline the terms of the
settlement of the litigation and then take up the question of why the engine
makers agreed to settle, a crucial part of assessing the EPA's strategy of
regulating through litigation. Next, we assess the consequences of the
settlement for air pollution and the engine industry. Finally, we look at the
implementation of the consent decree and its impact on the industry.
435. See Kennedy, supra note 433, at 1285.
436. Jeff Johnson, EPA Fines Engine Makers, TRANSPORT ToPics, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1.
437. See Kennedy, supra note 433, at 1285. Astonishingly, the EPA then claimed that
removing the programing from the electronic controllers would not affect fuel economy,
since it would be done when the engine was rebuilt and rebuilding engines improves fuel
economy. Id. Since the rebuilding is independent of the controller changes, the correct
measure would be whether or not a rebuilt engine without the controller change would have
superior fuel economy to a rebuilt engine with a controller change, not a comparison of a
rebuilt engine with the controller change and an unrebuilt engine with the original
controller. The American Trucking Association claimed a loss of 10% fuel economy would
result. See Johnson, supra note 436, at 1.
438. See Kennedy, supra note 433, at 1285 (noting that Caterpillar "agreed that it has
employed electronic controls to improve fuel economy during 'over the road' driving
conditions, but added that this was 'an area where we believed the regulations did not
apply," and that Cummins stated that the company "has been in full compliance with both
the spirit and the letter of the Clean Air Act and EPA emissions regulations" but chose to
settle because it was cost effective to do so); see also Johnson, supra note 436, at 1 (quoting
truck companies on the same point). Supporting the engine manufacturers' claim was a
comment from the chief deputy executive officer of the California Air Resources Board in
1997: "I would like to have seen them minimize emissions no matter how the engines
operate, but they weren't required to do that." Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36.
439. The fines were based on sales of engines alleged to violate the rule and totaled:
Caterpillar $60,000,000, Cummins $60,000,000, Mack Trucks $31,000,000, Detroit
Diesel $24,500,000, Volvo $14,000,000, and Navistar International $2,900,000.
Johnson, supra note 436 at 1.
440. See id. at 1.
441. See Diesel Makers to Pay $37 Million in Parallel Settlement with California, 29
BNA's ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 1285 (1998) (describing the agreement the same six diesel
engine makers made with California, including $37 million in fines and agreement to
introduce cleaner engines on an expediated schedule).
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a. The Engine-Controller Issue
There is much that is disputed concerning the engine litigation, with the
EPA and the engine manufacturers holding divergent views on the merits
and their respective likelihoods of success on the merits. However, the
basic facts of how the electronic engine controllers operated are relatively
uncontested. When engines were operating under the FTP test cycle
conditions, all agree that they met the relevant the EPA emissions
standards. When the engines were operating under non-FTP conditions,
particularly highway driving conditions, the engines produced higher
emissions levels than under FTP-conditions. The EPA alleged that this
constituted a violation of the Clean Air Act's requirements; the engine
makers argued that it did not.44 2
The engine manufacturers alleged that the EPA knew about their use of
electronic controllers from the beginning and had at least tacitly approved
it.443 For example, Volvo officials pointed to the existence of test results
from Europe, using the quite different European test protocol, showing
different results from the U.S. tests to demonstrate that the EPA was aware
of controllers' impact by at least 1994 because the results were presented at
a meeting attended by EPA officials.4 44 A presentation by an EPA staff
member had identified control strategies "based on the transient test cycle"
as "the regulatory requirement," 445 again suggesting the EPA was both
aware of and approved of building emissions control strategies around the
test protocols. Environmental organizations concurred, claiming they had
442. The engine manufacturers' defense, briefly, was that
the numeric standards apply when the engines are operating under conditions
represented by [the] EPA's FTP, but that these limits do not apply when an engine
is in other modes of operation. Under those circumstances, they say, emissions are
unregulated, or at most, regulated only through the prohibition against defeat
devices, and they argue that their engines do not employ defeat devices.
EPA, Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of Motion to Enter
Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments, at 84, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999).
443. See Jim Galligan, 'EPA Betrayed Us,' Engine Makers Say Agency Knew About
Designs, Test, TRANSPORT ToPics, Nov. 2, 1998, at 30.
444. Parker, Engine Tests, supra note 35, at 1; John Parker & Jeff Johnson, Evidence
Grows that EPA Knew About Test Flaws, TRANSPORT TOPiCS, Dec. 21, 1998, at 47
("Documents from the [1991] Geneva meeting, attended by EPA, state that the agency's
'transient cycle' test was already known to grossly underestimate emissions of NO, at
highway speeds."). This was confirmed in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 14-15,
which also noted that Inside EPA's Mobile Source Report had included information on the
software in a 1994 article. Id. at 14. (The article is reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL,
supra note 36, app. K.) A January 27, 1994 memo from Thomas M. Baines, senior technical
advisor in the Office of Mobile Sources to the office director confirms that the EPA knew of
the results presented at the Geneva meeting. The memo is reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE
WHEEL, supra note 36, app. H.
445. Chet France, Engine Programs and Compliance Division, EPA Office of Mobile
Sources, Accounting for Off-Cycle NO, Emissions from Heavy-duty Diesels at 12 (n.d.)
(copy on file with authors).
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446identified the problem in 1995 to the EPA. CARB also initially
identified the problem as the EPA's test procedures 447 and northeastern
states raised the issue with the EPA in 1996.448
A highly critical House Commerce Committee staff report, Asleep at the
Wheel, also concluded that the EPA was aware of the engine
manufacturers' use of electronic controllers as early as 199 1.449 Among the
additional instances recounted in Asleep at the Wheel:
" Representatives from Mercedes-Benz met with EPA officials in
June 1991, presenting test data that showed that "engine timing
on a competitor's engine increased after a certain amount of time
had elapsed beyond the length of the FTP cycle.'
' 50
" In the course of reviewing the Mercedes' data, an EPA employee
wrote a report concluding that "electronic controls are being used
to tailor an engine's performance to the transient test.
' 451
* In July 1991 an independent computer programmer approached
the EPA, alleging he had been hired to write defeat device code
for Detroit Diesel. 52
* John Deere & Co. submitted comments to an EPA rulemaking on
446. Parker & Johnson, supra note 444, at 47 (quoting an NRDC senior attorney that
"[a]nybody involved in the regulation of diesel emissions-whether-in government,
industry, an environmental group, or a state organization-knew that there was a disconnect
between certification emissions and in-use emissions, and frankly I've been raising that
issue since 1995 with the agency"). See Natural Resources Defense Council et al,
Comments Concerning EPA's Advanced Notice ofProposedRule-Makingfor the Control of
Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, at 14-15 (Oct. 23, 1995) (copy on file with authors)
("Existing test methods need to be modified in several important respects: ... to improve
the test's sophistication and sensitivity to electronic engine controls .... Additionally, the
tests' sophistication needs to be improved to prevent the certification of engines that
perform only within the narrow range of driving conditions simulated in the test cycle. For
example, the current protocol is unable to identify and account for engines that incorporate
controls called 'transient sensing algorithms.' These controls can automatically adjust
engine timing and interrupt key emissions control devices such as EGR during extended
periods of steady-state driving.").
447. See ARB Says Old Test May Explain National Heavy-Duty Emission Exceedances,
INSIDE CAL/EPA, Feb. 27, 1998, at 2.
448. Letter from Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management, to Mary
Nichols, Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation 8 (Sept. 11, 1996) (copy on
file with author) ("Since onboard computers can quickly and dramatically change an
engine's operating and emissions characteristics, engines operating in 'off-cycle' modes can
be optimized for fuel economy and power at the expense of emissions.").
449. ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 6-7 ("[The] EPA was informed, as early as
1991, that certain heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers were using an electronic fuel
injection strategy that would retard engine timing to meet the FTP, but would advance
engine timing under long- haul highway operation in order to improve performance and fuel
economy ... ").
450. Id. at 7.
451. Id. at 8.
452. Id. at 9-12. See also John Deere & Co., EPA Air Docket A-91-24, Deere &
Company Comments on Environmental Protection Agency Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
"Control of Air Pollution: Emissions of Oxides of Nitrogen and Smoke from New Nonroad
Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above 50 Horsepower" at 2-3 (June 25, 1993).
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off-road diesel engines noting it had discovered software in on-
road engines that distinguished steady-state and transient
operation, and producing higher NO, emissions under the
transient conditions.453
A 1993 OECD publication on emissions control noted that "a
recent set of tests in the U.S. EPA Motor Vehicle Emission
Laboratory" found evidence of a "defeat strategy.
' 454
EPA officials, however, denied knowledge before 1997, claiming they
discovered the problem only when retesting an engine that had failed its
initial test.455 Given the extensive evidence of multiple EPA employees'
knowledge of the controller use and the agency's work on exactly the same
issue during the 1970s in the automobile area, it is implausible that the
agency was unaware of the problem well before the decision to litigate.
Regardless of the merits of this particular dispute over whether the EPA
had known of the use of electronic controllers or not, there is clearly a gray
zone involving controller use. Indeed, in a 1972 memo, the EPA's Office
of Air Programs identified precisely this problem:
Where does the basic engine stop and the control system begin? In a
strict sense, even basic components such as a carburetor and a distributor
could be considered defeat devices. The carburetor varies the air-fuel
ratio, depending on air flow, throttle position, throttle movement,
manifold vacuum, and other parameters. The distributor advances the
spark as engine speed increases or load decreases.
456
Using such devices to protect engines or vehicles from damage "under
extreme operating conditions" is clearly not illegal. 57  Using them to
"reduce control system effectiveness under ambient or operational
conditions which are characteristically low emission modes in order to
improve engine economy and/or performance" would not harm emissions
goals and would improve engine performance. 458  Rather, as the EPA
concluded in 1972, the devices are illegal when they are "intended to 'beat
453. ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 12-14. This was apparently well-known,
since the American Lung Association discussed it in its 1996 comments to the EPA on a
notice of proposed rulemaking. See American Lung Association, Comments on EPA NPRM
on Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy Duty Engines, at 3-4 (Apr.
12, 1996).
454. OECD, Control of Emissions from Heavy-Duty Vehicles, 45 (1993) reprinted in
ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, app. J.
455. See Jeff Johnson, EPA Denies It Knew of Engine Test Flaws, TRANSPORT Topics,
Dec. 28, 1998, at 1; see also Galligan, supra note 443, at 30; ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra
note 36, at 16; Letter from Richard D. Wilson, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and
Radiation, to Rep. Thomas Bliley, reprinted in ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, app.
B.
456. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR PROGRAMS, MEMO: CHARACTERIZATION AND USE OF EMISSION
CONTROL SYSTEMS THAT OPERATE ONLY UNDER SPECIFIC AMBIENT CONDITIONS OR VEHICLE
OPERATIONAL MODES 6 (1972).
457. Id. at 1.
458. Id.
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the test. ,, 459
In 1972 the EPA wrestled with exactly the same issue with respect to
automobiles as it faced in 1997-1998 with the heavy-duty diesel engines.
The EPA's investigation then, for example, determined that prohibiting "all
temperature actuated devices" would affect "substantially all of the
production of 14 [automobile] manufacturers.,, 460 When considering how
to treat these controls, the EPA's staff position paper determined that
rejecting a vehicle because of its emissions outside of the federal test
procedure was inappropriate and that revision of the FTP was the more
appropriate means to address such concerns. 46' The staff recommended
putting the focus on whether or not a particular control was aimed at
discovering the test cycle or at modifying operations to adapt to engine
conditions.462 A reader of this EPA paper could thus plausibly conclude
that the EPA did not consider off-cycle emissions as a violation of the
statute.
Early work identified that
[t]he major advantage of electronic controllers, in terms of emission
control is that they permit control system components to be programmed
based on instantaneous sensing of engine variables. This allows control
devices to operate fully when they have the most beneficial effect on
emissions and the least deleterious effect on other aspects of engine
performance.
463
A controller that varies engine operation during certain conditions to
protect the engine may be hard to distinguish from one that does so merely
to avoid performance penalties, particularly when emissions controls are
not post-combustion "black boxes" like catalytic converters, but rather
combinations of injection timing and other engine parameters. 46 Moreover,
even before the advent of electronic controllers, the optimization of
emissions control during testing was a well recognized strategy of mobile
source manufacturers. 465  Indeed, as Caterpillar told the EPA in 1978,
459. Id. at 7, 8.
460. EPA, OFFICE OF AI AND WATER PROGRAMS, MOBILE SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL
PROGRAM, ISSUE PAPER: THE DEFEAT DEVICE ISSUE 3, at 4-5 (1972). The agency reached
similar conclusions about pressure activated devices. Id. at 5.
461. Id. at 7.
462. Id. at 16-18.
463. MOTOR VEHICLE NITROGEN OXIDES STANDARD COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 24.
464. John Deere & Co. found, for example, that two engines it tested in the early 1990s
advanced injection timing after a period of steady state operation, yielding a 16% increase in
fuel economy. See American Lung Association, Comments on EPA NPRM on Control of
Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy Duty Engines, at 3-4 (Apr. 12, 1996).
Since steady state operation would indicate both highway driving and that the EPA transient
test was not being performed, it is not obvious that anything illegal was being done.
465. See EPA, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 7 (stating that the EPA's
"early decision to push for a transient certification procedure was initially brought on by
observations of light-duty emissions control. The manufacturer's ability to selectively
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"manufacturers have no choice but to design engines to meet whatever test
is prescribed. ' '466 The EPA itself concluded in 1979 that "the attainment of
emission standards entails designing to a given test procedure. ' 467 Such
optimization need not be the result of bad motives-engines optimized to
468the US test cycle performed poorly on European tests and vice versa.
Indeed, the most plausible explanation for the difference between test
results and actual emissions was offered by Fleet Owner magazine, when it
stated that the EPA "told engine makers to develop new technology to meet
the law, but wrote enforcement procedures based on old technology.
' 'A69
The technology that developed was "far more sophisticated than [the] EPA
anticipated. '
470
One result of the combination of the form of the EPA's regulations and
advances in engine controls was that it became possible for engine
controllers to detect the EPA test cycle and manage engine performance to
minimize emissions of regulated pollutants during the test cycle. Testing of
pre-MY 1999 engines showed that controllers were programmed to do
so.
471 As a result, diesel emissions were significantly more than predicted
for NO, and particulates.472 Similar problems occurred with automobiles.473
There is much that we will never know about the heavy-duty diesel
litigation, including the subjective state of mind of the EPA's and the
DOJ's litigators at the time the lawsuit were filed. Interviews with a wide
range of sources elicited numerous off-the-record hypotheses about the
rationales for the EPA's behavior, including career advancement strategies
for particular individuals, political pressure related to the Gore campaign
for President, and an internal lack of communication that left litigators
unaware of the earlier (at least) tacit approval of engine controllers' use to
enhance fuel economy in off-test-cycle conditions. Whatever the reason,
the record seems clear that personnel at the EPA were aware of the
optimize emission control systems to pass simplistic test procedures ... was recognized
early on .... ).
466. Id. at 11.
467. Id. at 219.
468. See ASSOCIATION, TEST CYCLE, supra note 239, at 4, Table 2 (summarizing
differences in emissions).
469. Jim Mele, New Tech, Old Regs, 93 FLEET OWNER, Aug. 1998, at TC3.
470. Id.
471. See Clark et al., Factors Affecting, supra note 62, at 92 (discussing injection timing
variances).
472. A comparison of the EPA test cycle data with actual operating data on two engines
found, for example, that test and operating conditions differed by large amounts. See id. at
94 (explaining that PM emissions differ by a factor of 15 and NOx emissions by a factor of 3
in different test schedules; injection timing differences made NO,, emissions differ by a
factor of 2).
473. See Reitze, Mobile Source, supra note 56, at 359-60 (describing dispute between
the EPA and General Motors over "a computer chip that increased fuel flow when the air
conditioning and heating was used" at a time when the test protocol did not call for use of
either. GM ended up paying $45 million in penalties).
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controllers' use long before the litigation and had tacitly accepted, if not
formally approved it. The EPA thus might not quite fit the Claude Raines's
profile from Casablanca, but it misses only because it is an agency of
millions of employees, not because it is plausible that some agency
employees were unaware of how the controllers worked. The EPA's
"shocked, shocked" reaction in 1997 may not have been a purely cynical
move, but it did not accurately reflect the state of knowledge within the
agency concerning controllers' interaction with the FTP. The EPA's
litigation position may have simply been tactical or reflected genuine
outrage by litigators and top policy makers at having failed to secure
compliance with the "spirit" of their regulation, but the facts can hardly
have been a surprise to anyone at the EPA who had spent time working
with actually implementing regulations. Moreover, the EPA's willingness
to settle and subsequent defense of the consent decrees against criticism by
environmental pressure groups and state regulators who saw them as too
weak supports the conclusion that, despite the EPA's press hype about the
clear nature of the violations, winning the suits was not a foregone
conclusion.474
b. Settling the litigation
The EPA and the engine manufacturers settled the litigation in October
1998, entering into a series of consent decrees that set out a lengthy series
of actions each company was required to take and imposed substantial
penalties on the companies. The consent decrees imposed four types of
injunctive relief: "1) a schedule for compliance with currently-applicable
requirements, including specified emissions limits for new engines; 2)
supplemental testing requirements; 3) programs to address emissions from
engines already on the road; and 4) other projects to reduce overall
emissions of NOx and other pollutants to the environment.
' 475
The emissions standards applied under the settlement became stricter
over a two-year period, requiring engines used primarily under urban
driving conditions and manufactured after November 1, 1998 to meet both
a 4.0 g/bhp-hr standard under the FTP and a 6.0 g/bhp-hr standard under
474. See, e.g., EPA, Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Motion to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments, at 36-37, United States
v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999) ("Certainly the risk of higher
penalties after trial is something the engine manufacturers had to consider, just as the United
States had to consider the risk of lower penalties or none at all."); see id. at 90 ("While it is
possible that the United States may have obtained higher penalties if the cases were tried, it
is also possible that the penalties assessed by the Court would have been lower than that
attained in settlement.").
475. Id. at 14-15. We cite to this document for the details of the settlement terms, since
it covers all the settlements, while citing to the actual individual consent decrees would
require addressing each company's decree individually.
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the "Euro III" test.476 After July 31, 1999, emissions had to fall to 4.0
g/bhp-hr on both tests, and by October 1, 2002 had to meet the standard the
EPA had imposed through rulemaking for October 1, 2004, which was a
2.4/2.5 g/bhp-hr NOX plus NMHC on both the FTP and Euro III tests.477
For engines in vehicles used primarily on the highway, a longer phase-in
was allowed, giving the engine manufacturers until the end of 1998 to meet
the 6.0 g/bhp-hr Euro III test and October 1, 2002 to meet the 2.4/2.5
g/bhp-hr NOX plus NMHC test on both the FTP and Euro 111.478 In sealed
portions, the consent decrees also identified "those strategies that the
United States [allowed] ... each engine manufacturer to use in the interim
period" until October 2002, to allow an orderly transition to the new
engines required after that date.479 "Any strategy not listed and which does
not independently satisfy [the] EPA's screen for defeat devices, is not
allowed. '48°
Testing requirements changed as well. In addition to the FTP, the
consent decrees added several supplemental tests, including the Euro III
test, which examines "13 test points representing different steady state
conditions ... within the normal operating range of the engine" and covers
conditions "more representative of extended highway driving. ' '481 Another
required test imposed a "not to exceed" limit over a specified range of
operations, set at about 1.25 times the applicable FTP standard.482 A
"Transient Not-to-Exceed Limit" covered short bursts of emissions during
conditions such as accelerating after traffic stops and went into effect after
October 2002.483 Finally, the consent decrees imposed a "Smoke or
Opacity Limit" on particulate and smoke emissions to prevent tradeoffs of
NOx and particulate emissions.484  In-use testing was also required to
ensure engines "continue to meet the reduced emissions limits and other
requirements throughout their useful lives.
'A85
In short, the consent decrees created an entirely new set of test protocols
layered on top of the FTP that addressed the FTP's shortcomings. The
imposition of transient limits, testing over a wider range of operating
476. Id. at 14-16.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 15-16.
479. EPA, Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of Motion
to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments, at 17, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999).
480. Id.
481. Id. at 18
482. Id.
483. Id. at 18-19.
484. Id. at 19.
485. Id. at 19. The in-use testing program is quite complex, but we omit the details here
as what matters most is that the EPA now sought to match in use testing to the prior engine
only tests.
489
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conditions, and the addition of in-use testing to the out-of-chassis testing
transformed the FTP into a wholly new test protocol. Engines designed for
sale after October 1, 2002 could not have used the prior strategy the EPA
alleged constituted a defeat device. Of course, the EPA could have
modified the FTP to adopt additional test procedures at any time without
suing the engine manufacturers. Had it done so, however, the EPA would
have been required by the notice-and-comment procedure to allow public
comment on the modifications, including public discussion of the costs and
benefits of the various changes. It is likely also that the changes in the FTP
would have been found sufficiently major to involve the Clean Air Act's
lead time provisions. To justify such changes, the EPA would also have
had to explain why the earlier FTP was inadequate--conceding at least
implicitly that the EPA had failed to adequately design the FTP to cover
actual driving conditions. By adopting these changes through the consent
decrees, the EPA avoided the embarrassment of such an admission of
regulatory failure and avoided an extended public debate (and likely set of
court challenges by affected parties and environmental pressure groups)
over its testing methodology.
486
To reduce emissions from the existing engines, the EPA and the engine
manufacturers agreed to a "Low NOx Rebuild Program" that would cover
engines manufactured between 1993 and 1998.487 Under this program, the
engine manufacturers must provide to those who rebuild engines (including
independent firms) free rebuild kits that will "significantly reduce
486. General Motors' Chief Engineer, for example, a truck manufacturer but not an
engine manufacturer for heavy-duty engines, noted in a filing in a consent decree
proceeding that
The imposition of these arbitrary numerical limits over a wide range of engine
operating conditions greatly restricts an engine's allowed operating characteristics.
Traditionally, under the FTP test, emissions were permitted to vary in response to
engine operating conditions so long as the emissions over a typical driving cycle
(the FTP) did not exceed the emissions limits. Under EPA's interpretation of the
new supplemental test procedures, these limits must be met under nearly all engine
operating conditions. Thus, it makes no difference whether the engine is being
operated up a steep hill, into the wind, at high altitude, with a full load, on a hot
day. That engine must meet the same numerical emission limits as when it is
operated with virtually no load, down hill, at sea level, on a cool day. No
allowance is made for differing engine conditions. The imposition of the
supplemental testing requirements results in the need to design engines that exhibit
different emission profiles. Lower emissions are now required under a wide
variety of engine operating conditions and cannot just be lowered proportionately
to meet the FTP limits.
Declaration of Steven Matsill, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 98-2544,
98-2546, and 98-2546, at 5 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2002).
487. The settlement included a choice of rebuild programs, allowing engine
manufacturers to include either 1993-1998 or 1994-1998 engines, with a slightly stricter
standard applying to the shorter period. See EPA, Memorandum of Law of the United
States of America in Support of Motion to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public
Comments, at 21, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30,
1999).
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emissions from current actual levels.A
88
Finally, the engine manufacturers agreed to an additional set of programs
to offset the "excess" emissions caused by their controllers. One portion
cancelled the emissions credits that manufacturers had previously earned
for overcomplying engines, which under the settlement's terms were no
longer in compliance. 489 The engine manufacturers also agreed to meet
MY 2006 nonroad equipment standards by MY 2005 .490 Finally, each
company agreed to spend specified sums on projects that offset excess
491
emissions.
The non-test protocol portions of the settlement helped the EPA with its
ozone NAAQS problem by cutting actual NOx emissions, which reduced
ozone in the model although did not necessarily do so in reality. Almost
none of these provisions were ones that the EPA could have imposed
directly through regulation, although some were relatively straightforward
mitigation measures. Every ton of NOx removed from the atmosphere and
captured by the EPA's models, through these various programs, helped
reduce the NOx overload that was causing problems without imposing
additional costly controls on either upwind or downwind regions. To gain
such reductions without the litigation, the EPA would have had to offer
something of value to the engine manufacturers and, other than relaxing
other limits, the EPA had little to put on the table. Of course the EPA
could have funded such projects directly, but that would have required
convincing Congress to appropriate $104 million for it. By using
regulation-by-litigation, the EPA got that appropriation for free. The EPA
paid Congress not to object by directing the fines into the federal treasury.
As the state of New York, which objected to the consent decrees, noted,
those fines could have been allocated for additional NOx reductions, but
the EPA chose not to do SO.
4 92
Regulation-by-litigation thus offered the EPA significant gains over
rulemaking. None of the settlement provisions other than the test protocol
changes could have been directly imposed through rulemaking, either
488. Id. Several manufacturers also committed to specific product recalls and retrofitting
programs. Id. at 21-23. An important issue with the implementation of the settlement was
the problem of the interdependence of engine operating parameters that made a simple
change in the controller's program insufficient. It is unclear whether customers accept the
reprogramming of the controllers that this entailed, since the reprogrammed controller
would certainly provide reduced mileage.
489. Id. at 23.
490. Id. at 23-24.
491. These sums were: Caterpillar, $35 million; Cummins, $35 million; Detroit Diesel,
$12 million; Mack/Renault, $13 million; and Volvo, $9 million. EPA, Memorandum of
Law of the United States of America in Support of Motion to Enter Consent Decree and
Response to Public Comments, at 24, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action
1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999).
492. Id. at 87.
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because of the lead time provisions of the Clean Air Act or because the
provisions were outside the EPA's authority to require in regulations. As
the EPA stated in responding to objections about the consent decrees from
nonparties, "there is nothing that bars the United States from obtaining
relief that goes beyond present regulatory or statutory requirements."
493
Imposing the test protocol changes through rulemaking would have
generated a contentious and lengthy process, with the EPA in the difficult
position of having to make the case that the existing protocol was
inadequate to justify the changes. Moreover, any rulemaking would likely
have yielded changes only after the process was completed, pushing the
gains into the future. Since the EPA needed NOx reductions sooner rather
than later, this made rulemaking an unattractive option. The settlement
process also eliminated the industry challenges to the measures and
increased the agency's authority relative to the environmental pressure
groups and others who might object, since the changes would be reviewed
as part of the settlement process rather than in a challenge to a rulemaking
proceeding.494 As the EPA noted in seeking approval of the settlements,
the complaints of many of the commentators on the settlements was
that the government did not conduct this negotiation as it does a
rulemaking, bringing all "stakeholders" to the table, and working out a
solution in the same way that they participated in the development of the
emission standards. But the fact is that this matter is far from a
rulemaking. This is an enforcement action alleging longstanding
violations of the law, for which prompt compliance is a necessary
remedy. While the public has an opportunity to comment on a consent
decree during the comment period, it is neither feasible necessary nor
appropriate for the public to be present in negotiations of the United
States' claims against individual defendants.
495
The EPA was able to gain from choosing regulation-by-litigation. The
EPA's gains included faster reductions in NOx levels from heavy-duty
engines, circumvention of the Clean Air Act's lead time provisions, limits
on environmental pressure groups' participation, and a public relations
coup. The EPA even gained an advantage in defending its MY 2004
rulemaking efforts; the consent decrees' pull-ahead of the MY 2004
standards defeated a trucking industry challenge to the MY 2004 rules
493. Id. at 38-39.
494. A comparison of the EPA's responses to the comments opposing portions of the
settlements with the EPA's responses to comments in rulemaking proceedings shows the
EPA's reduced concern over potential challenges. The responses in the former are shorter
and less detailed than the EPA's responses to significant comments in rulemakings.
495. Id. at 38. See also id. at 97 (summarizing comments from the California Trucking
Association, the American Trucking Association, and Freightliner that "the Consent Decrees
are circumventing Congressional intent regarding stability and lead time, and the
government should be required to brief the court fully on why this is permissible").
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themselves by mooting the truckers' standing to challenge the
regulations. 96 All of these were valuable to the EPA.
c. Choice of Technology
Significant technological innovation was necessary to meet the MY 2004
standards that had been pulled ahead to October 1, 2002 by the consent
decrees. The standards agreed to in the consent decrees were clearly
technology forcing. As a Cummins' vice president summed it up: "This is
the first time I've ever come before the EPA without a clear idea of exactly
how we're going to get to [the standards.] 497  The engine makers
ultimately took divergent strategies toward compliance with the EPA,
producing what one news account headlined as "EPA Rules Spark Engine
War. 4 98 There were gains to be had by any firm that could break free from
the pack through technological advantage. 499 Indeed, the EPA may have
created the conditions for foreign firms to enter the US market. 500
Mercedes Benz was able to sell its MBE4000 and MBE900 engines
through 2003 while meeting only the 1998 emissions standards, allowing it
to undercut its U.S. competitors' prices. Mercedes's sales of the
MBE4000 went from 1,764 in 2002 to over 10,000 in the first eight months
of2003 52
All of the U.S. engine makers except Caterpillar announced plans to
develop various forms of EGR systems 50 3 that would enable their engines
to meet the October 2002 deadline, but which would be insufficient to meet
496. See Crete Carrier Corp. v. EPA, 2004 WL 756039, at 3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 9, 2004)
(noting that establishing the connection between 2004 standards and the trucking company
plaintiffs' higher cost "would be the work of a minute" but for the Consent Decrees and
concluding that "[b]ecause of the Consent Decrees ... the Trucking Companies have not
established the necessary causal connection between the 2004 Standard and the increased
costs they will incur").
497. Sean Kilcarr, Will the Diesel Engine Survive?, 96 FLEET OWNER, Nov. 2001 at Sl1.
498. Boris Ladwig, EPA Rules Spark Engine War, THE REPUBLIC, May 5, 2002, at Al.
499. See Kachadourian, supra note 253, at 17 (quoting "Mack Trucks Inc. of Allentown,
Pa., says it has an advantage because it makes both trucks and engines. The company is
developing a cleaner engine and expects it to be in production by this summer").
500. EPA, Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of Motion
to Enter Consent Decree and Response to Public Comments, at 99, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., Civil Action 1:98CV02544 (Apr. 30, 1999) ("These emission limits and
test protocols [in the consent decrees] do not impose any additional requirements on non-
signatories to the decrees.").
501. RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 21.
502. Id. at 26.
503. The five adopted different technological approaches to meeting the consent decree
requirements: Detroit Diesel is using an EGR system. Low Emissions Engines Dominate
Mid-America Trucking Show, 41 OVERDRIVE, May 2002, at 12. Volvo is using an EGR
system that uses high pressure pulses created by the exhaust system; Mack is using a
"cooled EGR" system; Cummins has a cooled EGR system with a proprietary "variable
geometry turbocharger;" Caterpillar has a non-EGR system that "involves optimizing in-
cylinder combustion and using exhaust after treatment along with an oxidizing catalyst
chamber." Bob Deierlein, Running Hot, 27 FLEET EQUIPMENT, Oct. 2001, at 31, 32.
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the MY 2007 standards already announced. The EGR systems had some
significant drawbacks; for example, Mack's had a 3 percent fuel
consumption increase and added 100 pounds to the engine weight.50
4
Similar decreases in fuel economy occurred for the other EGR
manufacturers' engines. 50 5 The EGR engines also increase soot, putting
higher demands on the engine oil 50 6 and significantly increased demands on
the engine cooling system. 50 7 The October 2002 engines increased in cost
between $3,000 and $5,000 compared to the prior year's models. 50 8 For
this group, a new emissions technology would have to be developed for the
MY 2007 engines and the EGR system would be sufficient for MY 2003-
MY 2006 engines. Although the EGR engines turned out not to require
major chassis redesigns, as truck makers had initially feared,50 9 they did
require changes to the cooling system, controllers, and oil system.510 Some
manufacturers used incentives to lure customers to the new engines.
International, for example, offered $2,500 in incentives for buyers of the
October 2002-compliant trucks. 51'
Caterpillar, on the other hand, abandoned its EGR research in March
2001512 and focused on a system it called ACERT (Advanced Combustion
Emissions Reduction Technology). 513 Caterpillar's non-EGR strategy was a
504. See Jim Starling, Engine Makers Display Low-Emission Models, TRANSPORT
Topics, Mar. 25, 2002, at 35 (basing these statistics on the findings of an SAE Type IV fuel
test).
505. See id (noting that Cummins ERG engines will drop 3-5% in fuel economy and
climb in weight by up to 130 pounds, and that Volvo's new engines will increase fuel
consumption by 3% to 5% as well).
506. Tom Kelly, The Show Must Go On, RPM, May 2003 (on file with authors).
507. See Carol Birkland, EGR: Its Time Has Come, EQUIPMENT TECH., Feb. 2002, at 16
(quoting the chair of a SAE panel on the challenges posed by EGR: "The recycling of
exhaust gas through a heavy-duty diesel engine will add 100,000 to 150,000 BTUs per hour
to the cooling system. It is estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the heat from the exhaust will
radiate from the EGR system to its surroundings, and the remainder will be added to the
cooling system. Potentially, the additional heat load could be 60 percent of the exhaust heat
or 288,000 BTUs per hour"); see also Low Emissions Engines Dominate Mid-America
Trucking Show, 41 OVERDRIVE, May 2002, at 12-13 ("One ongoing concern about EGR
engines is the increased cooling capacity required, since the hot exhaust will be going back
into the engine rather than out.").
508. John Wislocki, Kenworth Says Price Will Drive Decisions on Engines, TRANSPORT
TopIcs, Mar. 25, 2002, at 35.
509. See, e.g., Rolf Lockwood, Elegant Solutions?, HIGHWAY STAR, May 2002, at 22, 23;
Steve Sturgess, The Power and the Glory, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING, May 21, 2002; Steve
Sturgess, Lifting the Veil on EGR, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING, April 2001, at 98 (stating that
meeting new standards "won't be as bad as feared").
510. Steve Sturgess, The Power and the Glory, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING, May 21, 2002.
511. RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 177.
512. See Memorandum from Steve Brown, to Caterpillar Field Force, Re: "Additional
Information for Dealer and Customer Questions" 3 (May 23, 2002) [hereinafter Brown
Memo].
513. "ACERT is a systems solution that combines breakthrough combustion technology
with advanced fuel and air system technology, new integrated Cat electronics and an
aftertreatment solution." Id.
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"better fit for Caterpillar, because the technology can be used to meet
future emissions standards for off-road vehicles, a significant portion of
Caterpillar's business. 514  Because this system would not be ready for
October 2002 engines, Caterpillar developed a "bridge" engine that used
some components of the ACERT system and which reduced emissions to a
3.5 gram standard. 15 As a result, these "bridge" engines were subject to a
NCP. Caterpillar ultimately paid over $54 million in such penalties in 2002
and 2003.516
Detroit Diesel and Caterpillar requested a delay in the pull-ahead
requirement in the spring of 2001. Detroit Diesel, which ultimately did
manage to introduce an October 2002-compliant engine before the
deadline, nonetheless argued that a longer phase-in for the new standard
was appropriate, given the need for product testing and higher than
anticipated costs associated with the new engines.5 17  Environmental
pressure groups were critical of the requests.518
The most aggressive member of the EGR group was Cummins, which,
on April 17, 2001, was the first company to announce an engine certified
by the EPA for sale after October 1, 2002.519 As one editorial in a trade
journal summarized: "On the truck engine side, Cummins has gotten into
everyone's face about exhaust emissions regulations and technology. 52 °
After Cummins received its certification in April, the EPA rejected the
requests from Detroit Diesel, Caterpillar, and some customers to extend the
deadline.521 Cummins thus played a valuable role for the EPA, providing it
with "proof' that the October deadline was achievable and vindicating the
EPA's arguments that greater emissions reductions were possible. In the
face of Cummins' cooperation, it was impossible to imagine a court
granting the other companies relief from the deadlines on the grounds of
technological feasibility or cost.
Manufacturers competed on the technology to meet the October 2002
standard. For example, Cummins advertised that its EGR technology was
514. Boris Ladwig, 2 Ways to Get the Job Done, THE REPUBLIC, May 5, 2002, at B 1.
515. See Brown Memo, supra note 512, at 1 (describing October 2002 engines as
including "some of the ACERT technology" but featuring "minimum changes to the current
heavy-duty engines").
516. RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 18.
517. Engine Update, available at http://www.etrucker.com/apps/news/article.asp?id=195
98 (last visited May 14, 2004).
518. See Press Release, Clean Air Trust, Clean Air Trust Assails Caterpillar Lobbying to
Roll Back Clean-Air Controls, (Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.cleanairtrust.org/
release.040902.htm.
519. United States' Statement of Position-Pull-Ahead Dispute, at 10, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (HHK) (D.D.C. June 18, 2002)..
520. Mike Osenga, What's In the Water in Columbus?, DIESEL PROGRESS-N. AM.
EDITION, May 2002, at 2.
521. United States' Statement of Position-Pull-Ahead Dispute, at 11, United States
America v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. June 18, 2002).
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better because it was simpler.522
Truckers expected Cummins' certified engine would enable it to take
market share away from other companies after October 1, 2002.523 When
the issue of using emissions credits rather than engine emissions reductions
to satisfy the EPA arose, Cummins threatened to sue the EPA if Caterpillar
succeeded in getting credits for cleaning up off-road diesels to reduce its
on-road emissions requirements. 524 As this shows, October 2002-compliant
engines were less desireable for customers, since if a competitor could buy
NOx reductions and sell a non-compliant engine, Cummins obviously
feared a competitive disadvantage.
The EPA's position had a significant impact on technology. In short,
when the EPA certified a Cummins' engine as meeting the consent decree
terms in April 2002,525 Cummins, which opted not to develop a new engine
technology as a means of saving costs, thus met the deadline, while
Caterpillar, which invested in new technology, 526 did not,527 making EGR
the only technology that could meet the deadline. Indeed, the EPA became
heavily involved in the design of EGR engines.528 Two issues in particular
stand out. First, while the EGR companies managed to solve some
technical problems, such as cooling the exhaust gases529 and increasing
their pressure to equal that of the inlet side of the engine,53 ° there were left
several unresolved problems for EGR engines, including the presence,
522. Cummins Cooled EGR and VGT Technology Website, available at
http://www.cumminsnorthwest.com (last visited May 14, 2004) ("Compare our Holset
Variable Geometry Turbocharger to all the others, and you'll be convinced that its simpler
design is your best choice.").
523. Boris Ladwig, Analysts: 'Hard to say' which Engine has Upper Hand in Race for
Compliance, THE REPUBLIC, May 7, 2002, at Al.
524. See Mike Shaheen, The High Road, Roadking.com, available at http://www.road-
king.com/inside/story339.php (describing how Caterpillar hopes to "coast" through the
October 2002 deadlines by using credits for clean-burning engines, and if that is the case
then Cummins will sue).
525. Mobile Sources: EPA Certifies First Heavy-Duty Engine to Comply with New
Emissions Limit, 3 BNA's ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 729 (2002).
526. See Paul Hartley and Sean Kelley, Engine Makers Take Steps To Cut Emissions, 41
OVERDRIVE, Apr. 2001, at 16 (describing Caterpillar's new technology as better than EGR
because it does not put heat or impurities into the engine).
527. See Cummins Welcomes Engine Deadline Confirmation, 47 OVERDRIVE, July 2001,
at 16.
528. In a sworn statement filed in connection with the AECD dispute between Caterpillar
and the EPA, an EPA environmental engineer described how "[the] EPA met frequently
with engine manufacturers to discuss research and development, troubleshoot problems
encountered, and push industry to consider promising alternatives." Declaration of Richard
L. Gezelle, Jr., June 18, 2002, at 3.
529. See Steve Sturgess, The Power and the Glory, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING, May 21,
2002 (stating that "to reduce NO, as far as possible, the temperature in the combustion
chamber has to be minimized so the recycled exhaust must be cooled").
530. See id. (finding that "with a turbocharged engine, the inlet side downstream of the
turbo is at a higher pressure than the exhaust, especially with today's high efficiency
turbochargers").
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under some conditions, of condensation, and excessive heat under some
operating conditions. To resolve these, the EPA approved the use of
"auxiliary electronic control devices" (AECDs) to turn off the EGR
systems under three conditions for engines produced between October 1,
2002 and January 1, 2004: (1) to protect the engine against condensation at
temperatures above 25 degrees Fahrenheit and below 50 degrees Fahrenheit
if sensors reported condensation was occurring; 531 (2) to protect against
overheating when engine temperatures rose above a set limit;532 and (3) to
protect the air handling system at certain temperatures and altitudes.
5 33
The EPA asserted that its goal in approving AECDs was "to ensure that
the technologies needed to comply with the pull-ahead requirements on the
Federal Test Procedure and the supplemental tests-without the use of
defeat devices-are developed, demonstrated and deployed." To
accomplish this, the EPA evaluated proposed AECD use by looking to see
if a "manufacturer has pursued diligent and continuous efforts to reduce the
need for the problematic AECDs and has achieved results in this regard
consistent with the utilization of all reasonably available technology given
the time between the January 19th letter and the date of the certificate
application., 534 However, Caterpillar charged that some of the other engine
manufacturers using EGR technology were being unfairly allowed to use
electronic controllers as defeat devices, turning off the EGR system up to
30 percent of the time.535 Depending on the amount of time the controllers
shut down the EGR system, a Caterpillar engine that was not certified as
compliant could emit less total NOx than an engine certified compliant
with the 2.5 g/bhp-hr standard.536 The EPA's motive, Caterpillar charged,
was to "claim compliance with the Consent Decree by engine
manufacturers who would otherwise not have compliant engines. 537
Caterpillar argued that if 2 g/bhp-hr EGR engines turned off the EGR
systems 8 percent of the time, they would produce more NOx than a non-
EGR engine that met only a 3.5 g/bhp-hr standard.538
Second, the EPA proposed NCPs that were dramatically different from
those used in prior years. The original "default" consent decree NCPs were
531. See Letter from Steven A. Herman, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, EPA, to Douglas Grandstaff, General Counsel, Caterpillar, Inc. 4-5 (Jan. 19,
2001).
532. See id. at 5.
533. See id.
534. See id. at 2.
535. See Brown Memo, supra note 512, at 4; see also Caterpillar's Statement of
Position-AECD Dispute, at 1, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (May 10,
2002).
536. See Brown Memo, supra note 512, at 4.
537. Caterpillar's Statement of Position-AECD Dispute, at 1, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. May 10, 2002).
538. See Boris Ladwig, Diesels Fuel War on Words, THE REPUBLIC, May 6, 2002, at Al.
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set using "cost of compliance values and factors 1.5 times the existing NCP
values and factors., 539 The EPA subsequently proposed setting the NCP at
five times the "default" NCPs.5 40  The difference was striking: "[a] 3.3
gram NOx + NMHC heavy heavy-duty diesel engine would be subject to
an NCP of about $2000 under the Decree but would rise to almost $7500
under the EPA's NCP proposal., 54' A critical step by the EPA in the post-
consent decree period was to propose a dramatic increase in NCPs for
engines that did not meet the MY 2004 standard that was "pulled ahead" to
October 2002 by the consent decrees. To do so, the EPA proposed using
significantly higher costs of compliance to calculate the NCPs raising the
life-cycle cost from $879542 to $8940. 543 The EPA's final rule set the NCP
at $6810, which was still well above the original "default" value. 544
The EPA's approval seems inconsistent with its claims in the controller
litigation. The EPA's theory of the litigation centered on the alleged
illegality of the engine manufacturers' controller use to change engine
operations in non-FTP conditions. When the EPA implemented the
consent decrees, however, it eventually determined that controller use
remarkably similar to use it had challenged in the lawsuits would continue
to be permitted as an interim measure for some engines. Although the EPA
had initially stated in a January 19, 2001 letter that AECD use would
require modification of the consent decrees, it later reversed that position
and approved AECD use by engine manufacturers using EGR
technology.
545
A law review article is not the place to resolve the merits of the technical
questions behind the EPA's disputes with Caterpillar. 546 What is important
here is the nature of the dispute, the incentive issues for the agency, and the
539. Caterpillar's Statement of Position-NCP Dispute, at 2, United States v. Caterpillar,
Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. May 10, 2002).
540. See id.
541. Id. at 8.
542. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From Highway Heavy-Duty Engines, 62
Fed. Reg. 54,694, 54,711 (Oct. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9 & 86).
543. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Proposed Non-Conformance Penalties for 2004 and Later Model Year Emission
Standards for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Heavy-Duty Diesel Vehicles, 67 Fed. Reg.
2,159, 2,166 (Jan. 16, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86) (listing proposed NCP
calculation parameters for heavy-duty diesel engines).
544. See Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Non-Conformance Penalties for 2004 and later Model Year Emission Standards
for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Heavy-Duty Diesel Vehicles, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,464,
51,467 (Aug. 8, 2002).
545. See Caterpillar's Statement of Position-AECD Dispute, at 5, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. May 10, 2002).
546. See id.; United States' Statement of Position-AECD Dispute, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. June 18, 2002). The parties exchanged dueling
affidavits from engineers on the question of the necessity of the AECDs for engine
protection as exhibits to these statements.
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institutional means available for resolving the dispute. With respect to both
the NCPs and the AECD use, the EPA created conditions under which one
technology was favored over others. In short, the EPA's AECD and NCP
decisions (ratified by the court) granted to those following an EGR strategy
a competitive advantage over those opting for different technologies. This
result occurred due to the EPA's actions of imposing larger NCPs on the
non-compliant engines than engine manufacturers had reason to predict
when making technology decisions and allowing AECD use that mirrored
the pre-litigation use of the controllers only for EGR engines.
We are certainly not competent to evaluate the technical merits of such a
dispute, but it also seems clear that the courts are not capable of resolving
such disputes on the engineering merits. There is no bright line for
"necessity" that can be drawn by an expert. The problem with the consent
decrees is that they create conflicts such as this. The EPA as an agency had
an incentive to ensure that as many of the engine manufacturers were found
to have complied with the terms of the agreement as possible. In particular,
it was necessary to have at least one major engine manufacturer certify an
engine as quickly as possible to head off the public campaigns to alter the
consent decrees' deadlines mounted by Caterpillar and Detroit Diesel. It is
thus plausible that the EPA would accept controller use by Cummins that is
technically indistinguishable from the controller use that prompted the
lawsuits used solely to counter the Caterpillar and Detroit Diesel
campaigns. To counter such an appearance of self-interest is impossible
for the agency, since it is not possible to prove that the net emissions from,
for example, the Cummins 2002-compliant engine with the AECD would
not exceed those from the Caterpillar non-compliant engine except by
actually gaining data on road conditions. What could be, and was, disputed
was how the various scenarios played out in the EPA's model of mobile
source emissions.547
Most importantly, EGR was an inferior technology to at least some
alternatives for two reasons. First, it could not satisfy the MY 2007
standards, requiring engines be redesigned again for those standards.548
Second, it was not practical for off-road heavy-duty diesels, a significant
547. See, e.g., Declaration of Lyle R. Chinkin, AECD Dispute, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. June 18, 2002) (including affidavit of consultant
describing use of MOBILE6 to make estimates in connection with the EPA and Caterpillar's
dispute over AECD devices).
548. See RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 22 (noting that particulate filters and
NO, catalysts will be needed to comply with the 2007 rules and that Caterpillar's ACERT
strategy "seems to have some advantages looking toward 2007"); see id. at 41 ("The Cat
ACERT model appears to be in line with what will be needed with a few tweaks and a
particulate filter... What doesn't seem to be needed is cooled EGR, although internal EGR
is expected.").
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category of diesel engines. 549 For a manufacturer with a significant off-
road business such as Caterpillar, developing an emissions technology that
could not work in off-road engines was not an efficient business decision if
there was an alternative technology that could work in both on and off-road
engines. The EPA's EGR strategy thus unfairly penalized companies that
produce both on and off-road engines while rewarding those who produce
only on-road engines.
d Impact on Air Quality
How did the choice of regulation by litigation affect air quality? A static
analysis of the pull-ahead would suggest that the consent decrees
unambiguously improved air quality starting October 1, 2002, when the
new, cleaner engines came into use. A dynamic analysis, however, shows
that the question is more complicated.
The October 2002 compliant engines were unpopular with engine buyers
because they involved new technology and designs and because they were
relatively untested.550 For example, the inability to get test engines in time
to complete testing meant that Schneider, one of the larger trucking
companies, decided to prebuy in advance of its needs and buy used trucks
to avoid the October 1 engines until it could acquire sufficient
experience. 5 1 An editorial in Transport Topics predicted that large fleets
would buy a "few" new engines when they became available to test them
for up to a year before integrating them into fleets. 52 This was not
unusual: in April 2002, Fleet Owner reported that "few fleets have even
seen an '02-compliant engine much less gotten to tear one down after real-
world service or even just take one for a spin." 553 Fleet Owner quoted an
anonymous vice president for maintenance and equipment at "one of the
nation's largest tank-truck carriers" in favor of avoiding the post-October
2002 engines:
The way we figure it... the '02 engines will add about $4,000 to the
549. See id. at 18.
550. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-313, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS To HELP
MINIMIZE THE BENEFITS FROM THE 2007 DIESEL EMISSIONS STANDARDS 4 (2004) [hereinafter
GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS] ("However, [engine manufacturers] were not
able to deliver prototype engines to trucking companies early enough for them to test the
engines' reliability, according to representatives of all 10 companies [GAO] contacted.").
551. See Boris Ladwig, Tumultuous Market Making Buyers Wary, THE REPUBLIC, May
7, 2002, at A1. The EPA's consultant argued that such a prebuy occurs whenever emissions
standards change. ICF Consulting, Economic and Emissions Implications of the Pull-Ahead
Requirements for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, June 18, 2002, at 2 ("A similar disruption
would occur without the consent decrees, but in 2003 and 2004 rather than 2002 and 2003
as at present."). Although the problem with the October 2002 engines was not that they
were new but that there was insufficient time allowed for testing.
552. See Clean Engines and Common Sense, TRANSPORT TOPICS, June 3, 2002, at 8.
553. Cullen, supra note 184, at 20.
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cost of the trucks. Then we'll lose another $4,000 to $5,000 on
decreased fuel efficiency. That puts us $10,000 in the hole. And that's
without figuring in the uncertainty of engine performance. Yes, those
engines will be under warranty. But any downtime they pile up won't.
554
Trucking firms had three options for avoiding the new engines: keeping
existing trucks longer, buying used equipment,555 and pre-buying. 6  All
three involved increased costs. While substitution of existing used trucks
for new purchases was made possible by a glut of used trucks in 2001,
adding used trucks or extending an existing fleet brought higher
maintenance costs. 558  The problems with pre-buying include obtaining
sufficient capital to make the purchases 559 and complying with specific
truck requirements that could not be predicted in advance. 6° Moreover, the
overall size of the pre-buy was limited by production capacity. Pre-bought
engines had to be manufactured by October 1, limiting the total number
that could be prebought. Some industry observers predicted that assembly
line slots would be booked by the end of April.5 61 Given the short-term
nature of any increase in demand, the engine makers were limited in their
ability to expand production to accommodate increased demand.
The pre-buy began in earnest in early 2002 with sales of new trucks
554. Id. at 22. This article on the new engines in the April 2002 issue of Fleet Owner
summarized the problem:
The negatives already associated with the '02 engines-even before they hit the
market-are considerable. First, it's expected the new technology engine makers
will deploy to get down to the requisite EPA emissions limits will add $3,000 to
$5,000 to the cost of a new vehicle. What's more, engine makers concede fuel
efficiency will likely be compromised and maintenance schedules may have to be
modified. Bad as that news is, what is most disconcerting to new truck buyers is
the simple fact they don't know how these new engines will perform, that is, how
much they will break down.
Id. at 20-21.
555. Demand for three-to-five-year-old used trucks was also up. Heine, supra note 253,
at 14. See also GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS, supra note 550, at 5 (indicating
that rather than buying October 2002 compliant engines, some firms "instead bought more
used trucks.. . than planned before October 2002").
556. See Doug Condra, Can You Pre-Buy? Don't Count on It, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING,
Apr. 2002, at 6.
557. See Declaration of Steven D. Duley, at 5, United States v. Caterpillar, Inc., Nos. 98-
2544, 98-2546, 98-2546 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2002) (noting that a "glut" of used trucks existed
because of manufacturers' prior incentive purchase programs, so substitution of 400,000-
500,000 mile used trucks for new trucks was feasible). See also GAO, EPA COULD TAKE
ADDITIONAL STEPS, supra note 550, at 5 (rather than buying October 2002 compliant
engines, some firms "instead bought more... new trucks with older technology than
planned before October 2002").
558. See Cullen, supra note 184, at 24 (quoting a consultant who claims that doing a
major engine overhaul could cost twice the premium of a 2002 engine).
559. See id at 22.
560. See What Fleets Are Saying, HEAVY DUTY TRUCKING, February 2002, at 32 (stating
that some leasing companies also could not pre-buy as their customers have specific
equipment requirements that must be manufactured to order).
561. See Jonathan S. Reiskin, Truck Makers Foresee Dip After October, TRANSPORT
Topics, Apr. 22, 2002, at 1; see also Condra, supra note 556, at 6.
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doubling in the first quarter and up 170 percent in March alone.562 Based
on overall market conditions, industry observers saw that as twice the
expected demand.563 Looking back, we can see the dramatic change in the
production of engines in 2002.564 Truck engine consumers expressed
skepticism about the new engines with "pre-buying" taking place while
MY 2001 engines were still available. 565 Importantly, however, analysis
with MOBILE6 did not show increased emissions as a result of the pre-
buy.566
All of the strategies for postponing the acquisition of October 2002-
compliant engines meant "dirty" trucks would be on the road that would
not be otherwise. For example, buying a new truck on September 30, 2002
that would not have otherwise been bought until January 1, 2003 would put
a pre-October 2002 engine on the road for ten years or more, emitting at the
pre-October 2002 emission levels. If enough engines were added through
pre-buys or older engines were continued past their useful lives in the
absence of the consent decrees, the net effect on air pollution might be an
increase rather than a decrease for a period of time.
The EPA was not unaware of the potential problems for air quality
caused by a pre-buy as Caterpillar raised the issue in a request for a
modification of the consent decree. Caterpillar argued in its dispute with
the Agency that the cost of October 2002 engines was higher than initially
predicted by the EPA and that this higher cost would both increase the
incentive for pre-buying and harm the engine makers, who would have to
absorb some of the costs. Moreover, Caterpillar argued that its bridge
engines would have "actual emissions ... in the same range as the actual
emissions of engines the EPA approves with overheat, air handling and
562. See Reiskin, supra note 561, at 1 (referring specifically to orders for Class 8
tractors).
563. See id.
564. See GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS, supra note 550, at 18 (stating that
prebuy was "a widely used strategy").
565. See Donald J. Schneider, EPA's New Engine Standard: An Economic and
Environmental Defeat Device, TRANSPORT Topics, May 20, 2002, at 9 ("The lack of engine
availability combined with serious price uncertainty has caused the market to become
spooked as evidenced by the massive 'pre-buy' of truck engines underway. In March, new
truck orders were up 170% over the previous year, and first quarter orders were in excess of
70,000 units as compared with 38,000 the previous year."); see also Ball, Buying Binge,
supra note 115, at A1, A2 (noting that the operator of a large fleet says it will not buy "until
we as an industry can get convinced the new products are cost- effective and reliable" and
so is buying the 2,000 trucks needed for 2002 in 2001 before the new regulations go into
effect). The EPA's response was to launch an investigation of whether or not the "pre-buy"
violated the terms of the consent decree, under which engine manufacturers could not
encourage such behavior, and expressed concern that the pre-buy would jeopardize air
quality goals." Daniel L. Whitten, EPA Probes Engine Makers Over Trucking's 'Pre-
Buying', TRANSPORT Topics, May 20, 2002, at 1, 33.
566. See ICF Consulting, supra note 551, at 17.
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condensation AECDs."
567
The EPA rejected Caterpillar's arguments for four reasons. First, while
the EPA admitted that the cost of October 2002 engines was greater than it
had previously considered, it argued that the extra cost was due to the
engine makers' prior violation of the law in not complying with the
existing standards: "these additional costs, which the United States
overlooked in its Motion to Enter, derive from Caterpillar's and the other
settling engine manufacturers' obligation to comply with the Clean Air Act
by eliminating their defeat-devices. 568  Second, the EPA rejected
Caterpillar's argument that the pull-ahead would disrupt the trucking
industry, contesting Caterpillar's forecast of future market conditions. 69 In
particular, the EPA argued that the general recovery in trucking expected
for the first quarter of 2003 would cause truck sales to rebound more
quickly than Caterpillar predicted. Third, the EPA relied on news reports
quoting several truck manufacturers that they expected to be able to
integrate the new engines into their truck lines.5 70  Finally, the EPA
contended that delaying the deadlines would prejudice the engine
manufacturers who had "invested the resources necessary to comply" with
the pull-ahead: "it would be clearly unfair to modify [the consent decree]
obligations based on speculation or to insulate one company from the
competitive effects of its business decision to not comply with the pull-
ahead." 5
71
The result was a technical dispute submitted to the court as Caterpillar
sought a delay in the October 2002 deadline under the consent decree's
dispute resolution provisions. Whether the pull-ahead would result in more
or less NOx in the coming years was dependent on differing assumptions in
the EPA and Caterpillar's economic and emissions modeling. Resolving
that dispute is not the point of our analysis. Rather what is important is that
the court was asked to resolve a complex, technical point based on a
567. Caterpillar's Statement of Position-NCP Dispute, at 2, United States v. Caterpillar,
Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. May 10, 2002).
568. United States' Statement of Position-Pull-Ahead, Dispute at 6, United States v.
Caterpillar, Inc. No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. June 18, 2002).
569. See id at 6. The EPA relied on a consulting report it commissioned by ICF
Consulting, which in turn incorporated a consulting report ICF commissioned from Rhein
Associates, a report that the EPA also cited. ICF gave the EPA a copy of the entire Rhein
report, without securing permission from Rhein to do so. The EPA then included it in its
filing, which it submitted to the other parties. One of these parties notified Rhein that the
EPA was preparing to submit the report, making it a public document. Rhein then contacted
the EPA, demanding payment for the additional copies of the report. The EPA then had to
seek to file the report under seal to prevent its further distribution. Interview with Tom
Rhein, [institutional affiliation] (August 21, 2002); Declaration of Thomas A. Rhein (June
28, 2002).
570. See United States' Statement of Position-Pull-Ahead Dispute, at 7, United States
v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 98-2544 (D.D.C. 2002).
571. Id. at 7-8.
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contentious record which the EPA could expect to win based on courts'
deference to agencies on technical issues. For example, the EPA's
response to Caterpillar generated a series of letters and affidavits from
trucking industry entities contesting the EPA's interpretation of their
reports, comments, and positions. 72  Resolving disputes over such
technical details is not an institutional strength of courts. Moreover, the
dispute highlights the importance of the EPA's model, rather than reality,
in determining the impact of regulatory changes, as the dispute centered on
the appropriate inputs to the model, not the appropriate measures of air
quality. The court's resolution of the disputes, focusing on the contractual
nature of the settlements, did not allow for review of the substance of the
engine makers' arguments, since it focused on the question of whether the
heightened legal standard for modification was met rather than the issue of
whether the policies made sense.
573
Did the EPA make the right choice in refusing to extend the deadline in
the face of the pre-buy? No definitive answer is possible because
calculating emissions in the absence of the October 2002 deadline is
ultimately speculative.574 There are reasons to suspect that the EPA made
the wrong decision and to be doubtful that the Agency's incentives would
lead it to make the correct decision.575 First, the EPA made its analysis of
the pre-buy's impact based on the MOBILE model, which did not
accurately forecast heavy-duty truck emissions. The traditional warning of
"garbage in, garbage out" thus applies. Second, the EPA had an enormous
investment in the success of the consent decrees, biasing the Agency
against altering the deadlines. Third, the EPA and its consultants did not
appear to grasp the differences between the 2002 pre-buy and other pre-
regulatory deadline pre-buys. The October 2002 engines were different
from the other new engines introduced after regulatory changes because the
572. See Declaration of Thomas A. Rhein (June 28, 2002); Letter from Peter Vroom,
Truck Renting and Leasing Association, to John Pemberton (June 27, 2002); Letter from
Peter Vroom, Truck Renting and Leasing Association, to Christine Todd Whitman, EPA
Administrator (June 27, 2002); Declaration of Glenn F. Brown, CEO of Contract Freighters,
Inc. (June 8, 2002); Affidavit of Karel Znamenacek, Executive Vice President of Crete
Carrier Corp. (June 27, 2002); Affidavit of Dwayne 0. Haug, Vice President of Weiner
Enterprises, Inc. (June 27, 2002); Declaration of Steven D. Duley, Director of Equipment
Purchasing and Disposal for Schneider National, Inc. (June 27, 2002); Affidavit of Patrick
E. Quinn, Co-Chairman of the Board and President of U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. (June
28, 2002).
573. See Case Note-Clean Air Act, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE AND LITIG. STRATEGY, Sept.
2002, at 6 (describing court ruling).
574. Unfortunately the General Accounting Office did not consider the full implications
of the pre-buy on emissions, determining only that the pre-buy delayed the purchase of
October 2002-compliant engines but not examining the question of whether the extended
life of older engines increased emissions. See GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS,
supra note 550, at 4-6 (describing GAO's approach to prebuy and conclusions).
575. Id. at 15 ("[T]he consent decrees will not achieve the full emissions reductions in
the time frames EPA anticipated.").
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type of technology being used was significantly different from previous
engine upgrades, adding EGR with its demands on cooling, oil, and
turbochargers rather than tweaking combustion and completely changing
the test protocols. Moreover, other new engines had been introduced with
greater lead time. This gave engine customers a stronger than usual
incentive to avoid the new engines. 76 Fourth, customers opted against the
new engines, with a foreign firm (Mercedes) and U.S. firms that chose to
pay NCPs rather than deliver October 2002-compliant engines before the
deadline gaining market share against those who met the pull-ahead
regulations' emissions targets,577  and trucking companies delaying
upgrading the controller software by running engines longer before
overhauls.578  Finally, other upgraded engines brought with them
improvements in fuel economy as side effects of the controller technology
necessary to meet the EPA's earlier deadlines. The October 2002 engines
brought with them worsened fuel economy as a side effect. None of the
EPA's analysis of the pre-buy seems to have acknowledged these
differences.
Looking back, the EPA's assumptions were clearly wrong. As one
independent industry analyst summarized the impact of the consent
decrees: "The emissions regulations of October 2002 have created one of
the biggest boom and bust scenarios for the diesel engine
manufacturer .... The pre-buy happened and devastated the diesel engine
manufacturers during the last quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of
2003." 579 Because of the pre-buy orders in mid-2002, the total number of
engines built in 2003 was 38 percent more than in 2001.580 Production in
2003 was estimated to be "well below normal production levels."
581
Compare this to how the EPA might have handled the issue through
rulemaking. To pull the MY 2004 standards ahead to October 2002, the
EPA would have had to offer the engine makers incentives because the
Clean Air Act's lead time provisions otherwise barred a pull ahead.
Similarly, it seems likely that a radical change in test protocols would have
required compliance with the lead time rules.582 An incentive structure
576. Id. at 22 ("[T]hese engines had inherent disadvantages relative to existing engines
that made them difficult to sell.").
577. Id. at 5 (stating that four of five engine manufacturers who met the deadline lost
market share to engine manufacturers either exempt or who chose to pay penalties instead of
complying).
578. Id. at 6 ("[T]ruck owners are now operating their trucks longer before overhauling
the engines and adjusting the emissions computer controls.").
579. RHEiN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 39-40.
580. See id. at 40.
581. Id.at4l.
582. See Engine Manufacturers Oppose California Arb Proposal to Pull-Ahead 2007
Requirements for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 8, 2000 (describing Engine
Manufacturers Association argument that new test procedures proposed by California were
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would have compensated engine makers for reducing emissions toward the
MY 2004 standards early, possibly by postponing the MY 2004 standards
through emissions credits.583 Such an approach would have encouraged
engine makers to adopt technologies that produced cost-justified
improvements in emissions as soon as possible. Some might have used
EGR technology, but others besides Caterpillar might have developed new
technologies. Engine customers would also have earned credits by
accepting low-NOx upgrades to their controllers in existing engines.584 If
the price was right, these upgrades could have been worth the fuel economy
penalty the upgrade caused. Such a program would have been adopted in
the light of day with full public comment. If the EPA was wasting
resources on expensive NOx reductions in the heavy-duty diesel sector
instead of buying cheaper reductions elsewhere, commentators would have
pointed this out. If the EPA was paying too much for the credits,
environmental pressure groups would have objected. An incentive
approach also would have produced benefits immediately in 1998 without
waiting until October 2002. The "pre-buy" would thus have been of
cleaner engines rather than dirtier engines.
e. Explaining the EPA 's Choices
The EPA's choice to proceed with litigation, rather than revising the FTP
to include highway conditions, issuing new rules setting either lower FTP-
standards, or doing nothing, was derived from the institutional setting we
described earlier. The inadequacies of the EPA's models meant that the
EPA had a serious rule compliance problem on its hands-one that
threatened to undermine compliance with the ozone NAAQS forcing the
EPA to either hold back on penalties to protect the economy, risk the wrath
of environmental pressure groups for being too lax, or deliver economically
crippling blows to nonattainment regions. Neither alternative would have
been attractive heading into the 2000 Presidential election campaign.
Alternative sources of NOx reduction would entail squeezing automakers
further, which would be a problem for the battleground state of Michigan,
or cutting stationary source emissions particularly in the Midwest, another
critical political region. Taking on the heavy-duty diesel engine
manufacturers must have seemed an attractive alternative, and the EPA was
barred by lead time provisions of SOP).
583. The EPA took precisely this approach in the MY 2007 standards. Control of
Emissions from New and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 40 C.F.R. § 86.007-
11 (g)(2) (2001); Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 12.
584. The General Accounting Office concluded that the EPA's attempt to mandate such
upgrades had not proven effective. GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS, supra note
550, at 24 (indicating that only about 12% of predicted number of trucks "reflashed" with
new software).
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in a major bind.
The hammer of denying certification to the next year's engines could
induce a quick settlement bringing with it headlines about a major victory
for the environment. The defendants were a small group of companies
making an industry-wide settlement possible. As a concentrated industry
with little foreign competition, the U.S. engine makers presented a
vulnerable target. The annual certification requirement meant the EPA did
not need to win its lawsuit on the merits to force a settlement. No matter
the status of the EPA's lawsuit, the EPA could deny certification to any
company not willing to settle and put the burden on the company to seek
relief in the courts for the failure to certify-a question on which the
company as plaintiff would face a difficult burden of proof and a high
standard of deference to the agency on the arcane question of what
constituted a "defeat device." By threatening the survival of U.S.
manufacturers, the EPA was virtually assured of capitulation. Moreover,
the EPA's threats were far more credible than its hollow threats against the
auto manufacturers in the 1970s. The "Big 5" diesel engine makers had no
where near the political clout of the "Big 3" auto companies and the "sex
appeal" of the defeat device story meant the EPA would start out ahead in
the public relations arena. Finally, the EPA now had institutional players
on its side: the ozone nonattainment regions, stationary NOx sources, and
the auto makers would all prefer NOx reductions to come from the heavy-
duty diesel engine makers than from them.
Because of the lead time provisions, the EPA was unable to act through
regulation-by- rulemaking to tighten diesel emissions standards before MY
2007. Moreover, the Statement of Principles (SOP) agreed to by the EPA
in 1995 would have constrained any regulation-by-negotiation outcome.
The engine manufacturers would have surely resisted changing the terms of
the SOP to permit faster tightening of regulations, and environmental
groups had not accepted the SOP from the start.
The EPA also had strong incentives to proceed by regulation-by-
litigation in addition to the disadvantages of regulation-by-rulemaking and
regulation-by-negotiation in these particular circumstances. First, the gap
between predicted and actual diesel emissions was contributing to the EPA
and the states' problems in bringing nonattainment regions into compliance
with the NAAQS.585 For example, inspection and maintenance programs
586were causing popular unrest with clean air regulations in several states.
585. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Makers of Diesel Truck Engines Are Under Pollution
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at A16 ("Even if [using controllers to defeat emissions
standards] is not intentional, the fact that trucks routinely exceed the pollution standards is a
major problem as states try to comply with Federal demands that they clean up their air,
pollution experts said.").
586. See, e.g., J. Russell Capps, Editorial, Making Ineffective Emissions Tests Even More
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Second, the EPA and the Clinton Administration could reap immediate
political rewards by appearing "tough on polluters" during the runup to the
2000 presidential election.587 Third, the EPA faced relatively low risks of
losing the litigation because the enormous leverage it had over the engine
manufacturers made a settlement all but assured.
The discovery of the difference between actual diesel emissions and the
model's predictions had serious consequences and may have contributed to
the EPA's decision to pursue regulation-by-litigation. As one report on the
issue's implications for California put it, "[b]lowing the [compliance]
timetables not only prolongs the day when citizens can breath [sic] healthy
air but also carries economic penalties ranging from tougher regional
pollution control measures to the withholding of millions of dollars of
federal highway construction money.,
588
Regardless of the merits of the EPA's case, which was vigorously
contested by the engine manufacturers, 589 the EPA and the Clinton
Costly, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), June 18, 2001, at A 10; Daniel L. Stout, Editorial, No
Love Lost over Auto Inspections, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 9, 2001, at 30A; Jason Tyson,
Tougher Emissions Tests Drawing Fire Before Their Time, MORNING STAR (Wilmington,
N.C.), Jan. 5, 2002, at 7B; Editorial, Worthless Inspections, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 2, 2001,
at AA-1; Plain Speaking, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 11, 2001, at A2; John Griffith &
Dave Davis, E-check Tests Blowing Smoke, Critics Say, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept.
10, 2001, at Al; Randolph E. Schmid, Panel: Emissions Efforts Misdirected, AP ONLINE,
July 18, 2001, available at http://www.ap.org (last visited May 14, 2004).
587. Environmental groups had been pressuring the EPA to act on the "excess" diesel
emissions. Jim Mele, The Drive for Cleaner Air, FLEET OWNER, Nov. 1998, at 43. See Jim
Mele, EPA, Diesel Makers in Emissions Negotiations, FLEET OWNER, Mar. 1998, at 10
(noting environmental groups were pressuring the EPA and the Clinton Administration to
act). The Clinton Administration also looked at the benefits of carrots: the timing of a
"major new public-private partnership" with a federal contribution of more than $130
million to build cleaner trucks was debated over whether to "save it" for the Al Gore 2000
campaign. George C. Wilson, Clinton: Build Trucks that Save Bucks, 45 NAT'L J. 3268,
3268-69 (1999). News reports on the diesel settlements noted the change in the
Administration's approach. See, e.g., Harry Stoffer, EPA Says Mack Engines Pass Test but
Pollute; Truckmaker Sues, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 22, 1998, at 18 ("Even some EPA
officials were privately surprised at the more confrontational stance following years of effort
by the Clinton Administration to work cooperatively with businesses.").
588. Bowman, EPA Off, supra note 36, at Al.
589. There was (and remains) an important legal issue of whether the Clean Air Act
grants the EPA authority to regulate emissions off the test cycle. In a letter commenting on
the EPA's proposed post-1990 Amendments changes to the test procedure, the Specialty
Equipment Market Association argued that:
The proposal would essentially mandate emission control under all possible driving
conditions. This requirement, in whatever form it would take, could have the
potential to essentially extend emission control compliance liability to all operating
conditions. There is no statutory mandate or authority for such action. Moreover,
under Section 206(h), Congress required that test procedures focus on
representative driving behavior. This limitation indicates the desire of Congress to
avoid regulation that would cover infrequent or unusual behavior.
By extending emission control compliance liability to all operating conditions,
EPA is effectively changing the numerical standards under CAA Section
202(a)(3)(B)(ii), (g), (h) and (i), by requiring numerical standards in vehicle
operational modes where previously the emission standard was unlimited.
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Administration reaped a publicity windfall from the settlement. Attorney
General Janet Reno, for example, was quoted as saying "[e]very polluter in
America had better take note of these record penalties-if you pollute
America's air, you are going to pay a very high price."
590
The EPA had enormous leverage over the engine companies because of
the requirement for annual certification of engines.59' Mack's vice
president of engineering and product planning, for example, told a reporter
that the EPA "held a gun to our head by threatening to withhold
certification for 1999.,,592 Other companies echoed the concern citing the
need to litigate with the EPA annually over certification until the issue was
resolved.593 The negotiations took place after the EPA had issued
"conditional" certificates of conformity for MY 1998 engines that
exempted engines that employed defeat devices. 594 This occurred while the
engine manufacturers were seeking certificates for MY 1999 engines and a
related "show cause" order from the EPA to the engine manufacturers was
pending.595 Because the EPA could have denied certificates for the MY
1999 engines for any manufacturer who refused to settle, there was
enormous pressure to settle. Keep in mind that although all the engine
manufacturers jointly could have resisted the EPA, for the EPA could not
Letter from John Russell Deane III, General Counsel, Specialty Equipment Market
Association, to the EPA 10-11 (July 19, 1995) (copy on file with the authors).
590. Jeff Johnson, EPA Fines Engine Makers, TRANSPORT ToPics, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1.
Also quoted in Dori Meinert, Caterpillar Shares Record Civil Penalty, PEORIA J. STAR, Oct.
23, 1998, at Al; Harry Stoffer, Diesel Makers to Pay $1 Billion, AUTOMOTIvE NEWS, Oct.
26, 1998, at 53. EPA Administrator Carole Browner was also quoted along similar lines.
Marla Cone & Art Pine, $1-Billion Diesel Settlement OKd, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at
A3; Diesel Polluters Settle for $1.6b, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 24, 1998, at 118; Steven A.
Herman, Clean Air Act Settlement with Diesel Engine Makers is Historic in Size, Scope, and
Environmental Impact, NAT'L ENV'T ENFORCEMENT J., Nov. 1998, at 18; Joby Warrick &
Michael Grunwald, Diesel Makers Settle Case, Agree to Cut Air Pollution, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at Al. Browner was also quoted differently on the case in other
articles. See Seven Truck Engine Makers Slapped with $1 Billion Fine, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 1998, at 4; H. Josef Hebert, Diesel-engine Builders Fined for
Rigging Tests, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at A14; Stoffer, supra, at 53.
591. See ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 5 ("[T]hrough the denial of a
conformity certification, EPA has the power to shut down production of an engine, resulting
in serious economic ramifications for heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers.").
592. Galligan, supra note 443, at 2 (internal quotes omitted). The settlement prompted
several lawsuits against the engine manufacturers under a variety of legal theories, including
RICO; most of the suits were quickly dismissed. See Jeff Johnson, Operators File Lawsuits
Against Engine Makers, TRANSPORT Topics, Oct. 11, 1999, at 1 (describing four lawsuits);
Charles Cox, Truckers to Sue Engine Makers, OVERDRIvE, Apr. 1999, at 25.
593. See Galligan, supra note 443, at 2 (quoting a Volvo executive).
594. See, e.g., 1998 Model Year Certificate of Conformity with the Clean Air Act, Issued
to: Caterpillar, Inc., Certificate Number CPX-MHDD-98-03 (Nov. 20, 1997) (copy on file
with authors) (including a condition that "[a]ny engine which employs a defeat device is not
covered by this certificate of conformity" and requiring Caterpillar to show cause within 90
days that "the strategy for fuel injection timing, including but not limited to the Conditional
Timing Algorithm, light load timing algorithm and Acceleration Algorithm, is not a defeat
device").
595. See ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL, supra note 36, at 16.
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have borne the political costs of shutting down the new truck market
entirely, each manufacturer had to be concerned that one or more of the
others would "defect" from such a strategy and settle with the EPA. Any
company that held out while others were cooperating faced ruinous loss of
market share while it litigated the issue. The EPA thus created a classic
prisoner's dilemma: Each company would have been better off if no
company cooperated with the EPA, but each was individually better off
cooperating regardless of what the others did. The dominant strategy was
thus to cooperate.596 This leverage minimized the political risk that the
EPA might lose the litigation because it increased the probability of
settlement. Indeed, industry analysts have praised tightening emissions
controls as good news for market leaders, citing a number of
manufacturers' exits from engine markets. 97  Later, however, the
cooperation has broken apart.
The settlement short circuited the public participation that would have
been possible in a rulemaking proceeding. 598 Truck manufacturers, for
example, expressed concern that the settlement provided inadequate lead
time for designing new trucks to accommodate the redesign of the engines
that would be necessary as soon as they learned of the settlements. 599 But
596. If a manufacturer cooperated and the other companies did not, the manufacturer
would receive increased market share, an outcome preferable to the joint noncooperation
outcome. If others cooperated, a manufacturer who cooperated would maintain its market
share, an outcome superior to the losses that would result from being the only
noncooperator. The situation was different than it had been in the 1970s when the Big 3
automakers could successfully "play chicken" with the EPA, relying on the lack of
credibility behind any EPA threat to shut down any of the companies. See WHITE, supra
note 43, at 74-75 ("It is virtually unthinkable that one of the three large manufacturers would
be closed down for failure to comply with emissions standards."). The EPA's threat against
the engine makers was more credible because it had an intermediate threat of using fines
that would raise engine costs for noncomplying companies and because there were more
options for engine consumers. Id.
597. See Melinda Amberg-Vajdic, Cummins: EPA Emissions Regulations Pose
Challenge and Opportunity, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1993, at 10A (quoting a
Prudential Securities Research analyst that "Cummins' technological prowess is likely to
serve the company well in meeting future demands on the regulatory front"). Cummins
claimed that a quarter of its R&D budget went to meeting future regulatory requirements.
Id.
598. GAO, EPA COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS, supra note 550, at 13 (MY 2007
standards, "unlike the consent decrees established as the result of an enforcement action,
were developed through a public rulemaking process that gave stakeholders from across the
industry sectors the opportunity to provide input to [the] EPA for consideration").
599. See Johnson, supra note 436, at 1:
Another concern is that the new engines, which will likely need a bigger radiator,
will require the front ends of trucks to be changed in order to fit. "What we're
hearing is that some of the time frames of the settlement are very aggressive and
the manufacturers of the trucks feel that they can't possibly do what the engine
makers have agreed to with the EPA in those time frames," said [an American
Trucking Association representative].
Id See also Tom Berg, EGR is the Next Thing to Worry About, TRANSPORT TopicS, Dec.
18, 2000, at 1 ("Long lead times to order bracketry and other items to accommodate EGR
means that 'time is just about run out,' complained Jim Hebe, president of Freightliner
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because the EPA implemented its response through regulation-by-
litigation, the truck manufacturers had no ability to participate in the
regulatory process. There was no notice of the settlement proposals
analogous to a notice of proposed rulemaking that let the public know what
the EPA intended to seek. If the EPA had issued such a proposed rule, the
truck manufacturers could have brought their concerns into the process
before the deals were made with the engine manufacturers. Although the
Truck Manufacturers Association sought to intervene in the litigation to
make its views opposing the terms known,6 °0 its request to do so was
denied. Environmental groups were also shut out of the process, and they
objected to the terms of the settlement as insufficiently stringent. 60 1  In
particular, they argued that the EPA should require immediate recall and
retrofitting of the trucks with the objectionable controllers rather than
allowing them to be changed only during a regular rebuild.
8. Regulation-by-Rulemaking Since the Consent Decree
The EPA continues to view heavy-duty diesel engines standards as in
need of additional tightening, finalizing a rule in 2001 requiring a
significant reduction for MY 2007.602 These standards incorporate
elements based on the settlements from the litigation with the engine
LLC .... ).
600. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Top E.P.A. Official Not Backing Down on Air Standards,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, at 1 ("The American Trucking Association wrote President
Clinton to protest the deal, saying it would require significant changes in new engines and
trucks in overly short and unreasonable time periods.").
601. See Dori Meinert, Caterpillar Shares Record Civil Penalty, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR,
Oct. 22, 1998, at Al ("Environmental groups weren't pleased with the settlement and
threatened to challenge it in court, demanding the government immediately recall the
engines instead of allowing the companies to fix the engines when they're brought in by
truck owners over three years for overhauls.").
602. See, e.g., Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 8 ("EPA has announced a
strategy to significantly reduce emissions from on-highway heavy-duty vehicles and is well
along in putting it in place."). On-road heavy diesel NOx limits are to fall by 95% for MY
2007 from the already more stringent MY 2004 regulations and particulate standards to fall
another 90%. Timothy V. Johnson, Diesel Emission Control-Last 12 Months in Review,
DIESEL AFTERTREATMENT, 2000, at 33 [hereinafter Johnson, 12 Months].
Even with more stringent heavy-duty highway engine standards set to take effect in
2004, these engines will continue to emit large amounts of nitrogen oxides and
particulate matter, both of which contribute to serious public health problems in the
United States. These problems include premature mortality, aggravation of
respiratory and cardiovascular disease, aggravation of existing asthma, acute
respiratory symptoms, chronic bronchitis, and decreased lung function. Numerous
studies also link diesel exhaust to increased incidence of lung cancer. We believe
that diesel exhaust is likely to be carcinogenic to humans by inhalation and that this
cancer hazard exists for occupational and environmental levels of exposure. We
are establishing a comprehensive national control program that will regulate the
heavy-duty vehicle and its fuel as a single system.
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5002
(Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 69, 80, 86).
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603manufacturers. Japanese and European regulators are also significantly
tightening heavy-duty diesel emissions standards. 604  The standards
proposed for MY 2007 in the United States are significantly tougher than
those proposed for Europe and Japan. 60 5  The new standards shift the
emphasis to NO, and particulate control, requiring the development of new
technologies.60 6
The MY 2007 standards reflect a significant cost increase relative to
earlier standards. One study concluded that compared to the EU2
regulations in effect after 1998, the MY 2007 U.S. regulations were 32-37
percent worse for heavy-duty trucks, depending on the technology used,
and were more costly on at least 10 of 14 design criteria and better on only
one. 607  The ever-increasing stringency of the U.S. standards will again
require major engine redesign608 for those using EGR technology to meet
the October 2002 standards.
The EPA's 2000 rule adopting new standards for MY 2004 and MY
2007 also provided that the EPA receive the documentation necessary to
read and interpret engine on-board computers that relate to emissions
systems 609 and that engines include onboard diagnostic equipment that
allowed operators to know if emissions systems malfunctioned. 6 0
The MY 2004 and MY 2007 regulations adopted in 2000 adopted test
procedures "to more closely represent the range of real world driving
conditions of heavy-duty diesel engines, ' 611 including "Not-to-Exceed" test
procedures for testing engines in use, applicable over a wide range of
ambient conditions, that limit emissions to 1.25 to 1.5 times the test
standard.612
603. See Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 9.
604. See Johnson, 12 Months, supra note 602, at 33; Desantes et al., supra note 183, at
51 (stating that further reductions of 30% NO, and 80% in particulates were to be required
compared to 2000 levels).
605. See id. at 34.
606. See id. at 43; Johnson, Review, supra note 106, at 23 (noting that diesel particulates
"are emerging as the heart of concern to health experts and regulators").
607. See Moser et al., Impact, supra note 182, at 61-62, Tables 2-3.
608. See id. at 59 ("The emission legislation has an effect on base engine design not only
because of the packaging of the EGR system, but also because of the required higher peak
firing pressure potential and the increased heat load on combustion chamber walls, EGR
cooler and charge air cooler."). The designs of the following engine components are
affected: cranktrain, piston, bearings, cylinder head/block structure, head gasket, and
cooling system. Id.
609. See Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 9; Control of Emissions from New
and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.004-21(n) (2001) (including
hardware, passwords, and other documentation).
610. See Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 9; Control of Emissions from New
and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 40 C.F.R. § 86.005-17(a) (2001) (discussing
heavy-duty vehicles under 14,000 GVWR).
611. Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 9.
612. See Control of Emissions from New and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 40
C.F.R. §§ 86.007-1 l(a)(3)(ii), (a)(4) (2001).
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A final innovation in the MY 2007 regulations was to offer engine
manufacturers "clean engine credits" for selling cleaner engines before the
regulatory deadlines. For every "clean" engine sold in advance, a
manufacturer could sell fewer "clean" engines in MY 2007 and later.613 To
induce early selling, the EPA offered enhanced credits (1.5 to 2) per early
sale.6t 4
The regulations are forcing increased vertical integration, with truck
makers offering fewer choices of engines with their trucks.615 They are the
major driving force in engine development today. An Overdrive cover
story summed up their impact: "The near future of heavy-truck engines can
be summed up in two numbers, 2002 and 2007-the years the EPA has
chosen to further tighten the regulatory clamps on exhaust emissions."
616
Both the 2004 and 2007 standards will require substantial increases in
control systems complexity, both in controlling combustion and adding
617
after-treatment devices. Emissions regulations will also divert research
efforts from fuel economy to emissions control, reducing the future gains
from enhanced fuel economy. 618 Some observers predict a pre-buy before
the MY 2007 engines go on sale similar to that which occurred before the
October 2002 engines entered the market because of the uncertainties in the
new technologies needed, the greater costs, 619 and the expected fuel
economy penalties despite the longer lead time for testing the new
620
engines.
Despite the increasing stringency of the regulations, the EPA continues
to regulate only a few of the significant diesel pollutants. For example,
613. See Control of Emissions from New and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 40
C.F.R. § 86.007-1 1(g)(2); Walsh, Global Trends, supra note 166, at 12.
614. See id.
615. See Linda Longton, Expect Fewer Component Choices, Truck Makers Say,
OVERDRIVE, Apr. 2002, at 14 ("The cost of producing trucks with engines that meet the
Environmental Protection Agency's tough emissions goals is forcing truck makers to partner
with fewer suppliers, the leaders of four truck makers said during a panel discussion .. ");
Linda Longton & Avery Vise, New Freightliner Chief: Used Truck Surplus, Emissions
Regulations Pose Challenges, OVERDRIVE, Jan. 2002, at 13 (stating that the EPA regulations
will speed vertical integration by quoting Freightliner CEO Rainer Schmueckle that "[iut's
an enormous expense to carry a model range through three major engine overhauls over the
next five years"). See also RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 10 (predicting increased
consolidation and captive engine companies as a result of emissions regulations).
616. Paul Hartley, When Will My Diesel Engine Become a Dinosaur?, OVERDRIVE, Jan.
2000, at 64.
617. See Peter Schihl, Control Strategies for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine Emissions, IEEE
INSTRUMENTATION & MEASUREMENT MAGAZINE, June 2001, at 11, 15 (explaining that
complexity will increase due to "active devices, injection timing and duration, and VGT
blade position").
618. See Duleep, supra note 30, at 187 (forecasting that improvements in fuel efficiency
could decrease by half from 2002 to 2015).
619. See RHEIN, 7TH EDITION, supra note 185, at 22 (predicting cost increases of $5,000
to $10,000).
620. See id. at 214 (noting that engines were available for testing in mid-2003 but that
some suppliers still anticipated a pre-buy).
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diesels emit aldehydes and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, which are
both mutagens, and which are an important part of the "negative image" of
diesel engines.621 The EPA does not directly regulate engines with respect
to either,622 although some control technologies for regulated pollutants
reduce emissions of these as well.623
As engine manufacturers began to prepare for the MY 2007 standard,
several began to focus on selective catalyst reduction (SCR) systems, in
which an additive, urea, is injected into the fuel mixing chamber. The
addition renders the exhaust easier to scrub NO, from but requires
operators to maintain their trucks' urea supplies. The EPA has been quietly
lobbying and privately urging manufacturers not to use SCR systems out of
concern that truckers will not purchase the urea and that the emissions
reductions will not be possible to obtain.624 Instead, the EPA is promoting
a competing technology that does not require additional inputs.62 5
CONCLUSION
In his discussion of regulation-by-litigation, Richard Epstein described
two responses that might be taken by a constitutional government to
address harms imposed by some members of the community on others
against their will.626  The first response he described called for a
determination of the number being harmed and, implicitly, the cost of their
organizing common law suits against the parties that had invaded their
property rights, assuming, of course, a common law framework exists. 627 If
private action was feasible, then there would be no further role for the state.
Epstein implies that government has a responsibility to assist in defining
and enforcing property rights. The provision of a system of justice for
settling property rights disputes provides adequate protection of the public
621. See Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 11; see also DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE
BOOK, supra note 64, at 473 ("Other emissions, such as formaldehyde for example, can be
an important component of diesel exhaust but are not currently regulated in many
countries."); IPCS, CRITERIA 171, supra note 57, at 91 ("Diesel engine exhaust emissions
contain hundreds of chemical compounds .... ").
622. Thus far the EPA has largely addressed hazardous air pollutants through fuel
regulations rather than through regulation of vehicles. See Control of Emissions of
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,230 (Mar. 29, 2001) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80 & 86); see also Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40
C.F.R. §§ 80.40-80.83 (2001) (including reformulated gasoline & diesel regulations).
623. See Zelenka et al., Clean, supra note 92, at 10-11 (discussing use of an oxidation
catalyst to reduce NO, and these pollutants).
624. See Jeff Johnson, EPA Working Against Engine Technology, 16 LIGHT & MEDIUM
TRUCK, Feb. 2003, at 12.
625. See id.
626. See Richard Epstein's comments, in MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH,
REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LITIGATION,
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 61,61-62 (1999) [hereinafter NEW WAVE].
627. See id. at 61.
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interest. Epstein goes on in his comment to consider briefly those
situations where many unwilling individuals are harmed, situations where
the collective harm is large but the individual harm is too small to justify
taking private action.628 In these cases, he suggests, government can act for
the citizens, following a tradition that relates to a "distinction between
general and special damages as early as 1535. "629
Epstein moves from antiquity to the present, explaining that our modem
interpretation of government calls for government to act; if, after proper
deliberations among appropriately elected officials, government fails to act,
then government has failed.63 ° Under this theory, any failure to intervene
in the name of public health, no matter the cost, is a failure to serve the
public interest. Given that government has failed, special interest groups
that claim to be serving the public interest move to the courts. As Epstein
puts it, "so-called public health positions are always going to get at least
two bites at the apple. They, in effect, have to win only one war; industries
in defensive positions are going to have to fight their battles over and over
again., 631 Epstein's discussion focused on suits undertaken by attorneys
general in suits against hand-gun and cigarette producers; the discussion
was not about the use of regulation-by- litigation by federal agencies in
their pursuit of firms or industries already regulated. But while this was
not the focus of Epstein's comments, it is still possible to glean something
from them for the case at hand. In doing so, we return to Epstein's point
about constitutional government and the democratic process and apply to
the diesel engine case.
It seems clear enough that the harms imposed on individuals by diesel
engine emissions coming from trucks and other equipment are so small that
no one person or small group could justify organizing a suit against the
emission producers.632 Indeed, we will not attempt to reach a judgment as
to whether or not the collective harms would justify action, but we will
assume that to be the case. Assuming that a case for general harm can be
628. See id.
629. See id.
630. See id. at 62.
631. See id.
632. Environmental groups do bring "citizen suits" under a variety of environmental
laws seeking enforcement of permit terms against sources. The citizen suit provisions are
explicitly designed to overcome the collective action problem by providing attorneys fees
for the victorious group and eliminating the requirement to show direct harm to the
plaintiff's property or person. They thus arguably provide incentives for too much litigation.
Citizen suits do not, however, lead to substantive regulatory changes, merely to enforcement
of existing regulations. See generally Daniel J. Dunn, Environmental Citizen Suits Against
Natural Resource Companies, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 161 (2003) (discussing use of
citizen suits); Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity: A Defense of Citizen and
Taxpayer Suits, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 17 (2002) (arguing citizen and taxpayer suits should be
routinely allowed in equity and that current standing law is mistaken).
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made, then, as Epstein suggests, 633 government can act for the harmed
individuals. The passage of the Clean Air Act and its amendments is the
first result. The regulations affecting diesel engine emissions that evolved
from the Statute is the continuing result. When Congress debated the
statute, the affected industry and all other interested parties had access to
the debate. When the EPA engaged in regulation-by-rulemaking and
regulation-by-negotiation, the industry and all other interested parties had
access to the regulatory process and to the courts if the regulatory process
was seen as being improper. Everyone had the same number of bites at the
apple. In the process, some modicum of regulatory certainty was assured
for the industry and for all who favored stricter standards. The process was
transparent to the participants and to the monitors of the regulatory process
in the legislative and executive branch.
The EPA's decision to litigate did not necessarily represent a second bite
at the apple for those who support cleaner air. It was rather a fresh bite by
the regulator. The EPA, as a regulator, faced a political challenge. On the
one hand, the northeastern states faced the cost of nonattainment status
demanded action and the administration wished to be recognized as being
tough on polluters in the run-up to the 2000 elections. The EPA also had to
recognize that its own past estimates of improvements in air quality were
faulty and played a role in creating the crisis. If the EPA recognized that
the problem stemmed from its faulty predictions and modeling and granted
relief to the upwind states, it would anger northeastern voters whose states
would then require increased stationary source restrictions and look soft on
pollution nationally. If it attempted to reduce restrictions on both the
northeastern states and the upwind states, it would anger "environmental"
voters. If it required tighter stationary source controls in upwind states,
there would be important political costs to pay there. Mobile source
regulation offered a way out of this dilemma. On the other hand, the EPA
was constrained by the regulatory process from taking swift action through
issuing new standards there by the lead time restrictions and the impact of
fleet turnover.
By employing regulation-by-litigation, the EPA took a bite from the
apple it had been forbidden to eat. Circumventing the lead time
restrictions, the EPA was able to do what Congress had said it could not
and tighten mobile source emissions standards sooner than it could through
regulation-by-rulemaking. Environmentalists would be happy with the
"tough" action and northeastern states would get relief as the model
predicted lower emissions from the stricter emissions standards, while
upwind states would not be required to reduce their emissions. The
633. See NEW WAVE, supra note 626, at 61.
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solution was "win-win" for everyone but the consumers of heavy-duty
diesel engines and firms that made or used the engines. In other words, the
benefits were concentrated on environmental pressure groups and state
regulators, while the costs were spread among essentially all consumers,
since transportation services affect most products. Moreover, by
employing litigation, the agency insulated its regulatory action from
changes in the political control of the executive branch. A new
administration might consider rolling back a regulation but it would be
unlikely to return to court to seek to reduce the burdens of a "voluntary"
settlement agreed to by sources alleged to have committed significant
wrongdoing.
The cost of this episode cannot be reckoned in terms of the magnitude of
the settlement, which was a transfer from the owners of the diesel engine
producers to federal taxpayers. Nor can it be reckoned just in terms of its
effects on the cost of diesel engines and related effects on transportation
and other activities powered by large diesel engines. These are clearly
costs to consider, and to be minimized if possible. The more serious cost
of the diesel regulation-by- litigation relates to the integrity of the
regulatory process itself and the effect of regulation-by- litigation on the
behavior of participants in future regulatory episodes.
The EPA's recent and extensive employment of regulation by litigation
has set a new precedent in the already controversial annals of federal
regulation. It remains to be seen if regulation-by-litigation will become a
dominant form of regulation or if the EPA's expansive and recent use of
the process will spark a reform process that leads to the end of regulation-
by- litigation. We have no reason to predict that regulation-by-litigation
will end any time soon. Indeed, the public choice logic we have employed
to explain this episode suggests that when the conditions that triggered this
episode arise again, then regulation-by-litigation will just as surely emerge
again, unless this form of regulation is precluded by congressional action.
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TABLE 1: DIESEL EMISSIONS STANDARDS
Smoke Standard
MY 1970- 20% opacity (acceleration)
1973 40% opacity (lugging)
MY 1974- 20% opacity (acceleration)
current
(MY 2007) 15% opacity (lugging)
50% opacity (peak)
Gaseous emissions (grams/brake-horsepower-hour'
Model Year HC+NOX CO HC NO,, PM
1974 16 40
1979-either 5 25
or 10 25 1.5 max.
1984
Steady state -- 15.5 0.5 9.0
OR -- 15.5 1.3 10.7
Transient
1985 15.5 1.3 10.7
1988 15.5 1.3 10.7 0.60
1990 15.5 1.3 6.0 0.60
1991 15.5 1.3 5.0 0.25/
0.10
1993 15.5 1.3 5.0 0.25/
0.10
1994 15.5 1.3 5.0 0.01/
0.07
1998 15.5 1.3 5.0 0.01/
0.07
2004 either 2.4 15.5 -- -- 0.01/
or 2.5 15.5 0.5 max 0.07
2007 15.5 0.14 0.20 0.01
[56:2
